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CHAPTER 1.-Fl:NDINGS AND CoNCLUSIONS

This examination of the question of financing the .electric utility industry in
the remainder of the 1970's reveals important areas of general agreement, as
well as areas where reasonable and informed men and women may differ. The
details of the study are contained in t~ chapters that follow. This summary
chapter first presents those widespread areas of agreement. Subsequently, the
key policy alternatives are compared and specific recommendations offered.
AREAS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT

It is apparent to anyone who has ever studied the electric utility industry
that this is a key sector of the economy and that it has tremendous need for capital equipment. In fact, it is the single most capital-intensive industry in the
American economy. Although individual analysts differ in the precise numbers
that they develop, all agree that the planned capital expansion of the investorowned electric utilities is a very ambitious undertaking. In this study, those
capital needs are estimated at $140 billion for 1974-80.
mstorically, the utilities have had relatively little difficulty in raising the
large amounts of cwpital that they required. The very stable nature of their
earnings and the large proportions that they-regularly paid out made their stocks
and bonds attractive to investors, especially to retired persons and others interested in the safety of their investments. Events in the last few years have seriously undermined this situation. Very substantial increases in costs-for fuel
(basic "raw material" of electric utilities), for interest, and for the construction
of new powerplants-have, at least for the time being, ended the steady growth
of utility earnings. Many utilities have experienced substantial declines in
earnings and numerous traditional dividend increases have not been forthcoming.
Compounded by a general deterioration of the securities markets and the weakness of many of the firms in the securities industry, the results have been
profound for utilities. Their historically low level of retained earnings has not permitted them to finance major capital programs from internal sources. Some electric utilities must have not been able to raise sufficient capital. Others have
developed new methods of raising needed capital, which often ha:ve turned out
to be more expensive than the traditional means. Many others reluctantly have
postponed, cut back, or canceled capital projects (see Figure 1). One utility executive has estimated that, as a result of these cutbacks, the reserve margins between demand and generating capacity may get dangerously low later in this
decade. John M. McGurn, chairman of the Virginia Electric Power Company,
has estimated that generating reserves in the late 1970's will be "in the range
af 13 percent---'below the desired -level of 15 to 18 percent even if growth is lesR
than 8 percent per year." 1
The recent financing difficulties of electric utilities have become so obvious that
the newspaper coverage has frequently been moved from the finanical section
to the front page. It is fair to say that the widespread differences of opinion
that exist relate not to whether the industry has serious financial problems but
to alternative means of dealing with those pro·blems.
The investment requirements of the electric utility industry for the remainder
of this decade are very heavy--on the order of $20 billion a year. It is not a foregone conclusion that they can be achieved. Yet. the forecasts of capital needs
presented here are attainable. That will require a combination of public and private actions, ranging from rate increases to improved regulatory practices to
managerial innovations to achieve a more economical and efficient use of
electricity.
Although there is great variation in the specifics of the different proposal!!! to
deal with these financing problems, several comi;Don themes run through most
of them. First of all, it is generally agreed th!lt it will not be feasible to meet
1

Gene Smith. "Cuts in Expansion Spread at Capital-Short Uttltties," The New York
.

Times, July 29, 1974, p. 33.
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th" financial requirements of electric utilities with present rate levels; the differences of opinion, and they are substantial, occur over how much of the problem can or should be handled through general rate increases.
There is also considerable, but far from universal, agreement that both regulatory efficiency and private productivity should be increased. Furthermore, it is
generally recognized that success in dealing with the national (and in many
respects worldwide) problem of inflation will substantially alleviate the utility
industry's financial pressures.
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PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CREDIT GUARANTEES

One approach which has received considerable attention is the proposal for
federal guarantees of electric utility bonds. This proposal has been advanced in
most detail by William Rosenberg, chairman of the Michigan Public Service
Commission. A draft bill has been prepared by Lee White, a former chairman
of the Federal Power Commission.
There is a certain surface attractiveness to the Rosenberg plan. Government
guarantees should enable utilities to issue bonds at lower interest costs. They

should also permit the issue of a larger proportion of such low-cost bonds and a
smaller proportion of stock (dividends are higher cost to the utilities because
they are not tax deductible, as are interest payments). Thus, the Rosenberg plan,
by reducing a major element of utility costs, should permit some significant
slowdown in the recent pattern of rapid utility rate increases. The result should
be appealing to speculators, customers, and the companies themselves.
The traditional role of the economist has been to serve as the 'vet blanket,
dampening the enthusiasm of many proponents of simple solutions. Unfortunately, the present is a striking case in point. A detailed examination of the
Rosenberg plan and the accompanying White bill, as is done in the body of this
report, reveals fundamental shortcomings.
Boiled down to its basics, government guarantees of utility bonds really involve
putting "the monkey" on someone else's back. They do not increase the amount
of investment funds available to the economy. Rather, to the extent they succeed,
they merely take capital funds away from other sectors of the economy and lead
to similar requests for aid by those sectors. These government guarantees also
tend to raise the level of interest rates in the economy, including the rates on
Treasury debt which is a cost borne by the taxpayer. That added cost alone is
estimated at $145 million a year.
To the extent that the utilities would be paying less Federal tax than otherwise, the result would be either a greater burden on other taxpayers or a higher
budget deficit, which would exacerbate the already severe inflationary pressures.
Moreover, there are severe legal obstacles to the implementation of the Rosenberg Plan. Many utilities cannot issue substantial amounts of additional bonds
without violating the provisions of their agreements with existing bondholders.
A Congressional statute abrogating those agreements would be of doubtful constitutionality. Even if such statute survived a constitutional challenge, many
large investors (trusts, mutual savings banks, etc.) would be prohibited from
purchasing many of these bonds because of restrictions in existing state laws.
Moreover, the savings in interest costs that are estimated for the plan are
substantially overstated. Despite the claims of the proponent, vrivate bonds with
a federal guarantee do not sell at the same low interest rate as do Treasury
~onds themselves. We can conjecture over the reasons, but that is the fact of the
matter.
To the extent that the government guarantees would result in lower unit costs
of capital to the electric utilities, it would unwittingly provide an incentive for
more capital-intensive operations. The result would be to further increase the
total capital needs of the industry, and thus the size of the base on which rates
are based.
F'inally, the federal guarantee plan would shift a substantial portion of private
and state-local decision-making to the federal government. That is not mere conjecture on the part of an industry that is traditionally nervous over the growing
federal role in power generation and distribution. Rather, it is the obvious conclusion that emerges from merely reading the provisions of the proposed White
bill. That draft bill would give the Federal Power Commission authority over
ma-ny aspects of the electric utility industry which traditionally have been
reserved for the state utility commissions or the private managements of the
companies. It would be a major step toward federal control of the electric utility
industry.
THE BENEFITS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY

Another family of proposals to solve the financial problems of the electric
utilities relate to the possibility of introducing new technology. Until recently,
it has been technological improvements that have generated the productivity to
offset rising operating costs and thus avoid rate increases.
One such proposal is the adoption of a national grid. The attractiveness of the
suggestion is apparent. Regions of the nation with surplus power could transfer
the excess to regions with temporary shortages, thus reducing the need for new
facilities to provide for "peak" requirements.
Detailed examination is disillusioning. The benefits are not likely to be very
significant because peak periods in the various regions tend to coincide. The costs
of a national grid, in contrast, would be quite substantial. On reflection, it appears
that most of the proposed advantages is already obtained from the widespread
use of a series of regional grids.
Other proposals for new technology are of a longer term nature. The National
Science Foundation and other agencies such as the Federal Energy Administra-
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tion have sponsored a series of studies designed to develop more efficient methods
of producing, distributing, and using electricity. Such efforts surely deserve
strong support. Yet, it is unlikely that the results, if successful, will be operational in time to significantly reduce the financial requirements of electric
utilities in the critical1974-78 time period. The lead-time involved in developing
new technology and incorporating it into operational electric generating and
distributional facilities is simply too long for solving the current financial problems of the industry. Hopefully, technological advances will help to prevent a
subsequent period of financial distress.
CHANGES IN UTU..ITY RATES AND REGULATIONS

Although experts differ as to the precise effects, it is likely that the recent
increases in the price of electricity have dampened down the usage to some
extent. This effect has been reenforced by the Federal Government's formal
energy conservation efforts.
Thus, in the first quarter of 1974, federal agencies used 7,350,000 megawatt
hours of electricity, down about 1,213,000 megawatt hours from anticipated consumption, according to the Federal Energy Administration. In the four-month
period October 1973-January 1974, the industrial sector of the economy achieved
an approximately 5 percent reduction of energy use per unit of output.
The methods used to achieve these reductions in use of electricity ranged
from more efficient use of NASA wind tunnels to eliminating continuous operation of demonstrator appliances by retail stores. We surely should not develop
new long-term estimates of energy demand on the basis of three or four months
of new experience. Yet, we need to recognize that, to some extent, tJie rapid rise
in the price of electric power may tend to result in somewhat lower requirements
for· new facilities than previously planned. Though some of the recently announced cutbacks in new projects reflect primarily the short-term difficulties
being experienced by utilities in raising capital funds, some downward revisions
in expansion programs may be a sensible long-term adjustment.
Several factors point to further changes in the structure (not necessarily in
the overall level) of electric rates which could also dampen down future capital
requirements :
(1) The rising interest in using the rate structure not to encourage additional
consumption but to slow down the demand for energy.
(2) The shift in the electric utility industry's long-term cost structure from
declining average costs to rising average costs, thus making serving additional
demand more expensive than meeting existing demand.
(3) The growing awareness of dtiferential seasonal and time-of-day charges
as a means of lowering the extremely expensive peak loads of the electric utility
industry.
Although this study has not been devoted to a detailed analysis of the technical
area of utility rate-making, it would appear that some of the traditio:qal practices
which were developed to meet earlier circumstances, no matter how well-suited
they may have been in the earlier period, may not be appropriate under current
circumstances. This should not be interpreted as a plea for the simple-minded
and erroneous approach that would charge all customers a single rate regardless of the substantial differences in the cost of serving them.
Indeed, many traditional practices-such as the need to relate rates to the
cost of providing service-are as appropriate today ·a s ever. But the specific rate
structures needed to adhere to these principles may well require some updating.
Certainly, the procedures followed by the regulatory agencies are in need of
modernization. The comparisons of regulatory decision-making in earlier chapters showed the substantial variation that exists between the most progressive
jurisdictions and the least progressive. There are numerous changes in procedures that could be instituted by state commissions that would reduce the
frequency and size of rate increases. Many of these needed changes relate
to reducing the expensive •a nd time-consuming delays that are involved in the
regulatory process.
Reduction of "Regulatory Lag"

Governmental agencies with responsibilities in this area should take affirmative steps to see that adequate and timely rate relief is provided to the nation's
electric utilities. These steps could take a variety of forms. Policy statements
could be issued recognizing that prompt and effective rate relief will be neces-

sary for many utilities in the years ahead. This action itself would have a salutory effect of investors and the financial markets in which the utilities raise their
capital funds.
Uniform state laws could be enacted authorizing the use of projections, temporary rates, "filing" statutes with limited suspension periods, and automatic
adjustment clauses and surcharges. To deal with the lag in recovering fuel
costs, the present time period in the effective application of adjustment clauses,
which is now approximately two months, could be shortened.
Considerable capital and operating costs arise simply from the increased delays
now encountered in obtaining approvals for new facilities. Repetitious hearings
and prolonged delays now add substantially to utility costs. More effective
pr:ocedures need to be adopted for granting authority to construct needed
utility facilities and thus to reduce these avoidable costs.
Changing Accounting Practices

One way of strengthening the finances of electric utilities would be to change
some accounting practices used for rate making purposes so as to allow for
a higher cash flow while leaving the consumer no worse off in the long run.
One method of increasing cash flows, and thus reducing the need for external
financing, would be to switch from "flow through" of tax incentives to "normalization" in the states which have not yet done so.
Even more significant would be the inclusion of construction work in progress
in the rate base. If this had been done, it would have reduced utilities' need for
external financing by approximately $1 billion in 1972/ol
Reduction of Discriminatory Taa:es

Governments at all levels tend to tax public utilities more h~vily than other
forms of business. This procedure should be recognized for what it is-a method
whereby political decision-makers can substitute utility rate increases for property and other direct tax increases. When utility costs were declining, these
extra taxes were absorbed with minimum difficulty. But in the present environment of rapidly rising rate increases, this discriminatory form of taxation exacerbates a situation that already is extremely serious.
At the Federal level, the Congress should give prompt attention to increasing
the 4 percent investment tax credit for utilities to 7 percent, which is the level
available to companies in all other industries.
At state and local levels, legislatures and county and city councils should consider reduchig or perhaps even eliminating the multitude of special taxes on utilities. There is no justification for local officials-as some are now doing---{)pposing
requested utility rate increases and, at the same time, recommending increased
utility taxes in lieu of raising property tax rates. The fundamental inconsistency
of such an approach needs to be understood more widely, This situation is in
striking contrast to the low level of taxation borne by publicly-owned utiilties.
The needs of public policy are clear : the tax system should be used neither to
subsidize nor to penalize the electric utilities. They should pay their fair share of
taxes.
Why Worry About Electric UtiUty Stock1wlderst

Aside from any concern over fairness of treatment, there is a very hard-nosed
reason why public policy needs to be concerned with the situation facing the
stockholders of electric utilities. Because this most capital-intensive industry has
a relatively low rate of retained earnings compared to other industries, a disproportionately small part of its massive capacity expansion program can be financed
internally. This means that a disproportionately large part of the funds for new
capacity must come from investors who purchase utility stocks and bonds.
The typical utility is limited in the amount of bonds that it can issue. So-called
''indenture" agreements that accompany existing bonds usually require that operating income be twice (or more) than the interest payments that are required to
be made on the utility's bonds. With the rapid rise in both interest rates and operating expenses, a very substantial decline has been occurring in the average interest "coverage" ratio for the industry, perilously close to the minimum required
to meet the legal obligations to existing bondholders.
Thus, many utilities already are or soon will be facing the situation where they
cannot issue additional ·bonds, at least not a-t current rates of income and expense.
2 Irwin M. Stelzer, Electric Utilities' Oapital Supply: the Regulator's Challenge, a paper
presented before the Western Conference of Public Service Commissions Annual Meeting,
Las Vegas, Nevada, June 12, 1974, p. 17.
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The result, of course, is to increase the amount of capital to be raised by selling
more stock. But why should investors buy more stock in tbe utilities when they
see what is happening to existing shareholders? In many cases, the company's
common stock is selling below the book value of existing shares.
We might say that bygones should be treated as bygones. But in the case of the
electric utilities, prospective new stockholders have reason to be concerned that
a similar fate awaits them. Yet why should the average citizen and especially the
taxpayer worry? Because, as we have already seen in several highly-publicized
instances, if the utility companies are unable to :finance needed expansion on
their own, the answer is to cut back on their investments in the additional capacity to meet the electricity needs of a rising population, or the government picks
up the tab for this essential service. Moreover, if a government agency winds up
owning the powerplants, unlike a utility company, it is exempt from many taxes.
Thus, the burden on the taxpayer is increased further.
There is a role also to be played by the utilities in improving the productivity
of their operations. The great majority have shifted their advertising from those
areas that would accentuate peak demand problems to practices that would promote greater efficiency in the use of electricity. Electric utilities throughout the
nation have embarked on programs to encourage energy conservation by their
customers .This represents a fairly fundamental redirection in management thinking. The present generation of utility management grew up in a period of technological advancement which led to declining long-run average costs whereby the
more electricity was consumed the lower the average rate would be.
Tne basic situation is now far more complicated. Certain increased uses of
electricity, such as spaceheating in off-peak winter periods, can still serve to
reduce average costs. But rising use of air conditioning and similar peak-period
uses would only bring average costs higher still. More fundamentally, the needs
of national policy have changed: although a dynamic society always develops
new requirements, the current and foreseeable emphasis is on conserving our energy resources rather than developing and using them to the limit.
Growth of electricity usage surely will continue. Recent experiences of fuel oil
shortages and natural gas curtailments should lead to greater rather than lesser
dependency on electricity in the future. But the changing economics of the electric
utility industry mean that it is no longer a fundamental necessity for the individual utility to constantly seek ever-larger markets.

Rate Increases
Despite the improved outlook for regulatory and utility productivity, the general inflation in the economy as a whole makes an upward trend in utility rates
both a likely and necessary prospect. Although it may be difficult for those unfamiliar with the industry to grasp the notion quickly, the way to maintain rel·
atively low utility rates in the long-run is to grant adequate rate increases in
the short run. The basic reason is that payments to bondholders and other suppliers of capital are a very major share of total utility costs. A utility that impresses potential investors as providing a relatively assured return on their investment thus can raise new capital at lower rates than companies that are considered to be higher risks.
Many of the specific recommendations contained in this report should help to
slow down electric rate increases. But there is no reasonable approach which
would avoid the likely prospect of further increases in the cost of producing
electricity and hence in its price in the period ahead. Proposed subsidies which
would result in shifting a portion of the cost from users to taxpayers would be
worse than merely moving the bill from one pocket to another. Rather, in this
period of national concern over wise energy use, such subsidies would artificially
inflate the demand for electric power.
OTHER CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY

Many of the problems facing the electric utilities, perhaps the great bulk of
them, are not unique to the electrical industry. Hence, sensible public policy
should not be geared to thi!:l one industry but to the basic problems-inflation,
high interest rates, an inadequate supply of saving, and weakness in the securities
industry, as well as lack of public understanding of the functioning of the economic system.
Although public opinion polls now register inflation as the number one problem
on the minds of the American public, actions to deal with inflation usually fail
to gain popular support. Upon reflection, the reasons are obvious. Anti-inflation-

435
ary measures are often painful and unpleasant. I!'ighting inflation means saying
no to large and powerful groups-"no" to advocates of tax cuts, "no" to proponents of further expenditure increases, "no" to many potential borrowers, and
"no" to labor, business, and government practices \Yhich reduce productivity.
Proposals to protect the public against inflation by cutting taxes, as is suggested from time to time, must surely merit a special prize for economic irrespon·
sibility. In the long run, tax reform does have a role to play. But it is a different
one than envisioned by the advocates of larger personal exemptions or standard
deductions.
Rather, the government's :fiscal policy needs to be geared to dampening down
consumption while increasing the incentive to saYe, thus making available the
resources necessary for investment. The resultant higher levels of productive capacity will generate the output to reduce the basic inflationary forces. The federal
budget deficit should be reduced in order to curtail government borrowing and
hence increase the funds available to the private sector. The decline in government borrowing will also help to relieve the pressures in credit markets and thus
help to bring down interest rates. Simultaneously, the goven1ment must refrain
from relying on subterfuges, such as credit programs, which technically are out·
·ide of the budget but which effectively reduce the supply of investment funds
available to truly private borrowers.
It would also be helpful to reduce if not eliminate tht! numerous government
rules and regulations that restrict productivity and output and thus give an
inflationary bias to the economy. 'l'hese include subsidies to agriculture and
labor, as well as to business.
More fundamentally, an economic environment needs to be created that is more
conducive to private saving and investment. Unless this nation acts on both the
tax and expenditure fronts-to encourage private saving and reduce government
competition for investment funds--we must seriously consider the very real
possibility that the United States has entered a period in which the demand for
capital tends to outrun the supply of savings to finance it, and a high level of
interest rates is likely to be the resulting balancing factor. That would be a situation fraught with great difficulty for electric utilities and other capital-intensive
private industries.
Eugene ,V, :\'!eyer, a vice president of the investment :firm of Kidder, Peabody
and Company, contends that the crux of the utility :financing problem lies in the
fact that "The people can understand paying for the labor but they can't understand paying for the capital ... " He urges creating an atmosphere of public
acceptance wliere the average citizen appreciates the role of profit, capital, and
free enterprise. 3
In essence, the financial problems facing investor-owned electric utilities are
severe, but in total they are not unique to the private sector of the American
economy. The basic solution is to achieve greater public recognition of the need
to provide adequate capital funds to meet the growing needs of the American
society in the years ahead. Although an examination of the investment banking
business is beyond the purview of this study, the demise or decline of many
investment houses has made the situation more difficult.
THE OUTLOOK FOB THE INDUSTRY

A recent analysis in Fortune magazine presents two alternative "scenarios"
for the electric utility industry:
1. A "dev·a stating" scenario in which money remains tight, inflation remains
out of control, and demand for electricity is flat. This combination would imply
reduced profits, smaller dividends, and still lower utility stock prices.
2. A "cheerful" scenario in which fuel prices, inflation, and money rates all
fall. This combination also would presumably bring substantial gains for utility
stockholders. 4
It is unlikely that P.ither of these two extreme situations will come to pass.
The rate of inflation is likely to remain painfully high, but not beyond the control
by tough monetary and fiscal policy. Regulatory commissions are likely to respond
to the demonstrated need for higher utility earnings, but-in part as a result
of consumerist pressures- not as rapidly as the utilities or investors believe
to be justified by the facts of the circumstance.
·
3 Eugene W. 1\Ieyer. How About The Wise Use of Capitalf, an address before the 42nd
Annual Convention of the Edison Electric Institute, New York City. June 5, 1974, pp. 2, 9.
'A. F. Ehrbar, "Utility Stocks Aren't for Widows Anymore," Fortune, June 1974, p. 105.
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A Pollyanna attitude toward the very real financiai problems facing investorowned electric utilities surely is unwarranted. As pointed out by then Federal
Reserve Board member Andrew Brimmer, unless public utilities are able to overcome these financing obstacles in the next few years, "consumers are likely to
bear the real costs of such failure in the form of energy shortages, much higher
prices, and severe constraints on the improvement of consumer welfare." •
Yet, a number of authorities have looked beyond the immediate financial
squeeze being experienced by many companies and have come up with a
basically favorable long-term appraisal of the electric utility industry. For example, Ashby Bladen, senior vice president for investments at the Guardian Life
Insurance Company, recently described electric utilities as follows:
As a regulated industry providing an essential service that is still
price well below its economic value in most areas and possessing a
legally enforceable right to a reasonable profit, electric utilities must
be basically better situated to cope with instability than most other industries . . . I suspect that in the end, Consolidated Edison will tum
out to have played the role of salutary horrible example in this industry . . . e
SUMMARY

These are the policy highlights of this study of financing investor-owned electric utilities. The reader is urged to examine the body of the report for
supporting detail and necessary qualifications :
The Financial Oondition of Electric Utilities

1. The pressures facing investor-owned electric utilities attempting to finance
needed capital expansion programs in the current economic environment are real
and serious. The industry's capital needs are likely to total $140 billion in the
197~80 time period.
2. The importance of the industry and the seriousness of the situation requires
key changes in public and private policies.
Ohanges in Regulatory Policies

3. There is no escaping the need for substantial increases in electric utility
rates. These can be justified on grounds of financial need as well as economic
efficiency. None of the other proposals individually or collectively--obviate the
need for this unpleasant but necessary course of action.
4. The decision-making procedures of many state regulatory commissions need
to be modernized. There is too large a gap between the most-advanced and the
least-advanced standards and policies.
5. Rather than a matter of luck or happenstance, every utility should be allowed to use automatic fuel pass-through clauses, future test years, normalization of tax incentives, charges for late payments, and interim increases.
6. Regulatory lag should be reduced. Only 28 percent of the cases settled
during 1971-73 were completed in six months or less. One out of every four
cases took longer than one year. These delays contribute to the "revolving door"
phenomenon whereby no sooner is a utility granted one rate increase then it
applies for another.
7. Utility rate st~ctures should be revised in order more effectively to dampen
down "peak load" demand and encourage usage during off-peak periods.' These
changes should be consistent with the basic princi'Ple that charges to given
classes of customers should reflect the costs of providing service.
Ohanges in Management Practices

8. Utility managements are changing and should change their ·b asic outlook
from the historically-relevant notion of market expansion to the current need
for economy and efficiency in the use of electric power. This shift in priorities
in good measure is now feasible because of the earlier successes of the industry
in developing the uses of electricity.
9. Those electric utilities which have not already shifted their advertising away
from peak-demand uses should do so. An even greater ·emphasis should be put
on educating customers in how to use electricity more efficiently. Reduction of
11
Andrew F. Brimmer, Public Utility Pricing, Debt Financing, and Oons.u mer Welfare,
remarks presented to the Wharton School Club of Washington, May 22, 1974, p 2.
8
Ashby Bladen, "lnfiatton or Crash: Shuttling Between Horns of a DUemma," Money
Manager, July 1, 1974, p. 16.

peak usage will directly ea:se the industry's capital requirements and financing
needs.
Ohanges in Government TaaJ Treatment

10. Congress should promptly raise the 4 percent investment credit for utilities
to the 7 percent available to all other industries. This differential treatment is
not justified under present circumstances.
11. Sta•te and local gQVernments should refrain from instituting or increasing
special taxes on electric utilities. These companies should pay the same tax ra.t es
as firms in other industries. It wou~d be helpful---1llthough given the political
realities not very likely-if the existing special taxes on utilities were to be
repealed.
Ohanges in General Economic Policy

12. Changes in government legislation ·and: policy should give grea·t er weight oo
fostering an economic climate that is more conducive to private saving and investment. The basic way to provide more capital for the needs of the nation
is not to subsidize a given industry but to increase tlle size of the pool of investment funds for which all borrowers can compete.
13. The federal government itself should reduce the massive extent to which
it now competes with the private sector for the limi·t ed supply of investment
funds. During this inflationary period, the budget deficit and federal credit subsidies should be reduced if not eliminated. Proposals for federal guarantees of
utility bonds are misguided in principle and unworkable in practice.
14. Future changes in the tax system should give great weight to saving than
to consumption. It is private saving that is the basic source of financing of the
capacity to provide for future consumption.
15. Government restrictions and regulations which give an inflationary bias to
the economy-be they subsidies to labor, agriculture, or business--should be
sharply curtailed, especially those that reflect the needs of the 1930's rather than
the 1970's.
Ohanges in Public Attitudes

16. The average citizen needs to realize t'hat public policy has to be adopted to
changing circumstances. So much of current policies and attitudes reflect the depression years when vast reservoirs of capital were underutilized because of a
shortage of consumer demand. Literally, the tide has ·t urned. The Puritan ethic
was wrong for the 1930's ; it is appropriate, at least in modern dress, for the
current inflationary environment and period of inadequate savings.
17. As a nation, we have exhausted the easy or even simple answers to the economic problems of the present. In the difficult domestic and international environment that faces us, we should be suspicious of new policy solutions that
appear to be ·quick or easy or comfortable. The serious economic problems that
exist require sustained and difficult actions which likely will require sacrifice on
the part of many producers and consumers alike, and in the private sector as
well as in the public sector.
The proposals in this report ·a re designed to spread the burden ·a s equally as
possible in the belief that good national policy is the equal distribution of
dissatisfaction!
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INTRODUCTION

Utilities for a long-time had been considered by the public an important but
a very specialized part of the American economy. But now they often take the
center of the public stage. They are at the forefront of developing public policy in the areas -of environment, energy and resources, safety, land use planning, taxation, :finance, and inflation. Prior to evaluating the various policy
alternatives that have been proposed, it is necessary to examine the nature of
the problems that have arisen.
CONTENT OF THE BEPOBT

Following this brief introductory section, Chapter 8 is devoted to a detailed
examination of the present economic position and • :financial conllition of the
electric utility industry. Chapter 4 analyzes the industry's capital requirements
for the next several years, which are the pacing element in public policy.
Because of the close and often little understood connection between prices
charged and capital :financing, Chapter 5 is an explanation of the role of utility
rates. The :first four chapters thus constitute a prelude to the examination of
possible changes in public and industry policies and practices, to which the rest
of the report is devoted.
Chapter 6 analyzes in considerable detail the major proposals for change in
:financing electric utilities. These center on recommendations for fe'deral guarantees of electric utility bonds. Other possibilities for changes are covered in
Chapter 7, including bath governmental policies and industry practices. The
study's conclusions on how electric utilities can be :financed in the period ahead
are contained in Chapter I.
N ATUBE OF THE INDUSTRY

The electric power industry in the United States began in the late 1870's
as a street lighting and electric railway business, principally by electric companies. Through the years it has grown to become one of the nation's largest
group of business enterprises. Municipally-owned electric systems were established in a desire to provi'de street lights and to replace arc lighting systems during a depression period when electric companies were unable to secure funds
for expansion. The Federal Government entered the commercial power industry
only incidentally; electric power was produced as a byproduct of irrigation
development and flood control. Power not needed in the operation of the projects
was sold commercially. Preference was given in the sale of this ·s urplus power
for municipal purposes. Later the preference was changed to "public bodies
and cooperatives." In 1932, electric companies owned 93 percent of the generating capacity in the country; municipally owned electric systems owned almost 6 percent ; other government power agencies accounted for the remainder.
Beginning in 1988 the segments of the industry owned and :financed by government became more important. Numerous Federal multipurpose projects,
including power, were undertaken. The Tennessee Valley Authority and the ·
Bonneville Power Administration were formed and became major commercial
power enterprises. The Public Works Administration provided loans and grants
for the formation of new state and district power agencies and municipal electric
systems. Rural electric cooperatives were formed with :financing provided by
the Federal Government.
There are presently :five ownership segments of the electric power industryall important power producers. Four of these-Federal Government power agencies, state and district power agencies, municipal electric systems, and R.E.A.
:financed rural electric cooperatives-receive advantages not accorded the
investor-owned electric power companies. These benefits are in the areas of
regulation, financing, and taxes.
By 1971 the share of the electric power industry owned by the electric
companies had decreased to 78 percent, when measured by either sales or
generation of electricity. The Federal Government's share was close to 11 percent
(489)

440
(a decrease .frof!l its big~ of over 13 percent in 1965) ; municipals had 6 percent;
state and distnct agenCtes almost 4 percent· and cooperatives the remainder.
. Electricity service is .cu~omarily viewed as' consisting of three parts: productl~n .of :power, trans~ss10n of the energy over high-voltage lines, and local
distn~ution for short distances over low-voltage lines to :final consumers. Nearly
all private :firms are vertically integrated, providing generating transmitting
and distributing services as a single :firm or through separate ~ompanies con~
trolled by the same holding company.1
THE BOI.E OF REGULATION

It was recognized nearly two centuries ago that certain commercial services
are e~sential to the hef~:lth and welfare of the public but that competition nmong
suppliers of th~se services would result in unnecessary duplication of fadlities
and needless high costs to the public. Electricity supply is one such Sf~rvice;
ga~ and telephone services are oth~rs. The principal solutic•n to this problem,
which has been evolved over a considerable number of years is to permit franchised mo~opolies to operate under government regulation.
'
Regulation serves as a substitution for competition and strives to assure
that the economies resulting from using a single supplier are passed on to the
customers se~ed .bY. thf~:t supplier. In the United States, regulation of investorowned electnc utilities IS generally performed at the state lflVel, although with
many exceptions.
Electric utilities are regulated by state commissions in 46 states. In Nebraska
there are no private utilities. In Texas and Minnesota municipal governments
r~gulate within city boundaries. In South Dakota a Mediation Board settles
disputes among electric suppliers. The primary emphasis o1 state commissions
has been on regulation of rates. In 8 states that exercise regulation on the
sta~e level, local political subdivisions also have authority for rate regulation
subJect to appeal to the state commission. The activities of state commissions
are not confined to rates, however. Their activities extend into many phases
~f c.ompan¥ operations: ~ranting the basic franchise, approving :financing, establishing umform accountmg systems, auditing, reviewing depreciation policies
safety and adequacy of service, environmental factors, etc.
'
On the Federal level, the Securities and Exchange Commission has certain
regulatory' authority over utility holding compq.ny systems. The Federal Power
CommissiOn regulates wholesale rates of all companies operating in interstate
commerce. As a practical matter this includes about 95 percent of the companies.
Th~ F.P.C. als<? approves the is::'uance of securities for certain companies, prescribes ac<:ountmg systems, reqmres extensive and detailed reporting, and passes
upon appllcations for the development of hydroelectric projects on navigable
rivers.
One of the most important functions of regulatory commissions-perhaps the
most crucial ose-is to determine the proper level of return or profit that can be
allowed. This in turn requires that the commission validate the expenses of the
utility and arrive at conclusions concerning the "cost of capital." To these tasks
are also added the job of verifying that prices charged to different classes of
custom~I'~ are just and reasonable and based on an equitable distribution of cost
responmbllity.
·In carrying out their functions, regulatory commissions are concerned that their
current decisions do not jeopardize the capability of the regulated companies to
~ul!lll their obligations to serve customers in the future. This obligation to serve
Is mt~nsic to the nature of a utility franchise, representing one of the major
conditiOns for the granting of a monopoly. Thus, current regulatory decisions
attempt. to take account of the future needs of the customers to be served and
t!Ie capital required to provide the facilities to meet these needs. The long lead
~Imes which characterize electric utility plant construction mean that new facilIties must be planned and financing arranged many years in advance of the time
that the facilities enter into service.
1
Stephen G. Breyer and Paul W. MacAvoy, Energy Regu'fatlon bu the Federal Power
Oommjsslon, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1974, p. 90.
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THE PRESENT FINANCIAL CoNDITION OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY
THE SIZE OF THE INDUSTRY

Output ana SaZes

The production of electric power is one of the most important industrial activities carried out in a modern economy. The generation of electric energy is a useful measure of a nation's economic strength and progress. During 1973, nearly
1.95 trillion kilowatt hours (kwhr) were generated in the U.S. by utility and
industrial power plants. Total U.S. electricity porduction was more than twice
that of the world's next largest producer, the USSR. Utilities accounted for
nearly 95 percent of the U.S. total. The remainder is generated by industrial or
commercial firms for their own use.
Within the electl"ic utility industry, investor-owned companies generated more
than 78 percent of the 1.85 trillion kwhr of output. This report will concentrate
on the investor-owned segment of the industry in view of the unique nature of
the problems facing it. The problems of raising capital for non-investor-owned
utilities are quite severe and may be comparable in many ways tQ those covered
in this report. Where appropriate data are not available, information on the
total electric industry will be used and so labeled.
·Some 78.3 percent of the ultimate electric customers in the U.S. were served
hy investor-owned utilities. Sales of electric energy to these ultimate customers
represented 78.3 percent of all kwhr sales in 1973 and were allocated to residential,
business, and other users as shown in Table 1.
TABLE I.-SALES OF ELECTRICITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973, BY INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES

Category users
ResidentiaL _______ ___-- ----------------------- ------------------------ ------Small businesses ___ _______ -------- - ------------ ---------- -------------- ------Large
businesses ____________
------------------ ------------------------------Other ___________________
______________________
_______ _______ ---- - - ________
--TotaL_---------- · --- --- -- -- ------------ -- ---------- - -- ----- --- --------

Kilowatt
hours
(in millions)

Percent

416, 851
323,018
545,
912
48, 615

31. 2
24. 2
40.9
3. 7

----------------------------------1, 334, 396

100.0

Source: Edison Electric Institute.

Revenue of investor-owned utilities from sales to ultimate customers totaled
$26.3 billion in 1973. A breakdown of this tlgure is contained in Ta:ble 2.
TABLE 2.-sALES OF ELECTRIC POWER, 1973, BY INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES

Category of user
ResidentiaL ________________________________________ ---_--- __ ----------------Small business------------------------------------------------- - -------------Large business---------------------------------------------------------------Other_________________________________________ _______________________________

Amount
(in millions)

Percent

$10, 590
7, 808
6, 876
1, 043

40.2
29.7
26.1
4. 0

-------------------------------------

TotaL_---------------------------- - -----------------------------------

26, 317

100.0

Source: Edison Electric Institute.

RoZe in the IiJconomy

At the end of 1972, the investor-owned electric utility industry had a total gross
in electric plant and equipment of more than $117 billion, or about

invest~ent

(441)
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$4.50 for each dollar of revenue, which was larger than any other industry in
the United States. The petroleum industry, the next largest in terms of physical
investment, reported $78 billion of gross plant and equipment, or one-third less.
This difference in ranking between revenue and investment reflects the capitalintensity of electric supply operations, a subject which will be discussed later in
this report.
On the other hand, the investor-owned electric utilities are not among the
largest users of labor, although their work forces are significant in absolute
numbers. During 1972, 401,500 persons were engaged in electric operation and
construction work, an increase of only 18.2 percent over 1962. Over this same 10
year period the industry raised its total annual output by more than 18 percent,
demonstrating the significant improvement in output per unit of labor achieved
by electric utilities. This trend has been characteristic of electricity production
since the inception of the industry.
THE COST STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY

The predominant characteristic of the electric utility industry's cost structure is its capital intensiveness. Gross plant investment of nearly $4.70 is required on average to produce $1.00 of annual revenue. After adjustments for
depreciation, net assets equal nearly $4.00 to generate $1.00 revenue. This com~
pares with much lower ratios of assets to sales in other industries (see Table 10
and accompanying text) .
Being capital intensive, the cost of capital plays an important part in deter~
mining the ultimate price the electricity industry must charge for its product.
Likewise, the other fixed charges associated with investment--depreciation, insurance and property taxes-weigh heavily in the total cost of delivered energy.
To keep its total cost per unit of output as low as possible, a utility must seek
to spread these fixed costs over the largest output possible. Thus, load factor is
important in utility economics. Load factor is the ratio of actual output to the
potential output associated with around-th~clock use of maximum annual supply. To the extent that the load factor is increased, the portion of total costs
per kilowatt hour represented by fixed costs will decline.

Trends in Plant Costs

Over most of the history of the electric utility industry, plant costs per kilowatt of capacity remained stable or showed a downward trend. Economies of
scale available in production, transmission, and distribution were normally
sufficient to offset the effects of in:flation. Today economies of scale still exists,
though perhaps to a lesser degree than in the past. Since the late 1960's, however, the gains from advancing technology and increasing plant size have been
more than offset by the costs arising from in:flation. The current dollar cost of
additional capacity is above the embedded or historical costs of facilites already
in service. Figure 2 shows how this trend has developed since 1950 and how one
authority on the subject has projected it to develop over the next four years,,

Normally, more than 50 percent of the total cost of electric service can be
termed "fixed" or not directly related to output. This percentage can vary from
year to year primarily as a function of fuel costs, which is by far the largest
component of variable cost. Table 3 outlines the evolution -of fixed and variable
costs as percentages of total revenue over the past 10 years. To a substantial
extent, the data on fixed costs are understated.
A major portion, perhaps three-fourths or more, of the expenditures for main~
tenance and other operating expenses (mainly labor) need to be continued if the
utility system is to be in viable operation at all. It is more likely that purchases
of materials can be deferred during periods of financial stringency or slack
demand. If an adjustment were to be made for these factors, the share of fixed
costs would rise to perhaps 70 percent.

550
500

_.##~450

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

350
300

1973

I

--

15.4
6.8
19.6

15.4
6. 8
19.6

16.0
6. 7
19.4

16.1
6. 9
19.2

16.8
6. 7
19.0

17.3
6.9
19.2

19.8
7. 3
19.1

21.9
7.1
18.8

22.5
7.3
18.6

24.4
7.2
17.5

Subtotal, variable costs_

41.8

41.8

42.1

42.2

42.5

43.4

46.2

47.8

48.4

49.1

Fixed costs :
Depreciation
__ --------Taxes
________________
__
Operating
income
after
taxes ______________ __

11.8
23.0

11.8
22. 3

11.5
22. 1

11.9
21.6

11.7
22.0

11.7
20.9

11.7
18.3

11.4
17.4

11.0
17. 2

10.9
16.5

23.4

24.1

24.3

24.3

23.8

24.0

23.8

23.4

23.4

23.5

Subtotal, fixed costs_

58.2

58.2

57.9

57.8

57.5

57.0

53.8

52.2

51.6

50.9

Source: Edison Electric Institute Statisticlll Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry 1963-72; data for 1973 estimated
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I

I
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~00
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,....------~

I

I

Variable costs :
FueL _____ ---- ___ -----_
Maintenance ____________
Other operating expenses_

I

250

lOC

TABLE 3.-FIXED AND VARIABLE ELEMENTS OF COSTS OF PRODUCING ELECTRICITY

TREND IN COST OF FACILITIES

Doll•~·

(.()0

Fi:ceil Costs

Cost category

Th data in table 3 reveal the burden that fixed costs represent for an electric
utility. The fact that utilities have been earning less than adequate returns on
equity capital over the past several years actually serves to lower the share
of fixed costs in this tabulation l>ecause it uses revenue from sales as a proxy
for total cost. The latter is only equal to revenue from sales when the full cost
of equity is being eamed.
Present trends are likely to keep fixed cost at about 50 percent of revenue
in the next few years. Thereafter, it can •be expected to climb unless load factors
are noticeably increased. In the short run, the dramatic escalation of fossil fuel
prices will tend to keep operating costs at a historically high proportion of
revenue. As new and more expensive plant is added to utility systems and as
nuclear energy supplies an increasing share of total generation, the relative
importance of plant costs will increase and that of fuel costs will decrease.
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FIGURE 2

Some of the rise in plant investment per kilowatt is due to the installation
of more complex, capital-intensive plant. These upward pressures would exist
even if inflationary forces were nil. In effect, they result from the construction
of facilities which are noticeably different in characterstics from existing equipment. Nuclear power stations are a primary example of such new plant. Fossil
1 Edwin Vennard, A Ohanging Induatry in a Ohanging World, Edison Electric Institute,
Graduate Management Course, p. 44.
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fuel stations equipped with elaborate environmental protection devises can
also be considered as belonging to a new class of facility. The same can be said
of underground distribution plant in areas where, in the past, overhead lines
have been installed.
lnfiatlon impacts on fixed costs not only in terms of higher investment costs
but in higher costs of capital necessary to finance the investment. An example of
how fixed costs rise in response to both increased unit investment and risina.t
money costs of financing is given in the following example:
1968

1978

Investment per kilowatt •• ___ ------- _________ -----------------_---- __ -----------_
$350. 00
Annual fixed charge rate (percent)._______________________________________________
13. 2
Dollars per year ___ ._-------- ____________________ ------ ____________ -----________
$46.00
Kilowatt-hours at 60 percent load factor (8,760 times .60>---------------------------5, 256
Fixed cost per kilowatt-hour (cents)_______________________________________________
0. 87
Increase from 1968 to 1978 (cents) _______ ----------- __ ------ __ ------ _________ ----- ____ ----------

$490.00
15.2
$74.50
5,256
1. 42
0.55

LOAD FACTOR and
PERCENT RETURN

Percent
Return

9
7

5

~

.,.~

~

~

~

P"""""

Ill"""'

This example assumes a constant load factor of 60 percent. An increasing load
factor would attentuate the increase in fixed charges but a decreasing load factor
would further increase costs per kilowatt hour. In the above illustration, raising
the load factor by ·l percent would reduce the absolute increase in fixed charges
(1968-1978) by 4 percent.
Improvements in load factor depend on the ability of the electric utility to
market off peak uses of electricity. Electric heating is perhaps the most promising
load in this regard for utilities with summer peaks. The prospects for more stable,
or even declining, fuel costs which will accompany the growing use of nuclear
power should aid the competitiveness of electric heat versus other energy forms
used for space heating.
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Load Factor and Rate of Return

The significance of load factor is very substantial. Each 10 percent point
change (i.e. from 60 percent to 70 percent) in load factor is equivalent to one
whole percentage point change (i.e. from 6 percent to 7 percent) in return on the
investment.
It would require a 10 percent increase in price to accomplish the Harne thing.
For the same percent return on the investment, the price to the public at 60 percent
load factor can be one-tenth lower than it would bl' at nO percent. 'fhe following
calculation illustrates the snmP point using one kilowatt as the example. (Using
data supplied by Edwin Vennard) :
(1) Plant ------------------------------------------------------- $500.00
(2) Gross Revenue (5300 kWh (60% LF) at 1.9¢) ------------------100. 00
(3) Return--6% of (1>------------------------------------------30.00
(4) Increased KWH at 10 11ercentage points increase in L.F.=10o/o of
8760 hours in year= --------------------------------------- 876 kWh
(5) Increased Net Revenue
Increased Gross Rev. 1.6¢ (not 1.9¢)
IncrensNl Fhcpemm
.4¢ (mostly fnPl)
10.00
Increased Net Before tax 1.2¢X876kWh=-------------------!).00
(6) FPderal Jnrome Tax-50%------------------------------------5.00
(7) Increased Return--------------------------------------------35.00
(8) New Return (3)~(7>----------------------------------------
7%
(9) New Percent Return (8) divided by (1>------------------------A graphic representation of the Load Factor-Return relationship is presented
in Figure 3.

FIGURE
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be:~~~~7k.Edwfn Vennard, A Study and Forecast of the Electric Power Business, NovemPROFITABILITY OF THE INDUSTRY

Allowable Rates of Return

.A~. already noted, one of the key fuJ?ctions .of regulations is determining a perIm.&nl.Jle l~vel. of profit or return. In mdustnes sul.Jject to normal market forces
this functwn .Is left to competitive pressures, in the uelief that the a'Ppearance of
ah:qor~ally ~Igh profits in a given activity will elicit the entry of new competitors
who ~.Ill drive ~rofits l.Jack down to a more normal level. The monopoly nature
of utility operatwn, however, precludes direct competition. Thus by regulating
profits •. the governmental regulator fulfills a role analogous to that oi competitive
forces m the market economy.
Determining the a~propriate level. of return on equity is frequently one of the
more comp~e.x tas~s m a rate heanng. Expert testimony is often sought from
people familia: WI~h the n~t!on's capital markets. Conclusions must ue reached
as to the r~lativ~ ris~ of utility versus other securities and to the differentials in
returns whziCh Will fnzrly reflect the differences in risk.
In view of the strategic role of investor evaluations in determining a utility's
c~pital c?.sts, it is instruc~ive to examine the statement of Rouert w. Burke, th~
VIc~ preszdent of Moody s Investors Service responsible for the widely-used
ratmgs:

The requirements of the utility investor are not unreasonable. On the
whole, he has a conservative orientation. The utility common need not

41-160 0 - 75 - 29
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pr~vide exciting earnings growth but should at least promise steady and

TABLE 5.-EARNINGS APPLICABLE TO COMMON STOCK EQUITY OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES

reliable progress over the years. The bond buyer expects no more interest
than the going market rate will provide, but he does want reasonable
assurance of continuing quality. 2
Mr. Burke estimated two years ago that rate increases will have to aver~ge
"better than 5 percent annually" over the next five years to arrest dilution in
debt coverage. He w!lrns that "It will take a lot of fortitude on the part of regulators to.gran.t the higher rates that must come." 3 A similar sentiment was voiced
by a semor vice president of the First National City Bank of New York:
With today's intlation, and with today's expansion requirements, utility
r~tes d~termined on last year's rate base just do not tly from a financial
viewpomt. Investments and costs are reasonably predictable for a number
?f years ahead, and rate patterns must begin taking these future years
mto acco~~· There has been a move in this direction, but not far enough.
~hat utlhties really need i:s rate regulation that provides steady predictable and satisfactory growth in their earnings.4
'
It thus. ap~rs that t.h~ ~ey risk .for !in investor-owned electric utility at the
p;esent time IS the possibihty that It Will be prevented from raising rates suffiCiently to offset sharply rising costs, costs which have continued to rise
In granting or a~thorizing an increase in rates, regulatory commissio~s frequently do noL specify the level of permisr.;ihle return on common equity hut instead announce a pet;nitted rate of return; that is, the total of profit plus interest
as a pe.rcent of ca.pital (the latter is usually referred to as the "rate base").
Dependmg on th.e capital structure of the utility and the costs of debt and preferred stock, a given overall rate of return may imply varying rates of allowable
profits on common stock equity.
Some idea of the differing views held by various state regulatory agencies as
to the necessary return on equity can be gleaned by comparing data on returns
requested with returns granted over the past few years. In 1973 out of some 45
firut! rate decisions .surveyed, 39 had involved requests for after-tax returns on
eqmty of 12 percent or more. However, only 29 of the final orders permitted
ret:nrns at or above the 12 percent level. The average rate of return (unweighted) granted in the 45 decisions surveyed in 1973 was 11.9 percent, compared
to the average requested of 13.15%. Table 4 also contains comparable data for
1972 and 1971.
TABLE 4.-RATES OF RETURN REQUESTED AND ALLOWED, ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETTLED, 1971- 1973

Period of decision:

~~~~ - - ---- -------------- ------ -------------------------- ----------·-... -- -- ---· .. ......... ---- .. .. ---------------................... ---

1973- - -- ---- - -- --- -- ------ --- - - -- ----------------- --- - ------

--

Number of
decisions

Average
unweighted
return
sought
(percent)

Average
unweighted
return
granted
(percent)

40
57
45

12.62
13.11
13.15

11.90
12.24
11.92

Source : Edison Electric Institute.

Data collected by the Federal Power ·Commission 5 show that the range of
actual return on common .equity extends from below 5 percent to over 18 percent.
However, 'Of the comparues covered by this survey, the percentage earning 12
percent or ~ore on common has declined since 1969. In that year 45 percent of
the compames had a rate of return on equity of 12 percent or more. In 1970
the figure. was 40 percent, in 1971, 39 percent, and in 1972, 40 percent.
On an. mdustn: wide basis, data reported in the same FP.C •S urvey show that
the .earnmgs available for common stock as a percentage of average common
eqmty have declined noticeably sin~ 1966 (see Table 5).
2

Robert W. Burke. Electric Utilitu Bond Ratings, an address before the Fortieth Annual
Conve.ntion
of the EdiRon Electric Institute, San Diego California June 7 1972 p 6
3
lbul .• p. 5.

'

'

•

• ·

·

'Willinm A. Lockwood. Capital Resources for a Capital Intensive Industru a speech
hPfore thf' General Electric Sixth Electric Uttltty Executives Conference Hot Springs
Virginia, September 17, 1973. p. 7.
'
'
•tFederal Power Commission, Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the

U n~ ed States.

Earnings
r.vailable for
common stock
as li percent of
average common
equity

Year:
1966_______ ---------------------- ------------- ----------- ---------- . ----------- ----- --1967----------------- - ------------------------ -- --- ----- ------------------------ ----- --

1968_____ ----- -------------------------------- --- ------------------------------ ----- -- -

1969____ ----------------------------------------------------------------- -------------1970____ --- - - - --- ------- - -- - ------- - - --------------------------- - ---- -- -- --------------

~~~t::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

12.8
12.8
12.3
12.2
11.8
11.7
11.8

Source : Federal Power Commission.

Inflation and UtiUtieB

Although intlation is a serious problem for most sectors of the economy, it is
especially significant for the electric utilities because of their tremendous need
for new capital. A typical utility requires about $4 of capital to generate one
dollar of revenue. In contrast, the average manufacturing company needs only
75 cents to produce a dollar of revenue. Inflation not only increases the cost of
capital, but magnifies the amount needed.
Most manufacturing operations have equipment with a much shorter life.
The more rapid turnover of plant and equipment investment enables the manufacturing company to react more quickly in pricing its products. They are also
able to adjust prices, control expenditures, vary product and inventory lines,
and effect other internal policies with greater freedom. 11
Utilities, however, must provide service wherever and whenever the public
demands it and are subject to the dictates of regulation. The result for utilities
during a period of high intlation often is an erosion of earnings, a decline in the
proportion of internally generated funds, an overreliance on debt financing, a
lowering of overall quality~ and a loss of investor confidence.
As Professors Kamerschen and Wallace of the University of Missouri have
stated it:
Regulated industry is exposed to more risk than non-regulated industry during
periods of intlation in that regulated firms cannot readily adjust prices to compensate for the effects of intlation, whereas non-regulated industry historically
has had the a bility to adjust prices promptly in response to intlation. Regulated
industry must await the effects of intlation on earnings before an application
can be made for an adjustment in rates. After an application has been made,
there is an additional waiting period to allow for consideration of the application by the commission. This increases the risk of intlation for regulated industry. Also, regulated utilities have less opportunity to exit from old markets and
enter new ones than do industrial firms because of the large fixed investment
tied to a particular market and the necessity of obtaining authorization to make
such changes which itself is a costly, time-consuming task. 7
The after-tax return on investment in electric utilities typically is below the
average for other leading industries. The average return on net worth for leading electric and gas utilities of 10.8 percent in 1973 was significantly below the
returns of large non-financial corporations (13.2 percent) and of large manufacturing companies (14.8 percent) .8 Given the new higher level of risk in electric
utility operations, such differentials no longer seem to be appropriate.
1

Trend.y in Dividenrl-9 Payments
As will he explained in a later section, investor-owned electric utilities have

sought to maintain their dividend payout ratios for common stock in spite of
11 Professor Reuben E . SlPsinger of the University of Pittsburgh, " UtiUties and Regulation: <:omnatahtltty in a Dynamic Environment.'' Public Utilities Fortnightly, NovemhPr 2H. 1 fl72, p. 24.
7 Dnvic1 R. Kamer~;chen and Richard r,. Wallace, "Opportunity Cost and the Attraction
for Utilit;v Ratf' Regulation." Pu.blic U tilities Fortnightl1/, February 15, 1973. p. 44.
R First National City Bank, Monthl1f Economic Letter, April 1974, pp. 8- 9. The data
on nPt worth cover stockholders' investment applicable to both common and preferred
shares.

increased requirements for funds for construction programs. A slight downward
trend has been evident since 1968 as illustrated in Table 6.
TABLE 6.-AVERAGE PAYOUT RATIOS FOR ElECTRIC UTILITIES

,...
M

(Dollar amounts in thousands)
Earnings
available
for common
stock

(/)

r.:l

Common
dividends

H
NH

Payout
ratios

~E-1

..:l

UlH

•

Year:
1968____ ---- •• - - ---- ·---------.------ ·----.------ ·-------- •• 1969 ____ -- - - - - - - -----------.-.-.----------.-.-.-----.-------1970 ____
----. - ---- . ---------.-------------- ••
-.--. --.------.-_
1971_
___ ___________________________________
_________________
1972 _____ _____ - ----. ·--. -· - --·- . -- -- ·-- -·-- - ------.- --------1973 _________ ··- ·----- ----- -· ------------- •• •• - --· ------ ·-. --

E-1

>4P

~--------------------~ ~

Cl

$2,681
2,823
2,972
3,281
3,721
4,083

ou
OH

0.686

$1,838

.660
.680
.668
.646

1,880

2,022
2,191
2,402
2,656

~~
p

llc

~

.651

(/)

Source: Edison Electric Institute.
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The modest increase in the percentage of earnings thus retained by the
industry has permitted a slight recovery in the portion of construction expenditures financed by retained earnings (see Table 7).
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TABLE 7.-RETAINED EARNINGS AND CONSTRUCTION OUTlAYS OF ElECTRIC UTILITIES

r.:l~

~~
r.:l

(Dollar amounts in millions)

0
0
....

CD

"'
....en

llcr.:l

Year:
1968 ___ ----- •• ------------ --------------------------------.-1969·-----------------------··------·-·---------------------·
1970 ____ ------------------ --·-- ------.---. -· ------------.---1971 _____ -----------.--------.------------- - -- --------------1972. _____ --.--.------ •• -.----.----.---.------.- •••• --.-.---1973 ____ ---- ••• --·--·- ·- ---- --· ·--- ---- - -- -· ---.----- - -------

Electric
construction
expenditures

Retained
earnings

Retained
earnings
as a
percent of
construction
expenditures

$7,168
8, 323
10,182
11,938
13,435
14,979

$843
943
950
1,090
1,319
1,427

11.8
11.3
9.3
9.1
9.8
9.5

~r.:l

------~-----------------------------1 ~

~

~~

!::~
H

II)!<

><Ul
CIP
OCI

oz

~H

Source: Edison Electric Institute.
co

Trenas in Utility Stock Indices
The particular financial problems of electric utilities have compounded the
etrects of a stagnant stock market on utility shares. Declining interest coverage
ratios have required an increased reliance on common stock sales with their diluting efr'ect on earnings per share. All of this has occurred at a time when placement
of additional shares must be made at prices below book values because of the
depressed state of the equity markets.
Data on the comparative performance of the Moody's 125 Industrials and 24
Utilities averages reveal the acute difficulty being experienced by utility companies (see Table 8). Since 1970, the utility index has failed to track the industrial average during market rises. The year 1972 was especially significant
in this regard. While the 1972 average price level of the industrials was 14 percent higher than 1971, the utility index was 5 percent below 1971. Both indices
declined over 1973. The utility average fell by 11 percent, compared to only 2
percent for the industrials. Figure 4 shows the trend of both measures over the
period 1968-1973.
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source: Moody's Industrial Manual, 1974 Edition, Vol. I. Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
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TABLE B.-MOVEMENTS IN UTILITY AND INDUSTRIAL STOCK PRICES

TABLE 9.-COMPARISON OF MARKET VALUE TO BOOK VALUE, 51 ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES

Year and date:
Moody's 24 utilities average:
1974:
June ••••• __________ • ___ _______________ ------ __ • __________ __ ___ _______ _
March ••• . ________ • _____ __________ ••• __ . __ ----- •••• --.------ ----------1973 :
December·-----------------------_
September•• ----- __ ----- -- ---------------------------------_______ . __ ___________ ____ . _________--_-------June ••••• __ ____________ ----------------- ______ ________________ ______ __
March •• ______ • ____________ •.• __ -- . --.---.---.------------------------1972 : Decsmber___ __________ ________________ . ____ ------- __________ -------- __
Moody's 125 industrials average:
1974:June ••••• __ ___ • ___ • ___________________________ • _____________ . ________ •
March • • ----- ______________ --- ___ --- ______ ----------------------------1973:
December·-------------------------------------------------------------

~~~~~~~~~:::::===============:::===:======================:===========

-------------------------------------------------------------1972:March·-December
_______ •• _. ___ • _____________________ •••••••••• _•. _. __ -----.--

Price/earnin~s

ratio

Earnings
per share

6.0
8.6

7.23
7.15

8.1
9.5
9.2
9. 7
10.8

7. 55
7.60
7.63
7. 78
7. 73

10.6
11.8

131.60
24.70

12.4
14.4
15.1
17.3
19.2

29.18
23.77
27.15
23.95
24.42

1 Preliminary.
Note: Earnings per share are for 12 months ending with the quarter on or near date shown above.
Source: Moody's Investors Service, Inc.

Poorer performance on the part of the utility index was undoubtedly due to the
stagnation in per share earnings growth. Between December 1972 and June 1974,
average earnings per share of the industrial group rose by nearly 30 percent
while that of the utility group declined by 6.5 percent (see Table 8).
Deterioration of utility stock prices has been further aggravated since October
1973 by reduced earnings resulting from conservation induced reductions in sales
of electricity. For those electric companies not fully covered by fuel adjustment
clauses, the explosive rise in fossil fuel prices has also contributed to declines in
earnings. Even those companies having such clauses in their rates not only have
faced much higher finance charges on fuel inventories, but have experienced
delays between the time the added cost is incurred and the point at which it is
reflected in higher billings. The extent of stock price deterioration can be appreciated from the following list which compares August 26, 1974 closing prices of
51 electric utility stocks with corresponding book values as of December 31, 1973
(Table 9). The average price of stocks in the list as of August 26 was more
than 32 percent below December's average book value. Only 4 of the 51 stocks
were selling above book value and one listing, that of Consolidated Edison, had
an August 26 price less than 25 percent of book.

Allegheny Power System ____________ ___________________ ------- ____ _
American Electric Power. __________ ______ --------------------- ____ _
Arizona Public Service ____ . _________ ________ ----------- ___________ _
Baltimore Gas & Electric. ___________ ______ --------------------- ___ _
Boston Edison. ___ . ____ . ___________ _____ -------_--------- ________ _
Carolina Power & Light_ _____________ ______ ---------- _____________ _
Central
& South
----------------------------------------.
Cincinnati
Gas &West__
Electric___
•...
______________________________________

11 Agriculture has a higher ratio of investment to revenue than any industry, due to the
dominance of land, a nondepreciable asset, in its investment total.

Market value
as percent of
book value

Cleveland
Electric
Illuminating
_____
------ _______ -------------------Commonwealth
Edison
_________
____________________
. ___________ . __ _
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York--------- ---------- ------------Consumers Power ________ ---- ----------_-------------------------_
Dayton Power & Light.-------- - __________________________________ _
Detroit Edison. ____ . ________ . __ __________________________________ _
Duke Power. ___ ------------- ___ --------- ___ ------ _______________ _
Duquesne Light••• __ ___ ----- ____ • _______________ ----- ____________ _
Eastern Utilities Associates _____ _____ ._. ___ ------- _____________ ____ _
Florida Power Corp ____________ ______________________________ . ____ _
Florida Power & Lig.ht__ __ ________________________________________ _
General Public Utilities. __ _--------- ____ __________ __ . ___ • __. ------_
Gulf States Utilities _____ . ___ ___________ --------- - _________________ _
Houston Lighting & Power__ _______________________________________ _
Illinois Power------ ---- ---- -----. __________________ ------- _______ _
Long Island Lighting ____ __--- ----- ________________ ------ ____ ------_
Middle South Utilities ___ _____ _______ . ___________________ __________ _
New England Electric System. _____ • ________ • ____ -------------- ____ •
New England Gas & Electric·- -------------------------------------New York State Electric & Gas-------------------------------------Niagara Mohawk Power__ __________________ ------------- ----------Northeast Utilities _______ ____________ _----- __ ------_------- _______ _
Northern Indiana Public Service. ____ _____________ . ___ .. __ . ________ •
Northern States Power ____ _. _____ ._. __ ______ ________ . _____________ _
Ohio Edison. __._ . ____ .. _______ . _______ ------- ______ ---- ______ •. __
Oklahoma Gas & Electric. ______________ ------- ____________________ _
Pacific Gas & Electric .. __ . __________ . ____ . ______ . ________________ •.
Pacific Power & Light__ ___ _----- _____ ._. ________ ---- _____ .. ___ • ___ _
Pennsylvania Power & LighL .. __ --- _______________ -----. __ . --- ___ .
Philadelphia Electric _____ ____ . __ . _______________ •. ________________ _
Potomac Electric Power._. _.. __ . _______________________ ._ . • ____ . __ .
Public Service Co. of Colorado _____________________________________ _
Public Service Electric & Gas .. _____ . ___ . ____ • ______ . ___ ------ ___ .. _
Public Service Indiana _______ ._. ____________ ---- ____ -------_--- ___ _
Rochester Gas & Electric. _______ . _________ ------- __ . ___________ . __ _
San Diego Gas & Electric .. __ ---_.---. __________ --- ___ ._. ____ . _____ _
South Carolina Electric & Gas ___ . ___________ . _________ . ____________ _
Southern California Edison . ____ . _____________ ----. __ .. __ ._. ___ ._. _.
Southern Co ••• . _____ . __ _.. ______ . ___ ___ .. . . ___ • __ ---. ___ ---.---.Texas Utilities __ __________ _____ . _______ • _____ . ____________ --- ____ _
Union Electric .•• __ . ______ . ___________ . _____ ._. ____ . ______ .---- __ Virginia Electric & Power__ _________ . ______ ... ____ . ________________ .
Wisconsin Electric •. ------ - ___ ___________ .. __________ .. _. ____ ._---.

$18.00
20.40
20.70
26.10
31.70
22.70
12.00
17. 70
23.80
26.60
31.00
27. 90
18.70
19.90
20.60
19.50
17. 90
29.40
24.20
22.10
13.40
24.20
19.90
18.40
15.90
22.70
15.50
29.50
16.50
12.20
16.70
21.90
15.30
14.10
27.80
18.10
22.30
20.20
15.40
17.60
24.80
25.70
21.90
17.00
17.60
28.90
18.20
15.30
15.40
18.60
24.70

$13.750
14.625
13.250
14.500
16.250
12.625
12.875
15.250
23.125
21.000
7.250
11.625
12.000
9.875
10.750
14.750
9. 750
14.500
15.750
10.375
10.125
20.750
16.500
10.875
10.625
13.375
9. 625
18.500
9.125
6.875
13.625
18.000
14.375
18.000
19.375
16.000
17.000
11.000
10.375
10.000
12.375
32. 000
12.500
10. 500
10.125
16.750
9. 750
19.625
10. 500
8, 250
18.000

73.9
71.7
64.0
55.6
51.3
55.6
107.3
86.2
97.2
78.9
23.4
41.7
64.2
44.6
52.2
75.6
54.5
49.3
65.1
46.9
75.6
85.7
82.9
59.1
66.8
58.9
62.1
62.7
55.3
56.4
81.6
82.2
94.0
127.7
-69.7
88.4
76.2
54. 5
67. 4
56.8
49.9
124.5
57.1
61.8
57.5
58.0
53.6
128.3
68.2
44.4
72.9

Average __ __ _.. __ ____ ___• _____ .. ___ ._._._._---. ___ . _____ .•.•

20. 73

14. 17

68.4

THE PHYSICAL CAPITAL INTENSITY OF THE INDUSTRY

The electric utility industry has the highest ratio of investment to revenue
of any sector of the industrial economy. 11 For investor-owned electric utilities this
ratio has consistently averaged near 4, as data for the 10-year period 1964-1973
illustrate (see Table 10).
Other industries normally have much lower ratios of net assets to revenues.
After electric uti'lities the next most capital intensive industry is communications where revenue equals assets once in just under 3 years. Railroads normally
require more than 2¥:! years for revenues to match assets, and gas utilities and
pipeline companies require about 2 years. The great bulk of manufacturing industries, however, turn over their assets in less than one year. Table 11 compares
1972 asset/revenue ratios for several major industrial groupings.

1973 Market value
Yearend
at close
book value 1 Aug. 26, 1974 z

Company

1 Argus Research Corp. and Kidder, Peabody & Co. Inc.
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 27, 1974.

2

TABLE 10.- CAPITAL INTENSITY OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Year

Average assets
for the year

1963 ____ ----------------- ---------------------- -- ---------------1964. --- --------------- ----:. ----------------------------- -------1965.
---------------__---- ------------------- ---- ----------------_
1966 _______________
______
_____________________________________
1967-------------------- ---------- ------------------------------1968.--------------- --- ·----- ---------------------- ------.-----_
1969
___________________________
___ ______________________________
1970_----------------------.-----.- ----.-.------.---------------1971.-.-•• -------.-------.- •• -.---- ---- -- ·---.--- --.-------- ----1972 •• ---.---------------------.--- ----- -·------. -. ----- ---- -- -- 1973.-.---------.--••• ---.-.--.---- -.--------.-.-.---.---.--.---Source: Edison Electric Institute.

$45,012
46,963
49,243
52,260
56,299
61,346
67, 365
75,090
84,742
95,861
108,234

Electric Assets/revenue
revenues
ratio
$11,577
12,211
12,887
13,773
14,569
15,810
17,164
18,830
21,230
24,133
27,526

3.89
3.85
3.82
3. 79
3.86
3.88
3.92
3.99
3.99
3.97
3.93
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TABLE H .-ASSET/REVENUE RATIOS FOR VARIOUS INDUSTRIES, 1972

TABLE 13.-PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL SOURCES, ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
Assets/
revenue

Industrial groups
Electric utilities •_______
•• __--- __
- --------------••••• ___ ----- •• ___ ---- ••••• __ ••••• --- •••••••• ___ ••_
Communications
____ _______________• __
___________________________________________________
Railroads ••• ••• __ . _. __ __ _•••••• -----. __ • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• -- •••••••.•••••••••
Investor-owned las utilities and pipeline industry ___ ------- ______________________________________ _

¥:g~::t£o:~~;::r~~~~~~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::== ::::::::::: =:::: ~::: :::::::::::::
rYr~:~~~~!r:~~~d~~~~~~~:s:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:_=::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

3.97
2. 75
2.67
2.00
.98
.86
• 75
.58
.44
• 75

Source: Based on data from Moody's Utility Manual, Association of Americar. Railroads; Gas Facts; Federal Trade
Commission-Securities and Exchange Commission quarterly financial report for U.S. manufacturing corporations.
THE FINANCIAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY

Debt/Equity RatioB

The investor-owned electric utility industry is characterized by a highly leveraged capital structure, a far higher proportion of debt to stockholders investment than is present in most other industries. Reliance on long term debt pluH
preferred stock has been justified historically by the past pattern of stability of
net income growth. This is a characteristic which, at least in the past, has been
associated with regulated utilities as a general proposition, shareholders of a
company are wary of large amounts of debt because the payment of interest on
this indebtedness take precedence over the payment of dividends.
This stability in earnings growth hence was quite important. It allowed the
common equity investor to view high debt ratios with little concern because of
his confidence in the availability of adequate earnings. Other industries, which
lack stable growth in their net income, have depended less on debt financing and
normally seek to generate a large portion of their new capital internally. When
outside financing is needed, firms in these industries more often resort to the
sale of new equity.
Over the past few years, electric utilities have seen their interest burdens
increase rapidly because of two factors: (1) long term interest rates have risen
dramatically and (2) steadily expanding construction programs required more
capital. Since 1964, yields on utility bonds have nearly doubled while annual
construction expenditures have more than quadrupled (see Table 12).
TABLE 12.-ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPITAL OUTLAYS AND BOND YIELDS

Year
1964•••• -------------------------------- ------ -- - --- - -------- --------1965••••••• -- --------------------------- --------- - ------------ --------1966•••••• -- ---------------------------- - --- --- -- -- --- - - --- -- ---------19&7------------------------------------ ----- ------ -- --------- --------1968______________ ------------------------ -- -- ----- - -- -- - ---- ---------1969••• --------------------------------- -- -------------------- --------1970••••••• ----------------------------- ----- - ------ ---------- --------1971. •••• ------------------------------- ---- - --- - -- -- --------- --------1972______ ------------------------------ --- - - --------- ---.- -· . ----·.-.1973••••••• ------------------------------ ---.--- --.- -· ---- --- ----------

Overall average
yields on utility
bonds end of
year average
(percent)

Electric construction expenditures
(millions)

4. 53
4.85
5.63
6. 56
6.85
8. 57
8.29
7.87
7.48
8. 21

$3,567
4,050
4, 962
6, 140
7, 168
8, 323
10, 182
11,939
13,435
14,979

Source: Moody's Investor Service; Edison Electric Institute.

Together these two developments have meant that maintenance of previous
debt/equity ratios could only result in a substantial climb in the annual level
of interest charges on long term debt. Reacting to these pressures, electric utilities have attempted to alter the mix of their incremental long term financing
by expanding their sales of preferred and common stocks. This has led to some
reduction in the share of long term debt in the industry's capital structure, from
55.3 percent in 1970 to 52.9 percent in 1973 (see Table 13).

Year

Mortgage
bonds

Other longterm debt

Total longterm debt

Preferred
stock

Common
stock

Total Capitalization

48.3
47.9
48.8
49.5
50.1
50.9
51.6
51.1
49.4
48.0

3.5
3.8
3. 7
3.8
4.0
4.1
3. 7
3.6
4.3
4.9

51.8
51.7
52.5
53.3
54.1
55.0
55.3
54.7
53.7
52.9

9.6
9.5
9.5
9. 7
9.6
9.5
9.8
10.7
11.7
12.0

38.6
38.8
38.0
37.0
36.3
35.5
34.9
34.6
34.6
35. 1

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

1964
-- ------- --1965••••
_____••________
______
1966 ••• •• • -- - ---------1967-- --- -- -- . --------1968••••• -. -- ---------1969.... - - ---- --------1970•••• -- ------------.
1971..•• - -------------1972.... - ----------- --1973.. •••••• ----------Source: Edison Electric Institute.

The above figures illustrate the changing importance of the major sources of
the industry's capital over the past 10 years. From a peak of 55.3% in 1970,
long term debt has declined to 52.9% in 1973. The decline of the share of common
('apital stock equity which continued from 1964 to 1971 has only recently showed
a small upturn. It has been mainly the increase in preferred s tock sales which
has permitted .a reduction in the long term debt ratio.
T rends in the mix of new long term financing illustrate the relative shift away
from debt as a means to fund new construction since 1968 (see Table 14).
TABLE 14.-COMPOSITION OF NEW LONG-TERM CAPITAL
[Percentage distribution)

Year
1968 ••••• -- -------------------------1969.... - ---- -----------------------1970.... -- - -------------------------1971 .... ----------------------------1972 .... ----------------------------1973••• ------------------------------

Long-term
debt

Preferred
stock

Common
stock

Retained
earnings

Total

64.3
65.3
57.6
50.0
45.3
45.9

9.3
7.2
12.7
17.1
20.1
15.1

9.2
11.5
19.3
24.5
23.0
1.6.6

17.2
16.0
10.4
10.8
ll.6
12.4

100
100
100
100
100
100

Source : Edison Electric Institute.

In addition to the markedly heavier reliance on common stock, the pronounced
increase in the use of preferred stock is clearly evident. Viewed by many as
quasi debt, preferred stock has been an instrument for fixed interest financing
when I,roblems of diminishing coverage ratios threatened the expansion of debt.
'.rhe question of coverage has become an important factor in both utility financing
strategies and rate increase requests.
1\Iost electric utility mortgage indentures require the company to maintain a
specified minimum ratio of earnings to interest charges (either on a before or
after-tax basis). As this ratio declines toward the specified minimum, additional debt financing becomes increasingly difficult. In addition, the utility's bond
rating is likely to be reduced which means an increase in the interest cost of
new debt and further aggravation of the coverage problem. Ii'or the electric utility"
industry as a whole, the coverage of interest charges has declined steadily since
1965 (see Table 15) .
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TABLE 15.-INCOME AND INTEREST OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES
(Dollar amounts in millions)

Year

Income before
interest charges 1

Interest on
long-term debt

Ratio

$3,454
3,692
3,948
4,179
4,548
5,009
5,545
6,302
7,134

$953
1,040
1,180
1,373
1, 621
2,010
2,447
2,849
3, 271

3.62
3. 55
3.35
3.04
2.81
2.49
2.27
2. 21
2.18

1965.----- --- ------------- -- - - - - ----- --------------------1966. - --------------- -- -- . -- --------- ---------------- - ---1967----------------- ---- --------- -. -- -------------------1968. - -------------------- ---- - - -------------------------1969.---------------------- -- -- -- --- ---------------------1970.--------------------- -- - - -- - --- - --------------------1971.----------------------------------------------------1972.----------------------------------------------------1973.--------------------------------- ------- - -----------I

Less allowance for funds used during construction.

Source: Edison Electric

l;~stitute.

An indication of further upward pressures on interest charges can be obtained
from examining the calendar of refinancing of the industry's existing debt.
About $8.2 billion of public utility bonds and notes will mature during the
period 1974-78, approximately $1.2 billion of this amount in 1974 and $2.4
billion in 1975. Over half of the public utility debt to be refunded during 1974
and 1975 carries coupons of less than 4 percent (see Table 16). The implications
of refunding this debt at prevailing rates, even assuming some ease in money
and credit markets, are very substantial.
TABLE 16.-MATURING PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS AND NOTES
(In millions of dollars)

l~~t===~=========

24
20
61
93
93

1974-78__ _________ - 1, 987

2, 586

291

1976____________ --1977--------------1978____________ ---

I

75
284
53
50 -------1
738
314 --·- ---1
225
332
68 -------· -- -----166
25
10 ------- - -------150 - ---------- ------- ------------:!-

1,166
2, 430
1, 485
1, 654
1, 425

227

617

8,160

580

1, 379

A
May 1974:
Iowa Electric
Li'ht&&·Power
Power_______
.... -------------------------------------AA
Savannah
Electnc
____________________________________ A
Baa
Consumers Power __ • ___ ___ _____ • __ __ _---------------------------- ___ A
Baa
Eastern Utilities Associates & Subsidiaries _____________________________ Baa
A
Florida Power ________________ -------------------------------------- AA
June 1974:

~A

445

50

To

Category

Baa
Baa
AA
A

Mortgage bonds.
Do.
Do.
Debentures.

A
A
A
Baa

Mortgage bonds.
Do.
Do.
Debentures.

A
Baa
Ba
Baa
Ba
Ba
Baa
A

Mortgage bonds.
Do.
Debentures.
Mortgage bonds.
Debentures.
Mortgage bonds.
Do.
Preferred stocks.

A
Baa
A
Baa

Mortgage bonds.
Do.
Do.
Debentures.

Total

6 -------13
10
298
116
247
82

~~

February 1974:
Consolidated
New York·---------- --------- --- ----- - - - -- AA
Public ServiceEdison
of NewofHamsphire
____________--_________________________
A
Baltimore Gas & Electric ------ ------------- -------------------------- AAA
AA
Apri11974 :
Western Massachusetts Electric • •••• ---------- ___ ._ ____________________ AA
Detroit Edison
. _-- ----- ____
---------------- __ --------------------- - AA
AA
Columbus
& Southern
Ohio
___________________________________________

g~~'i:,~~~fs~:~~ -~ -~i~~~==

1.00 to 2.00 to 3.00 to 4.00 to 5.00 to 6.00 to 7.01 to 8.01 to 9.00 to 10.00 to
No
1.99
2.99
3.99
4.99
5.99
6.99
7.99
8.99
9.99
10.99 coupon
545
520
182
545
794

From

: : ===: =: === ====: : ======= ==== :: =:: == ::: =====
Virginia Electric Power----------------------------------------------- ~A

Interest coupon on maturing issues, in percent

129
823
573
402
60

During the period 197~1973, deratings occurred with great frequency. In
total, 13 electric utilities had their credit ratings lowered at least once by
Moody's Investors Services, one of the two principal firiDS involved in credit
evalution. Over the same period the industry's combined earnings/interest coverage ratio declined from 2.5 to 2.2, measured on a basis which excludes AFDC
from income totals. With the onset of the serious problems in utility earnings
which accompanied the "energy crisis" of the winter of 1973-1974, the number
of deratings has increased sharply. Between January and June 1974, the bonds
of the following 14 electric utilities were downgraded by Moody's Investor
Services:

Includes: Issues of electric, gas and water utilities and telephone companies.

Source: Moody's Public Utility Manual 19731 as cited in Andrew F. Brimmer, Public Utility Pricing, Debt Financing,
c.nd Consumer Welfare, remarks presented to tne Wharton School Club of Washington, May 22, 197~o.

Treml in Bond Ratings

The concurrent rise in capital requirements and interest rates has produced a
rate of increase in debt service charges exceeding the growth of electric utility
earnings. This in turn has led to a steady decline in the ratio of earnings to interest, a decline so pronounced that for many companies this key index bas
fallen to the minimum level permitted by indenture restrictions and effectively
arrested the issuance of addition at debt. An inevitable result of the deteriorating earnings coverage has been a series of utility bond deratings by the major
rating organizations. Each derating signals a higher cost of debt for the utility
concerned and further restricts the potential market for future bonds.

The effect of deratings is, as noted, to raise the cost of debts and constrain
its marketability. The higher cost effect is apparent from the figures .in table
17 which relate percent cost to rating level for 65 investor owned companies
surveyed by the EEl Investor Relations Committee. As bond ratings move downward from the highest (AAA) grade, the percentage of companies surveyed
paying more than 8% for debt in 1973 increased.
For the years 196!>-1972, industry wide averages prepared from Moody's data
for utility stocks and bonds likewise reveal the cost effect of credi~ or quality
deratings. These averages are set out in table 18.
TABLE 17.- DISTRIBUTION OF 65 PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, BY BOND RATINGS VERSUS COST OF
DEBT INCLUDED IN COST OF CAPITAL USED FOR ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS (DISREGARDING CAPITAL STRUCTURE)
Bond rating
Cost of debt
Up to and including $7..-------- ----------------$7.01 to $7.50 ________ _____ ----- ----------------.

AAA

AA

A Less than A

1
1

9
3
9
5
3
1

2
1
1
2
11
3 -----------1
1

U:~l
~~ U:sic~::::: :: :::::::: :::::::::::::::::
f
$8.51 to $9 __ _______ ____ __ _____ ______________ ............. ..
$9.01 to $9.50 ...... __ __ • ______ •• _________ ------------ -- ____ _
Distribution, by bond rating________________

Distribution,
by cost
of debt
14

1~

19
6
3

--------------------------~------~

5

30

23

65

Note: Data refers to 65 of the 70 respondents to the 1974 poll of members of the EEl Investor Relations Committee.

.

TABLE lB.-MOODY'S AVERAGE YIELDS ON UTILITY BONDS AND STOCKS, BY MOODY'S BOND RATINGS AND STOCK QUALITY GROUPS, 1965-73
(In percent)
Bonds

Preferred stocks

Common stocks
High quality

End of month
1973:
-- --------__
December_----------September---_____ __________________
____
June •. ___________ _______ __---- ____ - -_
March _______ _______ ___-- _-- - __- _- - --1972:
December __ ----- ---- -- ----- - - - --- ---September----- _____ ________ __________
June•• ___ ____________ _____________ ___
March _____________ -- __ -_ - - -- --- -----1971:
-----December_------------- - -----September------____ __ _____
______
.. __
June ••• ------------ - ---- -- --------- - March _____ • ______ --_----- -- ---------1970:
December
__ ------------------ ----September-----___ _________
______
_• __
June. _____ ._. __________ ____ • ___ _____ _
March _______________ -- ------- - --- --- -

1969:
December _____ --------- ---------- - -- September--- -- _______ ____ _____ _______
June. _______ _______ __ __--_- ___ _______
March _________ _---- -----------------1968:
December _________ ----------- ___ --·-September ______ -- - ---- ____ ---------June ••• _________ --- _____ - ___________ •
March ••••• __--_- -----_-------_------1967:
December_- - - --- ------ ___ -----------September ____ -- -- --- ----- -- ___ - -- - -_
June
•• _---------------------------March.
___________
_• __ _- --- ____-- -- --1966:
December ____ --------- - ----------- ___
September _____ ---------------------June ______________________ -- ________ March. ____ ------ ------ - __ ---- - -----1965:
December __ ----- --- ---· ·-· ---- - _____ _
September __ •• ·-----·----_------···- June ••• • __ _----- -- ______ --. __ _______ •
March ••• _. ---.---- ••• -.--- - -- ------1 Average

Rating

Good Medium
quality
quality

Good quality
Earnings/
price
ratiot

Medium quality
EarninJS/
pnce
ratio t

Overall
average 1

Ana

Aa

A

Baa

8.21
8.07
7. 73
7. 76

7.90
7. 76
7.53
7.44

8.10
7.92
7.63
7.52

8.24
8.08
7. 78
7. 69

8.59
8.52
7.97
8.01

8.04
7. 72
7.53
7.39

8.35
8.04
7.62
7.53

8.24
8.08
7. 75
7.60

8.06
6.84
6.88
6.42

11.27
9.52
9.65
9.34

8.24
6.92
6.93
6.69

10.91
9.97
10.38
9.80

7. 75
7.08
7.26
6. 72

7.4rs
7.63
7. 77
7. 81

7.29
7.42
7.41
7.53

7.39
7.50
7.57
7.69

7. 51
7.04
7.80
7. 70

7. 74
7.96
8.30
8.25

7.32
7.37
7.28
6.90

7.56
7.61
7.43
7.26

7. 77
7.82
7. 71
7.58

5.52
6.12
0.37
5.96

8.07
9.18
9.31
8.55

6.07
6.47
6. 73
6.23

8.91
9. 72
9.93
8.88

6.27
6.94
6. 72
6.42

9.05
9.58
9.40
8.87

7.87
8.10
8.35
8.03

7. 50
7. 70
7.98
7.56

7. 76
7.95
8.20
7.98

7.80
8.23
8.45
7.99

8.40
8.45
8. 77
8.59

7. 39
7.55
7.58
7.11

7.87
8.06
8.13
7. 74

5.65
0.23
5.95
5.55

7.84
8.56
8.00
7. 51

5. 81
61.8
5.65
5.36

8.25
8.99
7. 91
7. 71

6.06
6.46
6.17
5.80

8.31
8.98
8.32
7.83

8.29
8. 75
9.20
8.37

7.80
8.33
8.89
8.10

8.20
8.63
9.00
8.18

8.23
8. 79
9.22
8.26

8.91
9.24
9.67
8.94

7.30
7. 76
7.84
7.26

7.55
8.00
8.13
7.47

8.43
8.56
8.56
8.43

5. 77
6.38
6.88
5.62

7.69
8. 76
9. 51
7. 71

5.23
6.15
6.85
5.29

7.52
8. 99
10.24
7.99

5.89
6. 75
7.36
6.14

7.95
8. 92
9.96
8.08

8.57
7. 79
7.47
7.37

8.05
7.40
7.13
7.09

8.40
7.67
7.38
7.23

8. 76
7.82
7.45
7.40

9.05
8.27
7.90
7. 74

7.54
7.09
6. 71
6.39

7.80
7.08
6.87
6.58

8.53
7. 71
7.32
7.13

5.63
5.48
5.15
4. 75

7.98
7. 79
7.16
6.54

5.42
5.31
4.75
4.47

8.27
8.01
7.16
6. 75

6.04
6.36
4.88
5.18

8.34
8.69
6.57
7.20

6.85
6.27
6.60
6.39

6.52
6.03
6.32
6.13

6. 75
6.12
6.46
6.26

6.87
6.27
6.62
6. 41

7.23
6.67
7.01
6. 75

6.32
5. 97
6.17
6.04

6.52
6.17
6.33
6.28

6.97
6.64
6.84
6.63

4.45
4. 77
4.55
4.85

6.20
6. 73
6.36
7.01

4.35
4.57
4.49
4.69

6.54
6.88
6.89
7.41

4. 91
4.96
4.85
5.28

8.40
6. 72
6. 78
7.52

6.56
6.04
5.90
5.37

6.33
5.84
5.69
5.16

6.41
5. 91
5. 75
5. 20

6.63
6.06
5. 91
5. 38

6.88
6.33
6.23
5.74

6.25
5. 70
5.49
5.15

6.46
5.86
5. 76
5.47

6.98
6.23
5.96
5. 71

4.59
4.43
4.47
3.89

6.58
6.29
6.21
5.83

4.67
4.41
4.29
3.90

7.05
6.85
6.62
6.23

5.13
4.85
4.80
4.60

7.30
6.93
6.83
6.59

5.63
5. 78
5.33
5. 23

5.34
5.52
5.18
5.08

5.43
5.69
5.21
5.15

5.67
5.83
5.42
5.29

6.07
6.07
5.52
5.38

5.46
5.56
5.12
4.96

5. 72
5. 72
5.35
5.21

5.94
5.86
5.56
5.29

3.89
4.32
4.06
3. 79

5. 78
6.36
5.88
5.44

3.69
4.49
4.14
3.92

6.03
6.90
6.29
5.92

4.51
4. 79
4.47
4.31

6.47
6.87
6.26
5.98

4.85
4.66
4. 57
4.52

4. 76
4.55
4.47
4.43

4. 78
4.59
4.50
4.44

4.86
4.65
4.53
4.50

4.99
4.83
4. 78
4.69

4.72
4.57
4.56
4.43

4.94
4.80
4. 74
4.59

5.00
4.87
4.83
4. 77

3.46
3.31
3.22
3.07

4.83
4.90
5.08
4.52

3.45
3.33
3.34
3.22

4.98
5.06
5.16
4. 77

3.89
3.83
3.84
3.59

5.51
5.42
5.60
5.06

yield for 40 utility bonds, 10 in each of the 4 top-quality ratings shown. ,
r Ratio in percent is obtained by dividing earnings per share by market price per share.
aRevised.

Hi h
quafity

Earnings/
price
ratio2
Yield

3

7.15
7.28
7.31
6. 91

8

Yield

Yield

10
9
10
9

Note: Yields shown undu pref&rred stocks and common stocks represent averages of 10 companies
in each quality group.
Source: Moody's Investors Service.

~
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LegaZ and other .Restrictions on Le'Verage
In all utility long-term debt indentures there is a limitation on the issuance
of debt securities, usually referred to as the "covera·ge requirement." The general effect of this limitation is that the company may not issue new bonds or
debentures if the ratio of earnings to interest charges has been less than 2.0 for
twelve of the :fifteen months prior to the month in which the new securities
are to be issued.
In a few indentures, the ratio is as low as 1.75 and in some cases over 3.0.
In the majority of cases, the required coverage ratio is 2.0. The effect of this
limitation is that new long-term debt cannot be sold if the company's earnings,
before the payment of federal income tax, is not at least double the amount of
interest it is required to pay on its long-term debt securities outstanding and
proposed to be issued.10
In 223 electric utility rate cases settled during the three year period 19711973, 212 or 95 percent of the utilities had indentures which specified that interest payments must be covered at least 200 percent by earnings before interest
and income taxes (see table 19). In the 202 cases where data were available,
a greater proportion of the earlier cases reported high coverage ratios than did
the more recent cases. In the period January 1, 1971-March 31, 1972 62 percent of the utilities reported an interest coverage ratio of 2.5 or more. By 1973,
only 44 percent were in that category (see table 20).

TABLE 21.-RELATIVE DEPENDENCE ON CAPITAL MARKETS IN 1972

TABLE 19.-MINIMUM INTEREST COVERAGE REQUIRED BY INDENTURE (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SmLED
1971-73)
Number of
cases

Required interest coverage
Less than 2_______________________________ ------- _----- -------------------- ----2___to--------------------------------------------------------------------------2.1
2.5__ __________ _____________ _____________________ ---------- ____ ------- ---2.5 to 3_____________________ __ ___________ -- ___ -- __ -- _- ---------- -- -- -------- - -3 and over ______ --- _______________________ ------------------------------------TotaL ____________________________ _________ ---- __ ---- _____________ -------

Percent of
total

11
192
17
1
2
223

-----------------100

Less than 1 percent.
Source: Edison Electric Institute.

1

TABLE 20.-INTEREST COVERAGE AT TIME OF APPLICATION FOR ELECTRIC RATE CHANGE (202 ELECTRIC UTILITY
RATE CASES)
Time period
Jan. 1, 1971 to Mar. 31, 1972____________
Apr. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972 ___________
Jan. 1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973 ____________
TotaL _____ --- __________ -_-._--

Under 2

2 to 2.5

2.5 to 3

3 and over

Total

5
5
4

22
27
34

14
12
10

31
18
20

72
62
68

14

83

36

69

202

Source: Edison Electric Institute.
10

See Wllllam R. Brown, "Rates Cases and Utlllty Financing," PubZlo UtiUtieB Fort-

nightly, February 15, 1978, p. 89.

(In millions of dollars)
Electric utilities
Source of funds

All nonfinancial corporations

Amount

Percent

Amount

Percent

1nternal sources:
Depreciation and amortization _____ _______________
Retained earnings _______________________________

2.9
11.6

20
11

21.6
62.8

15
40

SubtotaL ____________________________________

4.5

31

84.4

55

External sources:
Stocks and bonds ____________________________ ___
Loans and other short-term items _______________ __

9.6
4

66
3

38.2
30.7

25
20

SubtotaL ________________________________ ____
TotaL _______ _________ ------------------- -- -t

10.0

69

68.9

45

14.5

100

153.3

100

Includes reserves for deferred income taxes.

Source: Federal Reserve System Flow of Funds; Edison Electric Institute.
THE ROLE OF THE INDUSTRY IN CAPITAL MARKETS

Greater Dependence on Capital Markets

The above-average dependence of electric utilities on capital markets is
illustrated in Table 21. Whereas all non-financial corporations, on the average,
obtained 55 percent of their funds from internal sources in 1972, the far more
capital-intensive electric utilities got only 31 percent of the funds they require
in that fashion. It is pertinent to note that the bulk of the electric industry's
relative modest internal funds are obtained via depreciation allowances. In striking contrast, the great bulk of the internal financing of other companies is
through retained earnings; in fact, profits are their major single source of
financing.
When we turn to the subject of external financing, we find that other companies
generally obtain a substantial portion of their funds via bank loans and other
short-term indebtedness, unlike the electric utilities.
Thus, the great and rather unique dependence of electric utilities on capital
markets arises from a combination of factors:
1. The highly capital-intensive character of the industry and hence its
continual need for new capital.
2. The modest availability of retained earnings and hence the industry's
dependence on external sources for financing its large capital programs.
3. The minor extent to which it uses, or could be expected to utilize,
short-term financing for its long-term capital projects, and thus the great
dependence on continually attracting new long-term capital into the industry.
Despite its massive size, the industry does not have the internal financial
reserves to weather periods of stress in capital markets generally or in the
electric utility industry specifically (see Figure 5). As pointed out in the introduction, an early period of lack of capital led to the entry of municipally-owned
utilities. The current period of stress has resulted in ane case where the state
government has taken over the ownership as well as financing of major new
facilities.
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GREATER DEPENDENCE ON CAP ITAL MARKETS
(Sources of Funds In 1972)
~

NEW CAPITAL OF INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES
AS PERCENT OF PERSONAL SAVINGS

Percent
100

"'

SHOr~A~~RH

1947 - 1973
SHORT-TERH
LOANS

90

80

Percent
20.----r--~----~---r--~

STOCKS
AND
BONDS

STOCKS
AND
BONDS

EXTERNAL
FINANCING

70

60

.....
t""
50

40

NATIONAL

RETAINED
EARNINGS

.....
~

30

INTERHAL
FlNANCING

RETAINED
EARNINGS

INCOME

BASIS
10

20
INtE&NAL
FtNARGING

10

DEPRECIATION
OEPREC IAT I ON

.....

......

0
ALL NONFINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS

ELECTRIC
UTILITIES

FIGURE

5

5

Source : Table 21.

Its Proportion of TotaZ OapitaZ Funds

Its high degree of capital intensity plus its reliance on external financing
for the major part of its capital expansion have led to the investor-owned
electric utility industry becoming a significant factor in the nation's capital
markets and in the overall process of capital formation. This significance can be
measured in a number of ways. Over the past 25 years, electric utilities have
annually taken the equivalent of from 5 percent to 16 percent of all personal
savings to finance their construction programs. Over the past decade this percentage has displayed a persistent tendency to rise. Over the period 1947-1972
the share of personal saving (measured on a national income basis) absorbed
by investor-owned electric utility stock and bond sales averaged an unweighted
9.9 percent annually. During the five years 196&-1972, however, the average was
13.4 percent and the annual values have been rising steadily. Figure 6 illustrates
the evolution af the electric utility industry's long term external financing as a
percent of personal savings.
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Source : Appendix table B.
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. Another measure of the role of electric utilities in the nation's capital formation
the ~hare of investor-o'Yned el~ctric utility expenditures in the total capital
expenditures of all U.S. mdustnes. Over the past decade the investor-owned
electric companies have doubled their proportion of the annual creation of new
plant. and equipment in the United States, from 7.6 percent in 1964 to 15.0 percent m 1973 (see Table 22). Undoubtedly, some of this increase has been due to
the unusually pronounced impact of inflation on the cost of construction a
factor. which weighs heavily in utility capital expenditures. Also, the growing
commitments to nuclear power, a very capital-intensive form of power generation
have accounted for some of this increase. Another factor was the desire t~
develop sufficient reserve capacity to reduce the likelihood of "brown-outs" and
"black-mils" during periods of peak demand due to equipment failures.
IS

TABLE 22.-CAPITAL OUTLAYS IN ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND OTHER INDUSTRIES
(Dollar amounts in billions)

Year

All U.S.
industries

Investor-owned
electric
utilities 1

Investor-owned
utilities as
percent of total
U.S. industry

$47.0
54.4
63.5
65.8
67.8
75.6
79.7
81.2
88.4
99.7

$3.6
4.0
5. 0
6.1
7.2
8. 3
10.2
11.9
13.4
15.0

7.6
7.4
7.8
9.4
10.6
11.0
12.8
14.7
15.2
15.0

1 Electric utility plant only.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "1971 Business Statistics " October 1971 p. 9 •
"Survey of Current Business," May 1974, p. S-2; Edison Electric Institute.
'
'
'

CHAPTER

4.

THE FUTURE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
INDUSTRY

OF THE ELECTRIC

UTILITY

SURVEY OF EXISTING FORECASTS THROUGH 1980

Industry Souroes

Forecasts of capital spending by investor-owned electric utilities are made
regularly by the Edison Electric Institute and by trade publications such as
Electrical World. In its periodic "National Power Surevys", the FPC also projects
electric utility capital requirements. Normally, these estimates are on a constant
dollar basis with possible rates of inflation suggested for developing current
dollar figures. Projections beyond a 10-year horizon are highly speculative and
of limited value. Estimates for the coming 5 to 10 year period are grounded in
actual construction program data, however, and can thus be viewed with some
degree of certainty.
For the 5 years 1974-1978, the Edison Electric Institute has estimated that
investor-owned electric plant construction will entail the expenditure of $73 billion, measured in 1973 dollars. Table 23 contains year-by-year figures from this
forecast.
TABLE

23

PROJECTED PLANT CONSTRUCTION BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES

[Constant 1973 Dollars]

Minions

Year:
1974
1975
1976
19-77
1978

$15,860
13,800
14,160
14,460
14,830

Total------------------------------------------------------- $73,110
Source : Edison Electric Institute.

For the years 1979 and 1980, it is likely that constant dollar capital expendi·
tures will stabilize at nearly $15 billion a year, making a 7-year dollar figure
of $103 billion.
In its most recent survey, Electrical World projected long-range investment
requirements for the total electrical utility industry. For the period 1974-1980,
these outlays are estimated at $179.3 billion, assuming an inflation rate of
3.3 precent a year. Taking the investor-owned segment of the industry at a
constant 78 percent of the total, current dollar needs of investor-owned utilities
would thus equal $139.8 billion over the 7-year span. The corresponding constant
1973 dollar figure would be about $122 billion (see Table 24).
TABLE 24.-2 INDUSTRY PROJECTIONS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPITAL NEEDS, 1974-80
(In millions of constant 1973 dollars)

Year
1974____________ ----------------------------------------------------------1975•••• ---- --------------------------------------------------------------1976 _____________ ---------------------------------------------------------1977----------------------------------------------------------------------1978_____ ----------------------------------------------------------------- 1979•••••• ------ ••••••• _-----------. -··· •••••••••••• __ •••••••••• _••••••••• _
1980·----------------------------------------------------------------------

Edison Electric
Institute

Electrical
World

15, 860
13, 800
14, 160
14, 460
14, 830
I 15, 000
115,000

15, 900
15, 650
16, 150
17, 300
18, 300
18, 950
19,550

--------------------103, 110
121, 800

TotaL ________________ ----------- •• --------------------------------- I

Author's estimates.

Source: "24th Annual Electrical Industry Forecast," Electrical World, Sept. 15, 1973; table 21; adjustments for inflation
and investor-owned shares by the author.
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. In addition to these capital outl'8.ys on electric plant and equipment. the
companies will also be making investments in other utility facilities (gas, steam, and water) of perhaps $500 million a year (measured in constant 1973 dollars). Thus, their caiptal needs in the 1974-80 time period will be
rnised by an additional $3-4 billion.
. Putting the above foreca·s ts on a current dollar basis involves an arbitrary
JUdgment of the average impact of in:flation over the remainder of this decade.
Urufortunately, predicting the course of price rises has proven especially difficult in the recent past. Recent developments, however, tend to indicate the
possibility of a higher average rate of in:flation during the next few years than
the 3-5 percent range commonly used in long-term estimates. For the purposes of
this study, an alternative set of estimates has been prepared, based on an average annual rate of in:flation of 7 percentt.
Adjusting the constant doUar series of the forecasts to a current dollar series
assuming a 7 percent in:flation rate produces the figures shown in Table 25.

TABLE 26.-4 PRIVATE PROJECTIONS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPITAL NEED, 1974-77

u~.vestor-owned

TABLE 25.-2 INDUSTRY PROJECTIONS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPITAL NEEDS, ASSUMING 7-PERCENT INFLATION
(In millions of current dollars)

(In millions of dollars)
Year
1974 ___ -- -----------------------------------------1975 ____ ----- -------------------------------------1976 _____ ------- ----------------------------------1977---------------------------------- ------------Total ____________ ._ ••• _. ___ •• _. __ • ___ ••• _____

Kidder,
Peabodyl

Truslow
Hyde2

Dean Witter a

First Boston'

14,413
14,588
15,126
16,925

14,400
15,000
15,600
16,200

14,438
16,759
16,527
17,441

16,100
16,700
18,200
21,200

61,052

61,200

65,165

72,200

1 E. W. Meyer, Kidder, Peabody & Co., testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Nuclear
Affairs, Mar. 6, 1973 (apparently, a constant dollar forecast).
ll W. Truslow Hyde, Jr., "Electrical World," Nov. 15, 1972, p. 31 (apparently, a constant dollar forecast),
a K. Hollister, "The Electric Utility Industry: An Investment Approach to Overall Return," Dean Witter & Co.,
August 1973 (inflation at about 5 percent).
4 S. A. Barnes and P. F. Naughton, "Investor Owned Electric Utility Outlook," First Boston Corp., May 21,
1973 (no indication of inflation rate but apparently is a current dollar forecast).

WORKING ESTIMATE OF OAPITAL EXPENDITURES

Year

Total. ___• ___ •• ____ _•• • _•• • ____ ___ __________________________________ _

Edison Electric
Institute

Electrical
World

16,970
15, 800
17, 3!i0
18,950
20,800
22,510
24,090

17,000
17,900
19,750
22,650
25,650
28,400
31,300

136,470

162,650

.~e two industry estimates,, when adjusted for a 7 percent in:flation rnte, ' fall
Withm a range of ±9 percent around $150 billion. Adding the expected expenditures on non-electric utility plant-$4.6 billion over the 197~1980 period'!O~d give ~ total capital requirement of about $155 billion. Perhaps the most
sigmficant difference between the two -sets of forecasts is that EEl anticipates
a lower level of capital spending by electric utilities in 1975 than in 1974. This
would permit some ease in the industry's current severe financial pressures.
In contrast, the trade publication sees little abatement in the upward trend at.
electricity capital requirements.
Estimates by Non-Industry Sources
Numerous organizations outside the electric utility industry prepare forecasts
of the industry's future capital expenditures. Most emanate from the :flnancia'l
community and are generated by analysts particularly conversant with utilities.
Other estimates are made from time to time by academic researeh(~rs and by
experts in fuel supply and equipment manufacturing indutJtries for which electrict utilities represent important customers. Comparisons of these various nonutility industry forecasts is often difficult because allowances for in:flation may
· not be indicated, time horioons vary, or year by year est imates are not given.
However, where a common approach is used or where a \''ommon approach can
be inferred, a com!pB.rative analysis of these forecasts can l,.."' useful.
Table 26 presents some recent estima•tes of near term capital requiremE-nts by
investor-owned electric utilities made by non-industry experts. '\\,.l:lile these estimates are not strictly comparable because of uncertainty over in.rlfttion rates
they all appear to imply constant dollar (1973) estimates of $60-65 billion ove~
the four years 197~1977. Over the same period the Electrical W r,rld forecast
cited previously calls for $66 billion in 1973 dollars and the EEI projection $58
billion.
'

For purposes of estimating the possible extent of external financing requirements of the investor-owned electrical utility industry in the period 197~1980, the
construction expenditure forecast to be used in the following analysis is a basic
constant-dollar total of $103 billion. This forecast uses the lower of the two
industry estimates through 1978 and assumes a plateau in real terms !or the
period 1978-1980 at about $15 billion a year. The moderrute projections for 1979
and 1980 specifically reflect cutbacks in capital programs recently announced by
several public utilities. An allowance is added to cover non-electric utility outlays
by electric companies. When the figures are adjusted for a projected 7 percent
annual rate of inflation, the result is a $140 billion total of 1974-80 in current
dollars. On a year-by-year basis, current dollar capital .outlays by the investorowned electric utilities are projected to follow the pattern shown in Table 27.
TABLE 27.- CAPITAL OUTLAYS BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES,

197~0

(In millions of current dollars)
Electric
plant and
equipment

Other
utility
plant and
equipment

Total

1974 ____
____ ------------------------------------------------------1975
__ _________________ _______ ________ __ ___ _______
___ __ _____ _1976 ____ ___ ______ ---- ------------- ------- --- --- -----------------1977---- -- ------- --------------- ---------- ----- -- ---------------1978 ____ -- ---------------------- ----- ---------------------------1979 ___ ---------- -------- --------- -- ------ -------------------- --1980 ____ _----------- ----- ------- --- ---- --------------------------

$16,970
15, 800
17,350
18,950
20,800
22,510
24,090

$535
570
610
655
700
750
830

$17, 505
16,370
17,960
19,605
21,500
23,260
24,920

TotaL_------ __ -------------- -- •• -- -- ----- -----------------

136,470

4,650

141,120

Year

These estimates would still prove to be too high if recently announced curtailments in electric utility construction programs should become a generalized
phenomenon in the industry. The use of a 7 percent in:flation rate may also be
questioned as 'representing an overly pessimistic view of the longer term effects o'f
anti-in:flation measures. However, for purposes of assessing the potential capability of the investor-owned electric utilities to meet their financing requirements
and to evaluate possible government actions to assist them in this endeavor, it
would seem appropriate to use a current dollar forecast re:flecting continued
increases in both electricity demand and the general price level.
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CAPABILITY OF THE INDUSTRY TO FINANCE ITB CAPITAL NEEDS
Historica~

Trends

The _internal generation of capital, as already noted, does not play as important
a ~ole m the financing of electric utility expansion as it does in most other industries. Normally, about 40 percent of an electric company's capital needs will be
covere~ from int~rnal sources, although this figure can vary from year to year.
In periods of rapid expansion external sources may have to be relied upon for as
~uch as 70 percent of the _
i nvestment, while in periods of more moderate growth
mternal funds generation may be sufficient for more than half of the annual
capital expenditure.
. La~ge increases in construction budgets over the past several years of high
m::tlation have been reflected in a reduction in the relative importance of interually generated funds as a source of financing. This is evident from the data
in Table 28, which show a decline from 48.4 percent in 1966 to 33.8 percent in 1973.

The importance of depreciation as a future source of funds can be inferred from
the rapid growth in new plant to be added by utilities in tJhe remainder of the
1970's. Normally, the V'alue of net additions to gross plant .r epresents an average
of 90 percent of annual construction expenditures. With the current dollar total
of such expenditures expected to exceed $140 ·billion over the period 1974-1980,
additions to the gross pl'a nt total will pr<Ybably surpass $125 billion. The total of
electric utility ·f acilities will almost double during this period, rising from about
$140 billion at the end of 1973 to nearly $270 billion by the end of 1980.
The contribution of depreciation charges to the flow of internal funds will
depend on the trend in average annual depreciation rates. Over the past several
years the percentage of pl'ant charged to depreciation expenses has shown a ·tendency to decline, as indicated in Ta·ble 30.
TABLE 30.-ELECTRIC UTILITY PLANT AND ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
(In millions of dollars]

TABLE 28.-TOTAL AND INTERNALLY GENERATED FUNDS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES
(Millions of dollars)

Year

Year
Total funds
provided

Internally
generated

Percent
internally
generated

5, 565
6, 726
8,058
8, 728
11,306
13,147
14,530
15,400

2,694
2, 954
2,962
3, 392
3,472
3,927
4, 585
5, 200

48.4
43.9
36.8
38.9
30.7
29.9
31.6
33.8

Source: EEl Economics and Statistics Department.

Internally generated funds :flow from three principal sources : retained earnings, depreciation and amortization, and provisions for deferred or future incom~ t.axes. Of the three, depreciation and amortization is the most important,
proVIdmg more than 60 percent of the total internal funds :flow. Retained earnings are the second most important source. Deferred income taxes are still a
relatively minor contributor to the overall :flow but have increased rapidly since
1966 as various tax measures designed to stimulate investment have begun to
make their in::tluence felt. A fourth source of internal funding of construction
which is tapped only sporadically is the reduction of working capital. The percentage breakdown of the internal funds stream for the period 1966-1973 is
shown in Table 29.
TABLE 29.-INTERNALLY GENERATED FUNDS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES
(Dollars in millions]

Retained earnings
Year
1966 ____ --------1967------------1968
--------1969____
_____________
1970______________
----------1971
1972 _____________
1973__ ___________

Depreciation and
amortization

Net decrease in
working capital
Deferred or future and miscellaneous
income tax
sources

Total internal
funds

Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount
$861
893
843
943
950
1,090
1, 319
1,427

32.0
30.2
28.5
27.8
27.4
27.8
28.8
27.4

$1,782
1, 902
2,044
2,206
2,411
2,639
2,920
3,270

Source: EEl Economics and Statistics Department.

66.1
64.4
69.0
65.0
69.4
67.2
63.7
62.9

$51
58
75
95
111

198
346
503

1. 9
2.0
2. 5
2.8
3. 2
5. 0
7. 5
9. 7

------------------ $2,694
2,954
$101
3.4
------------------ 2,692
3,392
148
4.4
------------------ 3,472
------------------ 3,927
------------------ 4,585
------------------ 5,200

Percent
100
lOU

100
100
100
100
100
100

1966••• ---------------------------------------------------------1967------------------------------------------------------------1968••• ---------------------------------------------------------1969.-----------------------------------------------------------1970_____
197L
••• __---------------------------------------------------------- _______ • ______________________________ • ____________ _
1972. ---------------------------------------------------------1973.------------------------------------------------------------

Total utility
plant

Depreciation
and
amortization

$69,260
74,640
81,040
88,470
97,690
108,910
121,480
135,770

$1,782
1,902
2,044
2,206
2,411
2,639
2,920
3,270

Average
depreciation
rate (percent)
2.57
2.55

2. 52

2.49
2.47
2.42
2.40
2.40

Source: Edison Electric Institute Economics and Statistics Department.

The steady decrease in the average effective depreciation rate is the result of
several factors. Among these are regulatory influences, company depreciation
policies, a rising proportion of pl'a nt with a longer expected useful life, and increased construction work in progress.
The overall pattern of internal and external flows of funds of the investorowned electric utility for the years 1966-1972 can •be seen in Table 31. :Apparent
in the figures is the uneven growth of retained earnings, the rapid growth of deferred or future vaxes, and the pronounced swings in the annual changes in short
term debt.
Estimated Internal Funds Fliow 1914-1980

!This section of the report is devoted to developing estimates of the availability
of .internal financing for the electric utility industry through 1980.
Deprectation.-As is evident from data in the preceding ta>
bles, depreciation is
the most important single source 'Of internally generated funds for electric utilities. If the reduction in average depreciation vates is arrested 'and if construction
e~penditures grow at a decreasing rate t!hrough 1980, as is generaHy expected,
depreciation w'Ould represent an increasing share of these expenditures. This will
tend to reduce the need for increased external capital.
To ·forec'ast the flow of funds from this source through 1980, it is necessary to
project toval plant v·a lues for the period and make an assumption concerning the
depreciation rate. Table 32 sets out the e~ted year 'by year net additions -to
gross plant. These are based on an assumed ratio of net 'additi'Ons to construction
expenditures of 0.90.
Assuming that current depreciation rates in the neighborhood of 2.4 percent of
total gross plant will be maintained for tihe balance of the decade, the internal
funds flow represented by depreciation will rise from $3.6 billion in 1974 to $6.2
billion in 1980 (see Table 33).
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TABLE 31.-CASH FLOW STATEMENT FOR INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES
Jln millions of dollars)
1972

' 1971

Increase in value of gross plant:
Electric.-------------------------- ------------- 12, 338 11,109
495
Gas, steam, and other.---- ----- ------ ----------694
TotaL.·----- __ --------_--------------------- 13, 032 11,604

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

9,427
554

7,635
363

6,397
464

5,n~

4,362
439

9,981

7,998

6, 861

5,943

4, 801

Retained Earninga.-Earned surplus represents the second most important
source of internal funding. The extent to which companies will be able to rely
on retained earnings will depend on several factors, including rate relief and
the trend of operating expenses. A conservative estimate would call for a
growth in annual earnings retention of 7.2 percent a year, slightly below tlie
average annual rate of increase realized over the period 1966-1973. Such an estimate would project retained earnings rising from $1.5 billion in 1974 to about
$2.3 billion in 1980. Total earnings retained for reinvestment would equal $13.3
billion over the 1974-1980 time period (see Table 34).
TABLE

Sources of funds:
861
893
843
943
950
Retained
earninas·----------------------------- 1, 319 1, 090 2,411
1, 782
Depreciation
an amortization ____________________
2,206 2,044 1,902
2,920 2,639
51
Deferred or future income taxes __________________
75
58
95
111
346
198
158
265
781 1}, 062
Increase in short-term debt. _____________________
380
137 -------Decrease in working capital (other than short-term
101 -------148 -------debt) and other miscellaneous sources •••. ------------------- ------------

34

PROJECTED .RETAINED EARNINGS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES

Year:
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

MiZUonB

---------------------------------------------------------- $1,530
---------------------------------------------------------- 1,640
---------------------------------------------------------- 1,760
---------------------------------------------------------- 1,885
---------------------------------------------------------- 2,020
---------------------------------------------------------- 2,165
---------------------------------------------------------- 2,320

Total internally generated plus short-term
borrowing _____ • __ ._. ____ • ____ •• ___ • ____ -_ 4,965

4,064

3,472

4,173

4,024

3, 219

2,852

Increase in long-term debt. ______________ ________ 4, 902
Increase in preferred stock ______________ _________ 2,119
Increase in common stock ________________ ________ 2, 544

4, 958
1, 745
2,380

5,037
1,147
1, 650

3, 542
402
611

3,136
459
439

2,636
470
401

2,160
356
197

Net proceeds from sale of securities _____________ 9, 565

9,083

7, 834

4, 555

4,034

3,507

2,713

Total ----------------------------~-------------------------- $13,320

Total funds provided·--------------- ---------- 14,530 13,147 11,306

8,728

8,058

6, 726

5, 565

Provisions for Deterred or Future Income Tames.-Deferrals of income tax

Funds
applied to: expenditures-electric department.. ••. 13, 435 11, 938 10, 182 8, 323 7• 168 6• 140
4• 962
Construction
481
Construction expenditures-all other departments..
423
560
436
405
312
586
Decrease in thort•term debt. ____________ ------------------------138 -------------------------------Increase in working capital (other than short-term
122
649
578 -------debt) and other miscellaneous sources__________
672
550 -------Total funds applied __________________________-1-4-,5-30-1-3,-1-47_1_1,-30-6--8,-72-8_8_,-o5_8_6_,-:72:-:-6--::5-::,5=65
1 Since

1968, notes payable are included in short-term debt.
Source: Edison Electric Institute.

resulting from accelerated depreciation have become a significant source of the
internal :flow of funds since 1970. While still a small percentage of total requirements (about 3 percent of construction expenditures in 1973), these annual
deferrals have been growing rapidly. Use of liberalized depreciation (or ADR)
has enabled many companies to increase the benefits of using accelerated depreciation. It should be recognized that deferred taxes are only a source of funds
for companies who are allowed to "normalize" tax incentives.
For purposes of this report, annual estimates of deferred taxes are assumed at
1 percent of the cumulative net addition~ to gross utility plant since 1969. On that
basis, the annual total of deferred taxes will rise from $645 million in 1974
to almost $1.8 billion in 1980 (see Table 35).

TABLE 32.-PROJECTIONS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY GROSS PLANT

TABLE 35.-PROJECTED DEFERRED TAXES OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES

(In millions of dollars)

(In millions of dollars)

Year
1974•••• --- •• ------------------------------------------------ ---1975____________________________________________________________
____________ -------------------------------------- -----------_
1976
1977------------------------------------------------------------1979
1978••••
____________________________________________________________
------------------ -------------------------------------- -_
1980•••• ------------------------------------------------------ -- -

Construction Net additions
expenditures to gross plant

Yearend
gross plant

$15,755
14,735
16,165
17,645
19,350
20,935
22,430

$158,155
172,890
189,055
206,700
226,050
246,985
269,415

$17,505
16,370
17,960
19,605
21,500
23,260
24,920

Source: Table 27 and assumptions described in the text.

Year

645
790
950
1,130
1, 320
1, 530
1, 755
8,120

TABLE 36.-PROJECTED INTERNAL FINANCING OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES

Average gross
utility plant
150, 280
165, 525
180, 975
197, 880

~·. ~}~

~~~: ~~g

Total..--.----------------------- -------------------------···--·------·---·-----·-- --

(Dollar amounts in millions)

Depreciation at
2.4 percent of
gross utility
plant

4, 345
4, 750
5, 195
5, 675
______________ ___________________________________ _________________________2_58_,_2o_o_ _ _ _6_,_19-:5

~~~~:::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

1980

64,325
79,060
95,225
112,870
132,220
153,155
175,585

1974_____ -------------------------------------------------------------1975•••• ---------------------------------------------- ------ ----------1976••• ---------------------------------------------------------------1977---------------------------------------------- -- -- --- -------------1978••.. ---------------------------------------------- -- ---- ----------1979•••. -- ---------------------------------------------- --------------1980••.• -------------------------------------------- -------- -----------

[In millions of dollars]

1974••• --- ----------------------------------------------------------------1975••• ----------------------------------- --------------------------------1976••••. -----------------------------------------------------------------1977------------ --------------------------------------------------- ---- ----

Annual deferred
taxes at 1 percent
of cumulative net
additions since
1969

TotaL. ___ •••. ------------------------------ ---- ------ -----------------------------

TABLE 33.-PROJECTED DEPRECIATION CHARGES OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES

Year

Cumulative net
additions to gross
utility plant since
1969

33,745

Retained earnings
Year
1974••• -------------------1975 ____ ----------- -------1976••• -------------------1977----------------------1978•••• -- ----------------1979•••. ------------------1980 _____ -----------------TotaL ___ • __ • ________

Depreciation and
amortization

Deferred or future
income tax

Total

Amount

Percent

Amount

Percent

Amount

Percent

Amount

Percent

$1,530
1,650
1, 760
1, 885
2,020
2,165
2,320

26.5
25.7
25.0
24.3
23.7
23.2
22.6

$3,610
3,975
4,345
4,750
5,195
5,675
6,195

62.4
62.0
61.5
61.2
60.8
60.6
60.3

$645
790
950
1,130
1,320
1,530
1,755

11.1
12.3
13.5
14.5
15.5
16.3
17.1

$5,785
6,405
7,055
7,765
8,535
9,370
10,270

100
100
lOO
100
100
100
100

13,320

24.2

33,745

61.1

8,120

14.7

55,185

100
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Total Internal Funds Flows, 1914-1980.-Table 36 summarizes the estimates
of annual internal generation of investible funds from the three principal sources
of depreciation, retained earnings, and deferred taxes. The total estimated availability of over $55 billion is an impressive sum, at least until compared to the
anticipated capital requirements of the electric utility industry.
For the period 1974-78, an alternative set of projections has been prepared by
Donald Mishara of Smith, Barney and Company. His total of internal financing
available to the utilities for the five year period, $36.2 billion,1 is very close to
the $35.6 billion that can be computed from Table 36. The coincidence of ind~
pendent estimates, of course, is no guarantee of accuracy, but it may provide some
assurance tha~t the figures used here are not extreme ones.

The critical role of rate increases in attracting adequate capital to the electric
utility industry has been noted by many experts. A vice president of the investment banking firm of Dean Witter and Co. described the relationship succinctly:
The single most crucial item in being able to finance this magnitude
growth will be the amount of rate relief that will be granted by the
various regulatory agencies.8
A utilities consultant described the situation as follows:
Certainly, investors are becoming increasingly concerned with not only
the universal and inevitable failure of utilities to earn the returns to
which Commissions say they are entitled, but also with the declining
return on the common equity of many individual companies. They will
also become more selective in their investment decisions as they become
more conscious of the ability, or inability, of individual companies to
·obtain adequate and timely rate increases and to maintain a satisfactory
return which is essential to permit financing at a reasonable cost.'

Ea:tent ot Ea:ternal Funds Required

For the 7-year period 1974-80, approximately 39 percent of estimated capital
requirements of the electric utilities will be met by internal financing according
to the estimates developed in this report, $55 billion out of over $140 billion (see
Table 37). The remainder, nearly $86 biUion will have to be raised by attracting
additional capital to the industry. Another way of looking at the situation is
that, for a regulated utility, the internally generated sources of funds are a relatively fixed percentage of existing plant. Depreciation is directly a function of
the capital stock and income is based on rates geared to the "rate base," which
is closely related. Hence, substantial increases in capita•! spending generally require added use of external financing via sales of stock and bonds.
An external requirements figure exceeding $85 billion over the seven years
1974-80 represents an extreme challenge to the capital markets by the investorowned electric utility industry. Al1though it is presented as a realistic projection,
it could be viewed as a "high" estimate fo-r the fol'l owing reasons :
(1) It ignores the potential contribution to internal funds flows of the
investment tax credit. 2
(2) It "pessimistically" assumes continuation of inflation at an annual
rate of 7 percent for the balance of this decade.
(3) It forecasts retained earnings growth as a marginally lower rate than
experienced over the preceding 7-year period, but assuming continued progress in rate relief.
(4) It assumes no improvement in depreciation rates.
(5) It anticipates only limiated curtailment in electricity demand growth
as a result of the recent energy crisis. (However, new ·a dditions to capacity
now cost two to three times as much as they did five or ten years ago).
The pattern of future financing needs outlined in Table 37 does reveal that,
over the period 1974-1977, some stabmty is likely to be attained in the absolute
dollar amounts which the industry will be raising in capital markets. This
"breathing space" could be available to industry, regulatory authorities and the
Federal government to deal with the underlying problems ~that affect the capability of utilities to finance their needs.
TABLE 37.-PROJECTED EXTERNAL FINANCING OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES
[Dollar amounts in millions)
Construction expenditures
Year
1974 ____ ------ --- --- --1975
--------- ___
--- ----1976 ____
_____________
1977------------- --- --1978 _______ - ------ --- -1979 _____ -- ------ ---- -1980 ________ - ----- --- -TotaL ______ ___ __

Internally generated

A senior officer at a major New York bank presented his "t""iews:
... many electric utility executives have expressed their serious,
and quite natural, concern about the availability of capital to meet their
burgeoning needs.
Frankly, we at Citibank do not share this serious concern. In our view,
the financial markets have the depth, efficiency, and flexibility to accommodate these requirements.
Therefore, the key to our confidence in capital adequacy for electric
utilities is the premise that they will maintain sound financial structures,
and that they will produce earnings sufficient to adequately cover fixed
charges. If this premise is incorrect, we will all have problems !-for
there will always be competition for funds. 5
A similar analysis was provided by a former president of the American .Stock
Exchange, now chairman of the management committee of the First Boston
Corporation :
Rate relief is urgent for the utility industry to attract equity capital.
Without rate relief, the investor-owned electric utility industry will have
great difficulty in meeting projected external financing requirements.6
It is ironic to contemplate that the alternative to adequate rate increases to
attract sufficient capital is also rate increases, but of a less efficient type. That is,
when utilities find it difficult to raise funds for expanding their facilities, they
are encouraged to select the least capital-intensive alternative. But that is likely
to result in higher operating costs and hence in higher rates to cover the costs of
using the less efficient alternative. To the extent that these uneconomic choices
result in curtailment of expansion of nuclear facilities, they also may be making
more difficult the attainment of the national objective of reducing this nation's
dependence on overseas sources of energy.
PROSPECTS FOB. A LOWER GROWTH RATE IN ELECTRICITY USAGE

Externally financed

Amount

Percent

Amount

Percent

Amount

Percent

$17,505
16,370
17,960
19,605
21,500
23,260
24,920

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

$5,785
6, 405
7,055
7, 765
8, 535
9, 370
10, 270

33.0
39. 1
39.3
39.6
39.7
40.3
41.2

$11,720
9, 9b5
10,905
11, 840
12, 965
13,890
14,650

67.0
60.9
60.7
60.4
60.3
59.7
58.8

141, 120

100

55, 185

39.1

85,935

60.9

1 Electrical World, June 1, 1974, p. 285.
• 2 The tax credit as now applied is limited to 4 percent for electric utilities as compared
to 7 percent for manufacturing firms. Moreover, limitations now imposed on the use of the
credit mean that a change upward in the credit rate would not help a company which is
already generating more investment credit than it can use. Many electric utilities are now
near this limit of 50% of income.

During the past two decades, the consumption of electricity in the United States
has risen at an annual rate of 7.4 percent, from 443 billion kilowatt-hours in 1953
to 1,849 billion kilowatt-hours in 1973. For most periods, except during the boom
of the 1960's, electricity usage has grown more than twice as fast as the economy
as a whole, reflecting in part the fact that the price of electricity was declining
sharply relative to all prices. The record of more recent months, however, shows
the possibility of a shift in the historical trend.
3
Kenneth Hollister, CFA, "Regulatory Ratings," Public Utilities Fortnightly, September 27, 1973, p. 19.
'W. Truslow Hyde, Jr., "Regulatory Ratings," Public Utilities Fortnightly, September 27, 1973, p. 21.
5
William A. Lockwood, Senior Vice President of the First National City Bank, OapitaZ
Resources for a Oapital Intensive Industry, a speech before the General Electric Sixth
Electric
Utility Executives Conference, Hot Spring, Virginia, September 17, 1973, pp. 1-2.
11
Ralph S. Saul, "Energy and tbe Capital Markets," PubZic Utilities Fortnightly, January 31, 1974, p. 38.
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Relationship Between RateB and UBage

·C onsumption of electricity began running below the level of the previous year
almost immediately upon the imposition of the oil embargo in the Fall of 1973.
This decline in usage, to some extent, reflected the public reaction to the government's efforts to foster voluntary conservation. It subsequently was reenforced by the sharp rise in utility rates, .although we cannot measure the precise
impact. However, by March 1974, even before the embargo was lifted, usage of
electricity ·began exceeding year-ago levels. The trend since then has been erratic.
June power consumption declined from the level of June 1973, but that may reflect
both an unusually strong month last year and unusually cool weather this year
with an attendant dampening effect on air conditioning usage. 7
This fluctuating pattern may suggest that voluntary measures are difficult to
sustain beyond periods of immediate crisis. Also, the impact of price on demand
patterns may take considerable time to unfold. In the short run, some economists
report that the elasticity of demand for residential users if electricity is quite
low, between -0.1 and -0.2. This means that a 10 percent increase in utility
rates will reduce usage by enly 1-2 percent.
.,
Over the long-run, however, demand may be quite elastic. Professor Dale J orgenson of Harvard University has estimated a long-run "elasticity" of demand for
electricity at -0.62; that is, a 6.2 percent decline in kilowatt hours consumed for
every 10 percent rise in prices.8 The economic staff if the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco reports that some studies indicate a long-run elasticity of
demand of -1.0 for residential users of electricity, as does a study by Professor Hendrik Houthakker of Harvard University and several associates. A recent
report by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory found elasticities for commercial
and industrial users in the -1.5 range. 9
However, a paper by Roger Carlsmith, Associate Director of the ORNL-NSF
Environmental Program at Oak Ridge adds the following "word of caution":
We also find that there is a time delay of 6-10 years in the response to
price changes. Thus one cannot expect electricity price rises to be a nearterm solution to the problem of supply shortages.10
If measures of price elasticity for electricity are uncertain, even less work
has been done in quantifying measures of cross-elasticity with other fuels, such
as oil and natural gas. It may well be that price elasticity for all enetgy is rather
low while cross elasticities, over the longer run, are rather high. If this is the
case, then to properly predict demand for electricity one would also need to predict the price and subsequ~nt demand for other energy sources as well.
As a general proposition, economists see electrical energy as a commodity subject to the influences of supply and demand, which means a sensitivity to price.
Many long-term projections by financial institutions and industry sources now in
use were prepared prior to the recent large increases in rates. It could well be
that these forecasts overstate future electricity usage.
Energy growth expanded rapidly in the past two decades, in part because real
energy prices were declining (that is, rates were going up more slowly than the
general p~ level). Between 1951 and 1971, real electricity prices were reduced
by 43 percent, encouraging users to substitute energy for labor and material, which
were rising faster in price. Now that energy prices are rising faster than labor
and materials, some reverse substitution may dampen energy demand.
As a result of the substantial rise in energy prices as well as concern over the
availability of adequate supplies, a new "energy ethic" is reported to be developing in some quarters of business and other parts of society. A recent
issue of U.S. NewB and WorZa Report cited numerous examples of companies
learning to economize on this now expensive resource, ranging from reducing
hot water in hotels to shutting down escalators in off hours.u
A homeowner may put in more insulation (substituting capital for energy),
a manufacturer may change from plastic to wood (substituting material for
energy), and a company may use more hand assembly rather than automation
(substituting labor for energy and capital).
'1 "Conservation Even Affected Peaks,t EEI Finds," Electrical Week, May 20, 1974, p. 2.
a Stephen B. Shepard, "How much energy does the U.S. Need?," Business Week, ;June 1,
1974. p. 70.
9 W111lam Burke, "After Con Ed," Business and Financial Letter, Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, May 24, 1974, p. 3; "Electric Utlllties face a price dilemma," Business
Week, February 2, 1974, p. 34.
10 Roger S. Carlsmith, "Energy Conservation Programs," in National Science Foundation, Energy, Environment, Productivity, Washington, 1974, P.· 9.
u "How Soaring Cost of Energy Spurs New Ways to Save,' U.S. News and World Report,
May 27, 1974, p. 49.

The Federal Energy Administration has embarked on a comprehensive campaign ·t o dampen down the demand for energy which, to the extent it succeeds,
should slow down the growth rate of electricity usage. 'l~he effort to foster. an
"energy conservation ethic" in the United States consists of the followmg
activities:
.
.
1. An advertising campaign, in cooperation wi:th the Advertismg Council, to
expose citizens "to how they can conserve energy and why it. is important."
2. A joint program with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
to distribute energy conservation school kits (teacher aids, charts, course. study
material, etc.) to one-third of the elementary and secondary schools m the
United States.
3. Individual campaigns using media and educational literature aimed at
home improvements, driving, appliance use and purchasing, heating and cooling
equipment maintenance and lighting.
4. A specific program to achieve 50 percent conformance with FEA lighting
standards of 50 footcandles over office work stations, 30 footcandles in general
office space, and 10 footcandles in halls and corridors.
5. The Department of Commerce program to label on a voluntary basis major
energy consuming appliances, to help the public determine the relative efficiency
of different units.
6. Developing a program to stimulate adding storm doors and improved insulation to homes, and to get localities to adopt revised building codes for the
same purpose.
7. The Federal Energy Management Program, which claims to have reduced
the government's own demand for electricity by 1,213,000 megawatt hours during
January-March 1974.12
Effect on OapitaZ RequirementB

To some extent, the changing pattern of electricity demand is affecting capital
expansion programs in the industry, although the problem of raising capital is
clearly another important factor.
Perhaps a straw in the wind was the May 22, 1974 announcement of the
Detroit Edison Company that it was reducing its :five-year capital spending pl'ans
from $3.6 billion to $2.95 billion, an 18 percent cutback. The utility announced
that it simultaneously was reducing its forecast of the annual growth rate for
electricity consumption from 6.8 percent to 5.8 percent. The previous month,
however, Standard and Poor's had reduced the rating of the company's bonds
from AA to A.18
Consumers Power Company of Michigan has said that it will delay for about
a year the planned openings of two major electric plans originally scheduled
for the late 1970's and early 1980's because its internal projections suggest "a
reduction in the rate of growth in electric demand over the next 5 to 10 years." u
The company conceded that the delay would result in higher costs for these
projects, but stated that, in the light of the current high costs of capital, it is
not considered to be prudent to build facilities before they are necessary. Construction work has not started at any of the proposed facilities.
Commonwealth Edison Company of Chicago in July cancelled plans to build
two 500,000 kilowatt coal-fired generating plants because of "reduced estimates
of peak loads." 15 A group of 10 electric companies reported to the Delaware River
Basin Commission that the area needs three fewer new nuclear power plants
during the next 15 years than the ten originally proposed in 1972.18
Some observers disagree with the notion that the combination of rising prices
and relatively elastic demand will dampen down the future growth rate of
electricity usage. With dwindling supplies of liquid fossil fuels, some analysts
12

Testimony of John 0. SawhtZZ, Administrator, Federal Energy Ofllce, before the Senate

Commerce Committee on S. 258!, Electrical Energy Conservation Act, Washington, June 17,
1974, pp. 2, 4; FEA Release 74-276, July 2, 1974, p. 2.
18
"Detroit Edison Cuts Its Spending Plans 18% Due. to Finance Woes," The Wall Street
JournaZ, May 22, 1974, p. 27.
u "Consumer Power To Delay Opening Two Electric Plants," Wall Street Journal,
May 3, 1974, p. 4. Additional cutbacks by the company were announced In late June. See
"Construction Plans for Nuclear Plants Canceled by Utllity," The New York Times,
June 29, 1971, p. 1.
J 15 "Blg Chicago Utility Drops Plans To Build 2 Coal-Fired Units," Wall Street Journal,
uly 5, 1974.
18
New York Times May 6·, 1974. See also Sanford L. Jacobs, "Money-Raising Problems
jause Utlllties To Cut Spending for New Electric Plants," The Wall Street Journal,
uly 19, 1974, p. 26.
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predict that electric power, which can be generated from a variety of sources
such as coal and uranium, will continue its past rapid growth rate. 17 They view
the recent softening of electrical use as a temporary response to a crisis-induced
"conservation ethic," which is not expected to be a lasting phenomenon. Some
a~celeration in the demand for electricity could occur as users switch from scarce
oil ~nd natural gas, especially for heating. Certainly, the more successful that
ProJect Independence turns out to be-with its emphasis on coal and nuclear
energy rather than oil and natural gas-the greater is likely to be the use of
electricity.
COMPETING REQUIREMENTS FOB CAPITAL FUNDS

. ~lectric u~ilities are not the only energy industries facing large increases in
capital reqwrements for the balance of this decade and beyond. The need to find
and develop additional fuel supplies on American territory in conjunction with
"Project Independence" will entail capital expenditures on an unprecedented
scale b~ the Prin;tary energy industries. To supple-ment natural gas resources, large
expenditures will 'b e needed to construct synthetic gas plants using coal or
~etr_?leum as raw materials and to build facilities to store and regasify imported
hqwfied natural gas. In addition to their investment in American reserves and
product~on facilities, many of the ''international" energy companies will be seekmg cap1tal for expansion of foreign operations including maritime transport
systems to handle fuel imports into the U.S. Much of the capital for these latter
developments will be raised in foreign money markets but some will also 'be taken
from American sources and these capital de-mands will compete with those of
the purely domestic energy industries.
In.1972 total capital expenditures by the petroleum industry in the U.S. app:o;x:Im1~ted half the same year's t?t~l of the investor-owned electric utilities, $14
bllhon. About ~0 perc~nt of the oil mdustry was generated internally. The rapid
future growth m capital outlays will likely force the oil industry to rely on
external financing for a larger percentage of its total requirements. Recent
dramatic rises in profits may have only a transitory effect on the petroleum industry's cash :flow and will not obviate the ue-ed to increase debt/equity ratios.
Th:e most comprehensive forecast of energy industry capital requirements was
pubhshed by the National Petroleum Council in 1972.19 This forecast considered
four different supply scenerios. The scenerio calling for the highest level of
domestic fuel production-more in line with current national priorities-would
necessitate the investment of $311 billion (in 1970 dollars) over the period 19711985. (These totals exclude outlays by utilities). Assuming that one-third of this
amount would be programmed between 1974 and 1980 and that 60 percent of it
would be funded internally, external requirements over this same period would
total more than $40 billion in 1970 dollars. A comparable 1973 dollar figure
would >be in the neighborhood of $50 billion, roughly two-thirds of the probable
external financing requirement of investor-owned electric utilities measured
likewise in 1973 dollars.
. Th~ fi';lancin~. ~equirements of non-inv~stor-owned electric utlities, and gas
~Istnb~tl~n utlhtles must also ~e taken mto account in estimating the energy
mdustr1es total demand on capital markets. Construction expenditures for the
government and cooperatively owned power suppliers might run as high as $30
billion, in 1973 dollars, for the 1974-1980 time span. About half of these funds are
likely to be raised in the capital markets.
Gas distribution utilities are forecast to spend some $9 bHlion over the 3 years
1974-76 for an average of $3 billion a year. 20 Some of this total is accounted for
by combination companies which supply both gas and electricity and is already
included in our investor-owned electric utility forecast. For the balance of the
decade gas utility expenditures should prove to be reasonably stable near the
levels projected for 1974--1976. They may u1timately total up to $20 billion in
1~73 dollars, half of which might require market financing.
In summary, a rough estimate of market financing requirements by the energy
industries could total, in 1973 dollars, nearly $140 billion (see Table 38).
D!lvid Myhra. "·T he Elasticity Argument in Electricity Demand," Public Utilities
June 6. 1974, pp. 41-46.
Based on expenditure data for 30 large petroleum companies surveyed by Chase Manhattnn Bank.
19 National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Outlook, 1972, page 296.
20 American Gas Association. Gas Facts, 1972.
17

Fortn~ghtly,
18

4;7:5
TABLE 38.-ESTIMATED INVESTMENTS BY ENERGY INDUSTRIES 1974-80
(Dollar amounts in billions)

~~i~~t~i~~~~-~~~~~~~i~~~====
=======================================
Non-investor-owned electric utilities_________________________________

Investor-owned electric utilities _____________ -------_________________

Capital
requirements

External
financed

Percent
externally
financed

$1~~30

$48
10
15
65

40
50
50
61

107

50
Tota'----------------------------------------------------------2-77--------183

A variety of projections by responsible public and private sources indicate that
very substantial demands will ·be made on the nation's capital market in the near
future to finance long-term investment projects. The economics department of the
General Electric Company, for example, has estimated U.S. industrial capital
needs at $2.7 trillion in the period 1974-1985. Table 39 contains a breakdown of
that substantial figure by major sector. Professors Barry Bosworth and James
Duesenberry have estimated that the anticipated heavy capital requirements
for such purposes as developing new energy sources, converting manufacturingl
plant and equipment to types of machinery that use less energy, and meeting
pollution restrictions will result in raising the ratio of private investment to
GNP from 10.6 percent in 1973 to an estimated 11.3 percent in 1980.n
Another way of looking at the question of rising capital needs is to look at the
annual totals. The Economics Department of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Com. pany has estimated that capital expenditures by American industry, other than
electric utilities, will rise from $89.0 billion in 1973 to $191.9 billion in 1985.2:1
A variety of estimates have been made for specific areas of public sector capital
spending. The Institute for Rapid Transit has estimated that 11 mass transportation authorities will spend over $5.8 billion for new rapid transit facilities in the
year 1975-79, in addition to $1.4 billion for modernizing existing plant.23 The U.S.
Council on Environmental Quality has projected public sector capital investment
for pollution control during the decade 1972-81 at $52.4 billion.2l In effect, available forecasts of future capital needs seems to present a constant variation of
the standard economic principle that human wants are insatiable. Thus, these
figures cannot ·b e viewed in isolation, but in reference to the likely supply of investment funds.
(In billions of dollars)
Amount

772
838
170
188

729

TotaL _·-·-- __________ _.• _____ __ • ____ ____ ______ •• •. _____ . ___ _____________ • __ ---- --- _______ ___ __ 2, 697
Sourc~: Gener~l Electric Co., Capital Requirements of Business, 1974-1985, statement of R. H. Jones before the Joint
Economrc Commrttee, May 8, 1974.

The prospects on the saving side are not very favorable. In absolute terms, of
course, there will be large increases in the dollar amount of funds that will be
available for investment. Several important factom, however, are dampening
down the growth rate of saving. Even with the inv~stment credit back on and
the liberalized depreciation (ADR) provisions, our tax system does less to encourage private saving and investment than those of most other industrialized
nations.
·
21 Barry M. Blechman et al, Setting National Priorities: The 1915 Budget, Washington
Brookings Institution, 1974, p. 268.
'
22 ,:'How U.S. industry's cash needs soar," Business Week, September 22. 1973, p. 50.
23 Transit Capital Needs, 1970-79," National Journal, October 3, 1970, p. 2157.
2' U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, Fourth Annual Report, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 93.
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For example, compared to the capital gains tax in the United rs tates-which
can be as much as 35 percent on assets held for six months or more--Japan does
not gain tax gains from occasional transfers of shares, but only if trades in a
single year exceed 50 transactions or 200,000 shares. In France, the Netherland,
and West Geremany capital gains generally are not subject to tax, while in Italy
they are taxed at the municipal level at 9-15 percent.
In Canada, 50 percent of capital gains are included in taxable income, but
there is no holding period requirement. The United Kingdom provisions similar
treatment on the first 5,000 pounds of annual gains only, or an alternative rate
of 30 percent.26 The very progressive nature of the federal personal income tax
will also exert a downward effect on the savings ration. As prices-and hence
nominal incomes--continue to rise, taxpayers are pushed into ever-higher
brackets. Thus, they pay a rising proportion of their income in taxes (unless
rates are reduced) and have a declining portion of their income available for
consumption or saving.
Consumers-who are the basic source of saving in the economy-will be experiencing some fundamental but adverse demographic factors in this decade. The
changing age distribution of our population suggests that, if past savings patterns
are maintained, the personal saving rate (although not the absolute amount)
could decline over the next decade. Table 40 shows the unfavorable prospects
as projected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
TABLE 40.-PROJECTED AGE DISTRIBUTION IN UNITED STATES, 1972-82
[In millions)
Age category (years)
Under 5-------------- - ----------- --- ----------------------------5 to 9--------------------------- ---- ----------------------------10 to 14---------------------- --- --- -----------------------------15 to 19·------------- - ------- --- ---- ----------------------------20 to 24--------------- ------ ---- ---- ----------------------------25 to 29.-------- - --------- - ----- ---- ----------------------------30 to 34.-------------- - --------- ---- ----------------------------35 to 39·------------------- -- --- ---- ----------------------------40 to 44·-------------------- - ---- --- --------·-------------------45 to 49·-------------------------- ---- ----- --- ------·---- -------SO to 54------·---- ---------------- ------ - ------- ----------- - ----55 to 59.·---- - ---------- ---- ------ --- ------- --- - --------- - -- ----60 to 64·-- ----- -- --- ------- ------- --- ----------- -·- -------- - ----65 to 69.·--- - - -- --- - -------------- ------ -- --- -- --- -- ------- -----70
-- --___
-- ----------------_-. --- ------ - --- ----75 to
and74·----over_. ___
__ • __ ____
________
_______
___--••--. . -__._-----__ .

1972

1982

Change

17.2
18.7
20.8
20.1
18.2
15.0
12.3
11.1
11.6
12.0
11.6
10.2
8. 9
7. 2
5. 61
8.

19.6
17.0
17.6
19.0
21.1
20.4
18.5
15.2
12.3
10.9
11.1
11.1
10.2
8. 4
6. 77
9.

+2. 4
-1. 1
-3.2
-1. 1
+2. 9
+S. 4
+6. 2
+4. 1
+O. 1
-1. 1
-0.5
+O. 9
+1. 3
+I. 2
+1.1
+1. 6

--------------------------208.8
228.7
+20. 2

Total,___ ___ _______ _________ ___ _____ ____ ______ ____ ___ ______

Note: Details may not add to totals shown due to rounding.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Current Population Reports," series P-25, No. 493, Washington, 1972, series E.

The number of Americans in the high-spending, low-saving age brackets (2034) is expected to rise substantially, from almost 46 million in 1972 to 60 million
in 1982. These are the young people who in the main borrow heavily, particularly
to finance and furnish new homes. In striking contrast, the higher saving and
investment age bracket (40-54) is forecast to show a decline in absolute numbers,
from 35 million in 1972 to 34 million in 1982. The projections should be fairly
accurate, because they deal entirely with people who are already born and are
based on expected life frequency patterns.
A study by the staff of the Feder.11l Home Loan Bank Board tends to reenforce
these conclusions. The FHLB staff concluded that the most dramatic shifts
from renter to homeowner status occur among younger families, especially
between the ages of 25 and 34 :
. . . almost two-thirds of the families shifting from renting to homeownership between 1974 and 1980 will be headed by persons under
35 . . . most of these families will be in the 25- to 34-year. age bracket. 28
~Gary ~-

.Another factor dampening down the private saving rate is the repeated
liberalization of social security and other government inco.m e-maintenance progrms. This relationship has been noted by several authorities. Recent studies
bY Professor Martin Feldstein of Harvard University show that the provision
of public pensions for the aged substantially depresses the rate of private
saving. "If this is not offset by other government policies," Feldstein says that
"the result is a decline in the rate of capital accumulation ... " !!7
Professor Robert Eisner of Northwestern University has reached a similar
conclusion :
Our increasingly comprehensive Social Security system tends, desirable
as it may be--and I do not want to be interpreted as opposing Social
Security-to obviate some of the need for private saving. It is not necessary to put aside income now to provide for the future if retirement
expenses will be taken care of by the government. 28
On balance, all of this indicates that large sums of money will be saved and
equally large sums will be invested in the United States, but not all requirements for capital funds are likely to be met. There will be vigorous competition
for available investment funds. From the viewpoint of any individual industry
attempting to obtain capital, the situation that will confront it has been
described tersely by John F. Childs, senior vice president of the Irving Trust
Company:
I don't think there is a problem of getting adequate capital. It's a
question of getting adequate earnings to attract capital.211
The deterioration in the relative position of the electric utility industry in
the competition for available investment funds is not something that occurred
suddenly in the Spring of 1974. This situation has been noted by many observers.
James G. Stark of the investment house of Lehman Brothers stated to an
industry meeting in the Fall of 1973 :
In recent years, as you know, the utility industry has been losing
ground in the competition-both in respect to attracting debt capital
~nd, ev~n more so, in respect to equity investment- as evidenced by your
mcreasmgly higher costs, relative to competing security offerings. 30
In the two and a half year period from January 1, 1971 to June 30, 1973,
Standard and Poor's reduced the bond ratings of 32 utilities and raised only one
The rate. ditf~rent~al be~ween notches can be as much as 25 or 35 basis poin~
(100 basis yomts Is. eq~Iva!ent to one percentage point in the interest rate). At
the same time, the msbtutwnal market for these debt securities shrinks considerabl~. as ratings decline, due to legal restrictions applying to lower-rated
securities.
Mr. Stark also noted that "It is very disturbing, indeed, to see the stocks of
40 of the 90 largest electric utilities selling today at or below book value-~here there ":ere ~n~~ 7 in t~is category just over two years ago. 31 The evaluation o~ electric ~tihbes by mvestors has declined .further since Mr. Stark's
analysis, a~ noted man earlier section of this report.
_The subJe~t of adequate earnings by electric utilities is inextricable linked
w1th the ~UbJect of rates allowed by regulatory commissions. Hence, the following
ch~pter IS devoted to a detailed examination of the role and importance of
utility rates.
f 27Ei'Iartin Feldstein, Social Security and Private Savings, Cambridge, Harvard Institute
7
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CHAPTER 5. THE RoLE AND IMPORTANCE OF UTILITY RATES
THE NATURE OF UTILITY REGULATION
For many years, the electric utility industry has been subject to close and
continuing governmental regulation in respect to accounting, financing, rates
charged for service, and many other aspects of operations. Rate regulation seeks
two key objectives:
1. To protect consumers against exorbitant charges that might otherwise result from the monopoly aspect of public utility franchises.
2. To set rates for service at a level which will afford the companies an opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable rate of return.
Altllough differences on specifics may emerge, there is virtually universal
agreement on the general functions of rate regulation. The following statement
on the subject is taken from a report by Ralph Nader's Study Group on Regulation and Competition:
In simplest terms, regulators perform two tasks. The first is to determine the company's "overall revenue requirements." These must be sufficient to cover all costs (which include operating expenses, depreciation, interest, and taxes) and to yield a fair profit, or "rate of return,"
which enables the company to attract the necessary capital for maintenance and expansion of its services. The second task is to devise the
appropriate rate structure, consisting of a schedule of charges which,
when applied to the various services that the company provides, will
satisfy the overall revenue requirements. For both of these steps it is
necessary to determine the value of the "rate base"-the company's capital investment in plant and equipment used in providing each regulated service--because the amount of profit that the company is allowed
to earn is expressed as a percentage of the rate base.1
The courts have consistently held that the profits or returns earned by utilities
should generally be comparable to those of other business undertakings of corresponding risk, and should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundness of the utility, to maintain its credit and enable it to raise the capital
that it requires.
In the celebrated Hope case, the U.S. Supreme Court laid down guidelines for
utility regulation:
... it is important that there be enough revenues not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock ... By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with risks
on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That
return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract
capital/~

The basic standards of the Hope case can be paraphrased as follows : 3
1. There should be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also
for the capital costs of the business, which include service on the debt and
dividends.
2. The return to the equity owner should be commensurate with the terms on
investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.
3. The return should be sufficient to ensure confidence in the financial integ·
rity of the enterprise so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.
1 The Monopoly Makers. Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Regulation and Competition, New York, Grossman Publishers. 1973. p. 5.
ll F.P.O. vs. Hope Natural Gas Oo., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
a Alfred Copeland, "Time for Another Hope Case?", Public Utilities Fortnightly, March 1

1973, p. ll.9.
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This sounds as though a substantial measure of financial protection is as·
sured by law. However, public utilities are not in any sense guaranteed any rate
of profit or level of earnings. This has been clearly stated by the Supreme Court
in the N aturaZ Gas Pipeline case ( 1942), when the Court said:
... the utility gets it return ... by rates sufficient, having in view
the character of the business, to secure a fair return upon the rate base,
provided the business is capable of earning it. But regulation does not
insure that the business shall produce net revenues, nor does the Constitution require that the losses of the business in one year shall be
restored from future earnings . . . the hazard that the property will not
earn a profit remains on the company in the case of a regulated, as
well as an unregulated business. 4
In this connection, the following statement by the Committee on Corporate
Finance, contained in its 1952 report to the National Association of Railroad
and Utility Commissioners, is quite pertinent:
·Good credit, if once lost by a corporation, is seldom regained. At
best, loss of prime credit standing results in increases 'in total capital
costs. At worst, it will impair the quality of service and lead to a public reaction much more serious than the utilities' financial position.
. . . Over the long term, obtaining and retaining prime credit rating
for the utilities is far more important to the public than the continuance of utility rates which are depressed in relation to present wages,
incomes and general prices. For prime credit ratings are essential if
utilities are to continue to secure at advantageous terms the new capital continuously required to maintain their existing service and to
extend and improve service in the future};
It is important, moreover, to understand that the allowable rate of return
for a public utility is not comparable to interest on a savings bank account or
earnings on shares of stock. The typical utility takes substantially less than
100 percent of its return into earnings. The rate of return applied to a utility's
rate base equates to net operating income, or the results of a company's operations after federal income tax, but before interest and other capital costs.
Rising interest rates alone could •quire a substantial increase in the rate of
return achieved a given company, without any change, or even a decline, in its
return of common equity.
Table 41 contains the results of a special survey conducted by the Edison
Electric Institute covering 219 electric rate cases which were settled during
the three-year period 1971-1973. The very considerable variation in the overall
rates of return which are allowed to individual companies is apparent, ranging
from less than 6 percent to over 9 percent.
Table 42 contains corresponding information for 181 of the cases where information was available on the return on common equity which was granted
by the regulatory commissions. Here, even more substantial variations are visible, ranging from less than 6 percent to over 12 percent. In theory, we would
expect that another factor was present, differences in capital structure. That is,
utilities that are highly leveraged (with a low percentage of common equity
to total capitalization) would show above-average returns; this would reflect
the relatively high risk to shareholders who would not receive their dividends
until the prior claims of a large number of bond holders had been satisfied. Conversely, lightly-leverage utilities would be expected to provide below-average
returns to their shareholders, in view of the lesser risk to which they are
exposed.
Yet available data do not bear this out. Appendix Table C contains the information on the common equity as percent of capitalization for the utilities surveyed. Figure 7 graphically presents the data that would show the relationship
if any between degree of leverage and rates of return to common stockholders.
No distinct relationship emerges from the data in the table. One explanation is
that the expected relationship is "swamped" or more than offset by another
factor-the great extent to which utilities are subject to the vagaries of individual regulatory commissions. As will be shown to be the case in many other
aspects, no standards emerge from analyzing the results of a national sample
of recent electric rate cases.
'Cited in Charles Tatham, Measures of Public Utility Bond Quality, New York, Bache
and Co., September 1970, p. 19.
6 Cited ln Ibid .• p. 20.
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TABLE 41.- VARIATIONS IN ALLOWABLE RATES OF RETURN (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETILED DURING PERIOD)
(In percent)
Time period

Less than 6

6 to 7

7to8

8 to 9

9 and over

Jan. 1,1971 to Mar. 31,1972 ____ _____
Apr. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972 ___ ______
July 1, 1972 to Sept. 30, 1972 _______ . _
Oct. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972. ----- -··
Jan. 1,1973 to Mar. 31, 1973 ...... ...
Apr. 1, 1973 to June 30, 1973. ________
July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973__ _______
Oct. 1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973.--------

1
1
1
2
5
1
0
1

17
3
2
2
0
3
3
4

48
13
8
10
11
8
9
5

14
6
8
9
5
4
5
8

0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

Total._------ -------- ________

12

34

112

59

Tota
80
23
19
24
22
16
17
18
219

Source: Edison Electric Institute.
TABLE 42.-RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY GRANTED (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETTLED DURING PERIOD)
(In percent)
Time period

Less than 6

6 to 8

8 to 10

Jan.1,1971 to Mar. 31,1972 _________
Apr. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972 _________
July 1, 1972 to Sept. 30, 1972 _________
Oct. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972__ ________
Jan. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1973 _________
Apr. 1, 1973 to June 30, 1973 _________
July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973 _________
Oct. 1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973 __________

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0

2
1
0
2
3
1
2
0

25
10
5
7
4
5
7
3

43
9
8
8
8
5
6
11

71
20
13
18
16
12
16
15

----- ... -- ... --------- ... ---- ...

2

4

11

66

98

181

Total

10 to 12 12 and over

Total

Source: Edison Electric Institute.

Without prejudging the decisions of any specific commission, it is clear that
they vary very substantially in the pattern of their decisionmaking as well as in
t~e manner in which they apply rates of return. Some commissions' tend to grant
higher returns to their electric utilities than do other commissions, and the differences cannot be explained by variations in capital structure. On reflection that
is likely to be the result of decentralized regulation responding to a V'ari~ty of
economic, political, geographic, and social circumstanC('S.
It s significant to note that ·a recent survey by the Edison Electric Institute
found no relationship between the regulatory rate of return and the cost of capital
use~ by 69 ..companies for their own internal economic evaluations of proposed
capital proJects. It was observed that the average regulatory rate of return in
early 1974 (8.2 percent )is lower than the cost of capital used for economic evaluations (9.8 percent) ,11
In spite of the multiplicity of regulatory bodies, rate-of-return regulation does
appear to be the essential feature of the regulation of the electric utility industry." This is essentially due to the influence of the U.S. Supreme Oourt. The
hist~ric ~a.se of Munn v. Illinois (94 U.S. 113- 1877) suggested the concept of a
public utihty. Smyth v. Ames (169 U.S. 466-1898) introduced the concept of fair
value in the regulation of rates. FPO v. Hope NaturaZ Gas (referred to earlier)
further developed the notion of an adequate rate of return.
REGULATORY LAG

The aspect of regulation which appears to have provoked the greatest amount
of interest during the recent period of rapidly rising utility costs has·been the delay of "lag" involved in regulatory commissions acting on requested changes in
electricity rates.
The recoql shows that state regulatory commissions have been approving substantial numbers of rate increase requests. During the first quarter of 1974, 40
11 Edison Electric Institute, Investor Relations Committee, Cost of Capital Used For
Economic Evaluations By Privately-Owned Electric Utilities, June 1974, pp. 6-7.
7 Leon Courville, "Regulation and efficiency in the electric utility industry " BeZZ
Journal o! Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring '74, p. 57. '

increases were ·g ranted, totaling over $526 million, compared to 2:1 increases
totalling $146 in the first quarter of 1973. For the entire year 1973, increases of
almost $1.1 billion were granted.8 Despite the large number of rate increases,
electric utilities as a whole have not been able to earn the rates of return allowed
by the commissions.
In an informal survey of electric utilities undertaken in May 1974, the Federal
Reserve System reported that "the regulatory process had not been accelerateddespite the severity of the financial problems which these firms face." 9 Of the
nearly 100 utilities that the System contacted, over 80 ha·d sought rate relief
within the previous year. Just under one-half of the requests were granted in
full. Another one-seventh were granted either in part or on an interim basis, and
two-fifths were still pending.
The Fed survey reported that, "The time typically required for the resolution
of a request for a rate adjustment apparently has not been shorted significantlyif at all ... If lags are not too long, the rate adjustments are often too small." 10
In reporting the results of the survey, Federal Reserve Board member Andrew
Brimmer stated that, since most rates are based on past costs, earnings sufler in
an inflationary environment, even if the pace of the regulatory procedure is
accelerated. However, he discounted the need for state emergency assistance:
I am personally convinced that a more sympathetic-and timely-response of regulators to requests for rate adjustments will enable the
vast majority of firms to cope with their problems.11
The Federal Reserve survey noted considerable variation in regulatory lag
in the different regions. According to Dr. Brimmer, "In the Middle West . . . the
12
regula~ory climate appears to be rather unfavorable to prompt rate action."
In OhiO, for example, delays of three years are not uncommon. Michigan currently bases its decisions on 1972 data. In contrast, the Federal Reserve Banks
of Dallas and Minneapolis reported rather speedy approval.
The state of Virginia has an annual earnings review. If a firm is found not
to be earning the rate of return the State Corporation Commission approved a
year before, it can increase its rates within 30 days, subject to a commission veto.
The survey by the Federal Reserve System also reported that three utilities in
th~ Atlan~a District can pass on local taxes, as can some companies in the
Mmneapohs Bank survey. Nebraska permits operating and maintenance costs to
be passed on as wel1. 13
Until recen~ly, the process by which the regulatory commissions approved
changes in rates received comparatively limited attention from the public.
Th~ough the late 1_960's, electricity prices tended to decline as technological innovatiOn offset cost mcreases. But with the more rapid rate of inflation of recent
years, delays in acting on requested rate changes have become more serious.
~he resultant problem of regulatory lag has become one of the major focal
p_omts of .c?ncern in financing electric utility expansion. This lag between the
time a utlhty files a request for a change in rates and the time a change is
granted has been aggravated not only by the number of increases being filed but
by the increasingly extensive hearings associated with each case. This latter
complexity has increased in turn because of the growing number of interventions
by environmentalists, consumer advocates, and others.
One _measure of the increasing dimensions of the "backlog" problem can be
found m the data on the number and dollar value of increases pending at the
end of ~ach quarter for the period 1970 through the second quarter of 1974. As
shown m Table 43, there bas been a fairly steady and substantial increase in the
backlog of pending rate cases, measured both in terms of number of cases and total
amount of rate changes requested.
Another measure of the increasing backlog problem can be gleaned from the
figures ~m new filings for rate increases made by investor-owned companies. As
shown m Table 44 an extremely rapid increase has been occurring during the
last few years, in the period 1970 through the second quarter of 1974.
8 Statement o! Alvin W. Vogtle, Chairman EEl, at
June 8, 1971, , Edison Electric Instistute p. 1.
e Brimmer, op. cit., p. 4.
'
10 Ibid.
u Ibid.
12 Ibid., p . 17.
13 Ibid., p . 18.
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TABLE 43.-BACKLOG OF ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE CASES

TABLE 45.-VARIATIONS IN REGULATORY LAG IN ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE INCREASES, 1971-73 (TIME FROM
FILING OF APPLICATION TO FINAL ORDER FROM CQMMISSION)

Number of
cases pending

Mar. 31, 1970 ____________
June 30, 1970 ____________
Sept. 30, 1970 ____________
Dec. 31, 1970 _____________
Mar. 31, 1971 ____________
June 30,1971 ____________
Sept. 30, 1971 ____________
Dec. 31, 1971 _____________
Mar. 31, 1972 ____________

45
46
47
59
71

86

105
99
96

Total dollar
value of
increases
pending
(in millions)
512
615
435
679
939
986
1,237
1,157
938

Quarter ending

Number of
cases pending

June 30, 1972 ____________
Sept. 30, 1972 ____________
Dec. 31, 1972 _____________
Mar. 31, 1973 ____________
June 30, 1973 ____________
Sept. 30, 1973 ____________
Dec. 31, 1973 _____________
Mar. 31,1974 ____________
June 30, 1974 ____________

104
102
99
96
123
112
137
144
169

Total dollar
value of
increases
pending
(in millions)
1,067
1, 317
1,123
1,059
1,572
1, 283
1,656
2,052
2,678

TABLE 44.-NEW FILINGS FOR ELECTRIC RATE INCREASES

Number of
cases filed

Total dollar
value of
requests for
mcreases
filed in
quarter
(in millions)

12
21
16
31
31
36
29
17
22

89
209
61
437
451
325
361
231
171

Mar. 31, 197D__ __________ _
June 30, 197Q ___ ________ _
Sept. 30, 1970 _____ ______ _
Dec. 31, 197D__ ___ _______ _
Mar. 31,1971 ____ _______ _
June 30, 1971 ___ ________ _
Sept. 30, 1971 ____ _______ _
Dec. 31, 1971 _____ _______ _
Mar. 31 , 1972 ____ ________ _

Date of final
order

Number

13
26
1912---- - -- - -- - 21
1973..--- - - ----Average lag __________

197L------ ----

Per· Number
cent
24
31
28

27
41
31

28 ---- - --

12 to 18

Per- Numcent
ber
50
49
42

13
12
10

47 -------

18 to 24

24 to 30

Per- Num- Per- Number
ber cent
cent
24
15
14

1

3

8

17 ----- --

Over 30

Per- Numcent
ber

Percent

54
83
74

100
100
100

2 -------------------------1
1
4 ------------4
11
5 ------------6 -------

Total

Per- Number
cent

2 --------------------

100

Quarter ending
June 30, 1972 ______ _____ _
Sept. 30, 1972 __ ___ ___ ___ _
Dec. 31, 1972 ___________ __
Mar. 31, 1973 ___________ _
June 30, 1973 __ · - - - - - ---Sept. 30, 1973 _____ __ __ ___
Dec. 31, 1973 ___ _________ _
Mar. 31, 1974 _____ ____ ___
June 30, 1974__ __________ _

Automatic Adjustment OZauses

Number of
cases filed

Total dollar
value of
requests for
mcreases
filed in
quarter
(in millions)

35
26
27
22
45
24
47
45
55

412
442
180
114
703
280
762
638
1,188

Source: Edison Electric Institute.

Rising backlogs mean increasing delays in getting the average case complet~d.
Data on 211 final rate case decisions made by state and local regulatory bodies
during the three years 1971-1973 show that less than 30 percent of the cases
were concluded within 6 months of the initial filing. About 47 per~ent were
completed between 6 months and one year. Nearly one-fourth reqmred more
than one year. One third of those cases involving lags of more than one year
required more than 18 months before a final d~cision was rea~hed (see Table 45) ·
The length of the lag appears to be incre~smg. An. analysis _of final rate case
decisions made in the year 1973 alone indicate an mcrease m the percenta~e
of cases requiring more than one year for settlement with nearly 30 percent m
this category. More than half of the latter involved lags ~reater than 18
months. Perhaps a more fundamental finding from the data IS. the very substantial variation in the length of the regulato~ proces~ that exists from state
to state, from utility to utility and from one time periOd to another.

Interim IncreaBes

Months
6 to 12

0 to 6

Source: Appendix Table A.

Source: Edison Electric Institute.

Quarter ending

[Number of cases and percent distribution)

One method of compensating for lengthening delays b~tween initial filings and
final decisions is the granting of interim _or tempo:ary .mc:eases. In the 211 decisions covered by the albove analy~is, 51 mvolved u:~tenm mcreases. The survey
data revealed a growing use of this procedure. While only 13 of the rat_e cases
settled in 1971 had involved interim increases, 18 of those completed m 1~72
has such increases, as did 20 of those in 1973. Thr_oughout the three year perwd
for those cases where interim increases were permitted, the average ~~l~y be~ore
an interim increase was granted was just under 5 months from the Initial fihng.

Certain costs of electric utility operation, subject to frequent changes, are
essentially out of the utility's power to control, at least in the short run. Some
of these costs represent significant portions ·of utility expense. To handle this problem, many regulatory bodies permit utilities under their jurisdiction to use automatic adjustment mechanisms which refiect, with relative short delays, the increase (or decrease) in the particular expense in question. The use of these
automatic adjustment clauses in effect thus reduces regulatory lag with regard
to the uncontrollable costs which are covered by these clauses.
Among the types of adjustment clauses in use are those taxes, the cost of power
purchased from other utilities, and fuel costs. The latter two have become increasingly important in recent years as fuel costs have escalated rapidly and
the need to exchange power among utilities has increased because of delays
incurred in the scheduled addition of new capacity. The fuel adjustment clause
is the most important one for many utilities and is most frequently alluded
to in public discussions of automatic provisions.
Currently, about three-fourths of all investor-owned utility kilowatt-hour sales
to ultimate customers are covered by fuel adjustment clauses. The extent of
their use varies from state to state, however. In 43 States and the District of
Columbia at least some of the rates of investor-owned companies are accompanied
by such riders. In some instances, their use is restricted to industrial and com·
mercial rates while in other cases all rates are covered. Differences also exist
with regard to the method of calculating the adjustment charge. Some utilities
base .the adjustment on fuel costs incurred the previous month, others on the
average cost of the two previous months, and still others use even longer period~·.
The actual lag between determination of the adjustment factor and its applicat ion to customers bills can also vary among states. Differences likewise exist
as to whether a cents/million BTU or centsjkwhr calculation is employed to
determine the adjustment factor. Also the treatment of nuclear fuel expense is
not uniform among the states having nuclear power plants. Finally, the extent
to which total costs are accounted for by the adjustment mechanism can differ
between utilities. A portion of the fuel cost is included in the base wi,th the adjustment factor retlecting changes in the price of fuel above or below that amount.
However, in many cases the full differential may not ,be recovered with the
resulting shortfall impacting negatively on the utility's earnings.
The purpose of the fuel clause, like any automatic adjustment mechanism, is
to bring revenue and expense as nearly into phase as possible. Its importance to
the utility is paramount when costs are increasing rapidly at unpredictable rates,
although this mechanism also permits a speedy reduction of the fuel cost component of a customer's hill should the price of fuel decline. The large increases
in fuel costs experienced during the winter of 1973-1974 would have been beyond
the capability of many utilities to absorb had they not been able to adjust their
rates automatically. In many cases the increases in fuel costs equaled or exceeded
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the net income of the companies. Even when rapid adjustments were effective,
the normal lags between billing and collection added to the strains on working
capital which had already been crea,t ed by ,t he need to finance much more
expensive fuel inventories.
RELATIONSHIP OF CURRENT RATE INCREASES TO FUTURE COSTS

It is important to recognize that the so-called regulatory lag as it relates
to the adjustment of permissible earning rates for utilities is not an accident
of history. The regulatory lag which receives so much attention these days
has served a useful function over the years in accommodating a range of earnings
opportunity within which utility managment is challenged and motivated to
perform efficiently. The fact that a company may have to wait for an extended
period of time before rates are adjusted upward to reflect circumstances also
provides a strong incentive to management to eliminate inefficient operations.
By the same token, during periods in which technological innovations are
reducing costs, management may enjoy an extended period of above average
profitability before regulatory authorities require downward rate adjustments.
The present problem lies in the fact th.a t existing regulatory arrangements
were established during periods of relative economic stability. During periods
of extreme price deflation or inflation the regulatory lag becomes a dangerous
burden rather than a constructive motivating influence. For example, the quality
of an electric utility's bonds is a function, among other things, of the earnings
available for the payment of interest on the company's bonds. This relationship
is variously referred to as times charges earned, fimed charge coverage, or
simply earnings to flmed charges.

\0

~~----~~--~~

....

Bond Ratings and Utility Rates
It may be difficult for individual users of electricity to see the relationship

'Jetween utility rates and something so technical as bond ratings. After all,
why should they really care what happens to the bondholders? Analysis shows
that there are very good reasons. The basic answer is that interest on those
bonds is one of the rising costs that are forcing utilitiea to apply for rate
increases.
When a utility's bond rating drops, the amount of interest it has to pay on
its new bonds rises. For example, when Union Electric sold $70 million of bonds
on February 5, 1974, it had to pay an interest charge of 8.29 percent (its bond
rating was a moderate one, single-A by Standard and Poor's and double-A by
Moody's). On the day before, a company with a stronger bond rating (AA),
Public Service of Indiana, sold its bonds at a cost of 8.03 percent. Spread out
over the 30-year mortgage period, Union Electric's higher interest will cost
the utility-and ultimately its customers-an additional $5,250,000.u
Although many institutional investors establish their own quantitative standards for specified qualities of bonds, most investors rely on the major rating
services for this purpose. One of the principal bond rating services is that of
Standard and Poor's Corporation. As reflected in Figure 7 until 1968, when
the rate of inflation began rising sharply, upgrading of the quality of electric
bonds was not unusual. It is also obvious that from 1968 to the present time there
have been few quality upgradings. With respect to downgrading, on the other
hand, a striking increase has occurred in recent years.
·
The ra,t ing organizations (Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch's) typically
reappraise utility bond quality at the time companies issue additional debt
securities. By so doing the rating agencies have the benefit of recent registration
ma.terials prepared for the Securities and Exchange Commission and other
information made available in connection with the sale of new issues of securities.
These rating organizations place much emphasis on such quantitative ratios
as the earnings to fixed charge relationship described above, the capital structure
of the firm, margin of safety tests, and others. The rating organizations also
have begun to place great stress upon the a·ttitudes and actions of the regulatory
authorities of the companies whose bonds are being rated. It is fair to say
that the rating organizations are not anxious to engage in precipitate changes
in bond ratings. Indeed, they seem quite restrained given the nature of changes
taking place within the utility industry. This patience is in part self-serving
since it would not be :flattering to engage in frequent changes in bond ratings.
14

Harry Wtlensky. "High Credit Costs Add To Utntty Problems," St. Louis Post-

Dispatch, June 25, 1974, p. 3B.
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The result is that a company with low quantitative measures of quality may
be all-owed to retain its oond rating if tecent and significant rate relief bas
been permitted by the regulatory authorities. On the other hand, a firm with
stronger quantitative coverages may experience a downgrading of its rating if
it is located in a jurisdiction where regulatory authorities show less sympathy
for or comprehension -of the importance of the earnings of the companies they
regulate.
Within recent months there has 1b een an increasing trend toward a reappraisal
of bond ra_tings at times other tban when new bonds are issued. This is undoubtedly accounted for by what the rating organizations consider to be a
rapid deterioration of the financial position of many companies and an apparent
lack of interest Ol! the part of s-ome regulatory authorities. Also, the managements or-some companies may not have ·been considered aggressive enough in
pursuing needed rate relief with skill and vigor.
The significance of reduced ratings for a company is quite clear. Table 46
reflects the cost differential among new issues of electric utility 'bonds of the
AAA, AA, A, and Baa categories. The reduction in the J.'lating of the bo~ds
of a company is quickly reflected in the interest cost structure of the firm, w1th
the effect tbat earnings to fixed charge ratios are reduced further. This, of
course simply hastens the day when additional requests for rate relief must
be maile. It seems clear, therefore, that prompt and judicious rate relief prevents companies' interest cost pressures from feeding upon themselves.
TABLE 46.-COST DIFFERENTIALS AMONG NEW ISSUES OF PUBLIC UTILITY BONOS, 1964-73
(FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY OF EACH YEAR SHOWN) 1
[In percent)
Average of yield on new issued bonds
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Average

Rating category

f~~ ~

=:

~~

============================ ===: ::
DifferentiaL ••• ___ • ______________ .26

4. 55 5.29 6. 38 6. 81 7.45 9. 63 8.12 8.10 7. 62 --- ----4. 50 5.00 5. 90 6. 62 7.17 8.96 7.90 7.36 7. 54 -------• 05

• 29

.48

.19

. 28

• 67

. 22

. 74

.08

• 33

AA·----------------------------------- 4. 45 4. 43 4.90 5. 36 6. 43 7. 06 8. 66 7.49 7.11 7.46 ------- . 54
Differential ••• __ ••• __ ._ •••••••• _. - .36 .12 .39 1. 02 .38 • 39 .97 • 63 .99 .16
7.09 7. 36 -------AAA •• --·················--·---··--·-- 4. 53 4. 37 4. 83 5. 35 6. 28 6. 97 8. 64 7. 29
• 60
DifferentiaL __ • __ • ______ •••••• --- • 28 .18 . 46 1.03 .53 .48 . 99 '83 1. 01 • 26
1 Or

nearest month, if none issued that month.

Source: Moody's Public Utility Manual and Bond Survey, weekly issues.

The differences in annual interest charges can be substantial. Taking the
54/100 of 1 percent average differential experienced in the past decade between
an AA bond and a Baa bond is $54,000 a year in interest charges for a $10 million issue. To compound the problem, many traditional utility investors may not
legally buy bonds that do not qualify for some minimum rating. When Standard and Poor's Corporation, a major private rating agency, reduced its rating
of the bonds of the Consolidated Edison Company from BBB to BB, this action
made the bonds ineligible as legal investments for fiduciary financial institutions in New York State.
THE BASIC ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF ELECTRICITY PRICES

Prices serve a basic economic purpose, even though it may not always be a
popular one. During the pa.s t year characterized by rising public concern over
the availability of energy sources, attention has been drawn to the allocative
or "rationing" role that prices play. Thus, rising prices for gasoline have served
as a means for bringing supply and demand of energy into better balance.
In our economic system, we "economize" on scarce resources by making
them more expensive, thus making users more conscious of the need to restrain
their demand. Simultaneously, the increase in price encourages producers to
expand their supply, some portion of which may not have been worth producing at earlier, lower prices.

In the case of utilities, regulatory commissions closely control the income
of the companies so as to avoid "windfall" profits. Certainly, the current precarious financial condition of many electric utilities dramatically demonstrates
the absence of "excessive" or "windfall" profits, however defined.
During this period, some observers have expressed concern over the hardships imposed by rising energy prices on low-income groups. One instinctive
response-which unfortunately has no justification in economic analysis-is
to subsidize the price for these groups. On reflection, such an action would run
counter to· the basic need to dampen down demand for scarce resources. Moreover, it would not help attract additional supplies. Dr. Andrew Brimmer
concludes that "we should all accept the fact that this growing scarcity will
mean higher prices for energy relative to most other items on which consumers
can spend their income" and that "it is better to permit the~e increases in real
costs to be passed on to final users-rather than pretend that we can-somehow-escape the lmrden. Only in this way will consmner welfare be truly served
in the years ahead." 1G
The answer that present public policy provides is not a hard-hearted one at
all, but a fairly sensible approach. It is to provide an adequate income to enable
various groups of the population to buy the goods and services that they require,
but without exempting them from the price pressures to conserve relatively
scarce and hence relatively expensive resources. We can see the generosity of
existing policy in the very substantial increase in welfare, social security, and
similar "income maintenance" expenditures by the federal government. From
a relatively high level of $95.9 billion in the fiscal year 1973, such expenditures
are budgeted to rise to $129.8 billion in 1975.18 These payments are often supplemented by substantial state and local government programs.
The public and political pressures exerted on many state regulatory bodies are
very real and need to be acknowledged. A recent issue of U.S. News and World
Report reported some of the more colorful reaction to recent electric rate
increases:
"In some places, t.he increase has been so staggering that customers
can't believe it. "My electric bill has gone up from $20 a month to $43
a month since last fall, even though I haven't used my electric dryer in
a coon's age", complains a housewife in the Southwest. "I don't know
what to say. "It's outlandish." 17
It indeed is likely to be extremely difficult to fully mollify the outraged South·
west housewife. Yet, she must be told the hard facts of equally or even more rapid
rise in the costs of producing electric power. Otherwise, the utilities will simply
become convenient "whipping boys" for the general public distaste for inflation.
One outspoken chairman of a state regulatory commission has described the
following "necessary" action: "Elimination of partisan politics from utility ratemaking, coupled with a determination by state commissions to grant cost-jm~tified
rate increases promptly, regardless of the political consequences." 18
Leon Keyserling, a former chairman of the President's Council of ~conoiQ.,ic
Advisers in the Truman Administration has provided some useful perspective
in assessing the relationship between utility rate increases and the concern for
the consumer :
The ultimate interest is always the consumer. But the policy, far too
prevalent at least until very recently, of pointing toward the lowest price
for the consumer in the short run, has ignored the interest of the consumer in investment and plant and growth and technological progress.
In view of the natural and popular pressures for the lowest feasible
prices in the short run, I believe that utility regulators, among others,
must join in the educational process, in order to avoid killing the goose
that lays the golden egg.18
The Michigan State Special Commission on Energy, chaired by Professor Pa"Ql
McCracken, a former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advise],'~
1& Brimmer, op. cit., p. 23.
1 e Special Analyses. Budget o! the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1975, Washington,
Government PrintinA' Office, .1974, p. 161.
17
''Electric. Gas. Phone Bills Jump--Some Double or More," U.S. News ana Worltl
Revort. 1\Ia:v 1ll. 1974. n. nO.
18
William G. RosenherA'. Crisis in Utility Finance: Where Do We Go From Heret, presentation to Fe!'leral Energy Administration Utility Rate Reform Conference, Washington,
D.C .. June 19. 1974. o. 6.
19 Leon H. Keyserling. ''Critical Issues in Utility Regulation," Proceedings o! the Eighty-

Second Annual Convention o! the National Association o! Regulatory Utility Commi88ion'ers, 1970, p. 515.
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in the Nixon Administration, provided a very useful statement of the need to
achieve balance in utility regulation. The following is an excerpt from the
Commission's report, with specific references to Michigan deleted:
A proper balance must be found between protection of consumers and
the approval of rates that are substantial enough to maintain the financial integrity of the companies. Without the latter, earnings of these
companies would be inadequate to raise the capital needed to assure
meeting future energy needs of . . . consumers and businesses, and preserve job opportunities . . . The citizens ... have a stake in the
maintenance of that healthy financial condition for their public utilities
without which future service will not be assured. 20
Clerily, there is a primary economic role for rate changes, and they are likely
more frequently to be increases rather than decreases in the current environment.
Nevertheless, other changes in regulatory and ·utility practices may be required,
and they are examined in the following section.

relatively uncontrollable costs. Table 48 shows the rapid growth in the use
of these automatic clauses. Whereas less than two-thirds of settled rate cases
contained fuel cost pass-through clauses covering 90 percent or more of the
kilowatt hours sold during 1971 and early 1972, these provisions had become
almost universal by late 1973.
The use of these automatic devices tends to reduce regulatory lag, but not
to eliminate it. Some commissions require utilities to u~e the FIFO method
(first-in, first-out) to measure changes in fuel inventories. With a 60 day or
greater stockpile, a utility may thu~ have to wait two months or more before
its added fuel costs become fuel eligible for inclusion in the pass-through.
There is another lag-often 1-2 months-between the time that increased fuel
costs are allowable and the time that they actually show up in added billings.
Thus, a 3-4 month lag is customary even with the use of supposedly automatic
pass-through mechanisms.
Although automatic pass-throughs of fuel and other cost increases can be
useful to utilities, it should be realized that they do not provide a panacea.
These rate adjustments are one-for-one pass throughs, with no increase in net
income. If customers adapt to the resultant higher rates without cutting back
on electric power usage, then the utilities merely break even on the higher
rates. But when customers respond by using less electricity, revenues fall more
rapidly than costs, which comprise an element of fixed charges which must be
covered regardless of the precise rate of operations.

VARIATIONS IN REGULATORY AND UTILITY PB.A.CTIGES

As shown in earlier sections of this report, there are very substantial variations in the pattern of decision-making by utility regulatory commissions in
different parts of the country. An examination of these variations provides useful
insights into possible changes in regulatory or company practices which may
help to meet the financing requirements of the utilities through means other than
general rate increases.
UtiZity BiZZing Practices

One area of substantial variation among utilities is in the way customers are
billed for services, particularly in the case of late payments. An April1974 survey
of billing practices of 90 electric utilities obtained a variety of responses. While
40 of them do not have any charge for late payments, the other 50 follow many
different ways of adding a penalty or interest to the bill or offering a discount
for prompt payment. 21 As shown in Table 47, the interest charges range from a
low of 6 percent to a high of 18 percent, where such charges are made.

Rate Bases

The base on which utility rates is determined is of course one of the key factors in the regulatory process. Traditionally, most state commissions have used
the original cost of the applicable company investments to estimate the rate
base.
As shown in Table 49. however, in a modPst number of cases, the commissions
have used a replacement or "fair value" basis. In a period of rapid inflation,
the latter approach is likely to yield a higher base for rate-making. Although
this report is not the place for a detailed analysis of the two alternatives
it should be noted that replacement cost may come closer to the economic notio~
of "opportunity costs."

TABLE 47.-LATE PAYMENT CHARGES BY 90 UTILITIES, APRIL 1974
Penalty for late payment (add-on to base rate).--------------------·------------------------------------Discount for prompt payment (deduction from base rate)_---------- · --·---------------------------------Interest charge:
6 percent. ••• _. __ ---· ••••• _•• _. __ ••• -- ••• -.-·_----.--.-.------- ••• -.- •• ---------------.-·--------12 percent.. __________ •• - •• --.-------------.----------------------------------------------------No
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TABLE 48.-COVERAGE OF FUEL CLAUSES-PERCENT OF KILOWATT HOURS (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETTLED
DURING PERIOD)

90

Source: Survey by the Rate Research Committee of the Edison Electric Institute.

Only 17 of the utilities reported t~at all classes of customers were charged
for late payment. Seventeen other utility companies said that government agencies were not charged, and five others excluded both residential and governmental
users. Two utilities only levied late charges on large commercial and industrial
users, while the late charges of two other utilities covered all customers except
large general service and industrial users.~~ There is also an important equity
aspect to this relatively mundane question of billing.
The reluctance of some regulatory commissions to pPrmit utilities to charge
penalties for late payment means that customers who pay their bills promptly
are unfairly bearing a portion of the cost of the added working capital to be
raised by the utility to compensate for the lack of revenue from late-paying
customers. This process of differential treatment through the regulatory process
which arbitrarily shifts costs from one category of users to another is now referred to in the literature as a type of "regulatory subsidy."
Automatic Oost Pass-Throughs

To deal expPditiously with the frequent increases in the cost of fuel purchased
by electric utilities, many regulatory commissions have authori~ed companies
to add an automatic adjustment to utility bills to cover such mcreased and
20 Paul W. McCracken et al., Report to Governor William G. MllZiken by the Special
Oommission on Energy, Lanstn~. State of Michhran. 1!l74, pp. 31-32.
n Questionnaire Oovering Electric Utility BiZZing Practices tor use in EEI Rate Research
Oommittee Meeting, April U-!S, 1974, p. 2.
21 Ibid., p. 4.

0 to 25
percent

Time period
Jan. 1, 1971 to Mar. 31, 1972_________
Apr. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972_________
July 1, 1972 to Sept. 30, 1972_________
{let. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972__________
Jan. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1973_________
Apr. 1, 1973 to June 30, 1973_________
July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973_________
Oct. 1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973_________ _
Total. _____ __ ____ __ _________ _

26 to 50
percent

50 to 75
percent

76 to 90
percent

90 to 100
percent

Total

11
1
1
3
4
2
1
1

3
0
0
2
0
4
0
0

46
18
15
19
16
13
17
18

72
21
16
26
20
21
21
20

162

217

6
1
0
0
0
2
3
0
12

10

24

Source: Edison Electric Institute.

TABLE 49.-TYPES OF RATE BASES USED IN ELECTRIC RATE DECISIONS
Time period

Original cost •

Jan. 1, 1971 to Mar. 31, 1972 ___·---- -- -------- -- - - --- Apr. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972 ____________________ ___.__
July 1, 1972 to Sept. 30, 1972 ________________________ _
Oct.1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972 __ _______________________ _
Jan. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1973· -- ------------------·--Apr. 11973 to June 30 , 1973 _____________ ____________ _
July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973__ ______________________ _
Oct.1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973 _________________________ _

66
17
13
22
18
15
13
12

Fair value

1

Both

Total

25
8
6
4
5
5
5
3

1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

92
25
19
27
23
20
18
16

----------------------------------176
61
240

Total ______ ______ __________________________ __
I

Includes "reproduction" basis.

Source: Edison Electric institute.

Interim Rates
In some states, interim rate increases may be granted while a rate increase
is being considered by the regulatory commission; typically, the interim rate is
lower than the request being considered. This clearly is an effort to reduce the
length of regulatory lag. In 18 percent of the cases surveyed, interim increases
were granted (see Table 50).
A related approach is for the commission to grant a temporary approval of the
requested increases, with the proceeds held under bond. Thus, if the commission
ultimately rejects the increase or approves a lesser amount, all or a portion of
the proceeds must be refunded to the customers. As shown in Table 51, this
procedure was followed in 11 percent of the cases surveyed.
1.'reatment of Ta.m Incentives
The benefits of federal tax incentives are often offset, in the case of public
utilities, by the actions of state regulatory authorities. For example, many utilities are in effect required to ignore the rapid write-offs of capital outlays permitted for federal income tax purposes and to "fiow through" the tax savings.
This results in higher reported earnings and in lower cash fiow to finance new
outlays.
In recent years, many commissions have permitted utilities to switch from ":flow
through" to "normalization," that is to follow the procedures used in industry
generally. But as shown in Table 52, in over half of the cases, utilities are still
required to use the ":flow through" method for all or at least part of the federal
tax incentives.
TABLE 50.-INTERIM RATES IN EFFECT WHILE CASE IS IN PROGRESS (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETILED DURING
PERIOD)

Time period
Jan.1, 1971 to Mar. 31, 197L---------- - ------------------------- -Apr.1, 1972 to June 30, 1972 ••• -------------------------------- --- July 1,1972 to Sept. 30, 1912------- ---- ----------------------- ---- Oct. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972.------- - - - ----------------------- -- --Jan. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1973.- - ----- ---- ----------------------- --- Apr. 1,1973 to June 30, 1973·------ ----- ----------------------- --- July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973·----------- -- - - ----------------------Oct.1, 1973 to Dec. 31,1973.----------- ---- ----------------------Total.------ ________ ------ ____ -- --- -----------------_______

In effect

Not in
effect

Total

17
4
6
2
4
2
6
7

82
21
14
29
20
19
16
14

99
25
20
31
24
21
22
21

--------------------------48
215
263

Source: Edison Electric Institute.
TABLE 51.-RATES IN EFFECT UNDER BOND WHILE CASE IS PENDING (IN ELECTRIC RATE
CASES SETILED DURING PERIOD)
Time period

In effect
9
5•
4
2
2
4
3
1
30

Source : Edison ElEctric Institute.

Not in effect
90
20
16
29
21
19
19
20
234

Total

TABLE 52.- TREATMENT OF TAX INCENTIVES (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETILED DURING PERIOD)
Normalization

Flowthrough

Both

Total

1,1971, to Mar. 31, 1972·-----------------------1, 1972, to June 30, 1912-----------------------1, 1972, to Sept. 30, 1912•• ----------------------1, 1972, to Dec. 31, 1972·------------------------1, 1973, to Mar. 31, 1973·-----------------------1, 1973, to June 30, 1973_ ____ _______ __ ___ _____ __
1, 1973, to Sept. 30, 1973•• ----------------------1, 1973, to Dec. 31, 1973••• ----------------------

36
8
9
17
12
11
10
10

42
12
10
8
6
10
4
6

12
4
0
3
5
2
6
3

90
24
19
28
23
23
20
19

Total. ________ -- _____ -------.---.------------

113

98

35

246

Time period
Jan.
Apr.
July
Oct.
Jan.
Apr.
July
Oct.

Source: Edison Electric Institute.

Forward, Looking Test Periods
Regulatory commissions generally set utility rates on the basis of costs incul'lred during some recent past period of •time, which is referred to as the "test
period." Some commissions have been experimenting with the use of estimated
future costs as a basis for fixing rates. In July 1973, the Federal Power Commission issued order No. 487 providing for a twelve-month test period beginning
as late as the date when the increased rates are proposed to go into effect.
The order covers wholesale •r ates where the proposed increase is in excess of
$1 million ; for smaller increases, the use of a future test period is optional.
Historical data for the preceding 12-month period will also be considered, but
·p rimarily to check the reasonableness of the projected figures.
Although there is always some reluctance to base decisions on forecasts of
future events, it should be noted that the future test period used by some commissions is quite short when compared to the planning period for electric
utilities. The companies are expected to invest very substantial sums in equipment which is to be used to meet demands which are anticipated to arise over
a period of several d~ades.
Okanges in Utility Rate Structures
The energy crisis of last fall and winter has caused many observers to review
the basic principles of energy pricing. It seems unlikely that economies of scale
and technical improvements in the near future will be sufficient to offset in:flation and high debt costs. In the words of Dr. Brimmer, ''INo one doubts any longer
that energy is now both an increasing cost industry and in increasingly competitive one, when substitutions among energy sources are considered." 28 Despite
recent rate increases, the average price for a residential kilowatt-hour of electricity was 2.38 cents at the end of 1973, the same as it was ten years earlier.:u
He went on to state:
. . . the presumption among most observers is that rates will have
to rise. This will be necessary not only in order to attract funds for
the necessary increases in capacity and environmental quality, but also
in order to perform an allocative function as well." 25
The allocative function that Brimmer has in mind is rthe one pointed out earlier, that price increases help to dampen down demand and to guide the use of
scarce resources to the activities that produce the highest returns. However, he
goes on to point out that. if energy is indeed a scarce commodity that should be
conserved ,"rewards could be given to the small user and penalties extracted
from the large users ... This ... is the reverse of the present pricing system." 26
system." ?II
»Brimmer, op. cit., p. 21.
:u News from Edison EZectrio Institute, June 11, 1974, p. 1.
: f6jtfmer, op. cit.
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He does acknowledge the physical efficiencies that are involved in delivering
energy to large users, citing the savings achieved by using. high: voltage lines. to
deliver electric service to large customers. In contrast, residential users reqmre
expensive and complex distribution networks. Nevertheless, Dr. Brimmer maintains that the current pricing pattern tends to encourage industry to develop
in the direction of energy-intensive production technologies.~'7
Several authorities have begun to advocate replacing the present system of
declining block rates with a structure which more nearly approximates marginal cost pricing. In other ~vords, the .u~er is charge~ acco:ding to. how ~uch
it costs to deliver the last umt of electricitY consumed m a given perwd of time.
Such a structure would include peak load ra•t e differentials for both time of day
and season of the year.
In the past year considerable interest has developed in the possibility of
discouraging the use of electricity through revising the current "decliningblock" rate schedule whereby larger users of power typically pay lower rates
for each "block" they use. 'l'he current practice is defended on the basis of the
underlying economics-the total cost per kilowatt hour tends to decline with
volume, as many items of fixed cost are spread over larger number of units ;
thus price is related to cost of service. To some extent, however, a considerable
flattening of electric rates is occurring with the growing importance of proportional "fuel-adjustment" charges whereby utilities pass on the added cost
of the fuel they purchase. Further flattening of block rates for large industrial
and commercial customers may result from the sharp rises in generation and
transmission costs.
There is precedence in other parts of the economy for discouraging usage in
peak periods, when production is more costly, and to encourage off-peak use
when the cost of production is very low. ~Iovie houses, parking lots, and other
kinds of businesses set their prices according to the time of day in order to spread
the use .o f their facilities in the most efficient pattern.
Telephone companies do this by charging higher rates for long distance calls
in the daytime and thereby encouraging night-time, off-peak use of their facilities. Similarly, many airlines offer lower "night owl" rates. Electric utilities
have taken limited steps in this direction. The Union Electric Company charges
lower rates for dusk-to-dawn lighting. It seeks to promote electric heating by
bargain rates in an effort to offset the summer air-conditioning peaks (ironically,
summer air conditioning was originally encouraged by the utilities when their
peaks resulted from winter heating demands) .
Union Electric's Taum Sauk storage plant pumps water up a mountain during
the slack hours and lets it flow back down to generate additional current when
needed to meet peak demands. Since 1959, the company has bet>n charging residential customers a higher summer rate, about 25 percent more, when their
use of electricity, usually stimulated by air conditioning, exceeds 600 kilowatt
hours a month.
Higher summer rates may also be viewed as an attempt to deal with the
problem that, under current rate schedules, the higher usage represented by air
conditioning is charged a lower than average rate, while the cost of installing
the added capacity to provide the extra power is higher than the cost of providing basic electric power.
Time-of-day pricing of electricity, as suggested by some economists, would
be a more drastic change in the basic utility rate structure. According to Professor William Vickery of Columbia University, "The time of consumption is
by far the most crucial element to be taken into account in any rate structure." 28
He believes that if consumers were charged the true cost of service--more when
a utility is operating at full capacity and less when it is not-they would shift
a considerable amount of their electric usage from peak hours to periods when
total demand is less.
According to Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, now chairman of the New York State Public
Service Commission, Great Britain and France sell electricity at time-of-day rates
that are based roughly on rising short-run marginal cost. He also points out
that power pools draw power automatically from alternative sources on the
same basis. 29
:rr Ibid., n. 20.
28
Onoted in Harry Wilensky, "Searching for A Short in UE's Rate System," St. Louis
Post-DisTJatrh . .Tnne 2::!. 1974. n. 1D.
29 Alfren E. Kahn. "Economic Theorv as a Guideline for Government Intervention and
Control: Comment." Journal of Economic Issues, June 1974. pp. 305-306. For an analysis
of the nra~tical difficulties of introflucing marginal cost pricing in utility reg'Ulation. see
Harry M. Trebing, "Realism and Relevance in Public Uttuty Regulation," Journal o!
Economic Issues, June 197'4, pp. 215-216.

Many governmental and industry experts are dubious about the effectiveness
of such an innovation. According to William Lindsay, head of the rate division of
the Federal Power Commission, '"It's an undemonstrated and radical departure.
I doubt that it would hurt much. I'm not persuaded that it would do much good,
either." 30 Industry reaction is even more negative. Charles J. Dougherty, president of Union Electric, believes that electricity has become such a necessity that,
"I'm not sure that even a 50 percent increase in cost of current used by the
housewife would change consumption patterns." 31
The New York State Public Service Commission recently ruled that Niagara
Mohawk Power Corporation will have to investigate the feasibility of time-ofday pricing before making another application for a rate increase.
Another suggestion for change in the structure of utility charges is to "invert"
the rates, eliminating the discounts now given to large users and, in order to
foster conservation, increasing a user's unit charges as usage rises. Such a change,
it is frequently argued, would constitute a fundamental departure from the
time-honored principle that prices should reflect costs. It is obvious that it costs
a utility more to bring power to small separate residences or retail stores than
to one large industrial plant, but it is not inevitable that existing rate differentials exactly match these cost differences.
Some of the suggestions to invert the utility price structure have been based
on the argument that increasing consumption leads to higher costs and, therefore,
the price per unit should rise with increased consumption. This type of argument confuses short-run marginal costs with long-run marginal costs.
In terms of rate structures, that is a confusion between rate forms and rate
levels. Rate forms are a function of the short run marginal cost of existing
facilities. Rate levels are a function of the long run marginal cost of additional
facilities.
It does appear that long run marginal costs are now rising-the cost of producing power from new units is greater than the cost of producing power from existing units. But there are good reasons not to respond to a sharp change in long run
marginal cost by abandoning rate levels based on average costs and suddenly
adopting levels based entirely on the new incremental cost. Utilities on the
average would reap windfall returns (economic rents) on their present investment. Existing customers would be required to pay more than the actual costs
of service.
There is a theoretical solution, of course, to the problem: charging higher rates
based on long run incremental costs for the loads of new customers and for
the new additional loads of existing customers. Such a proposal, however, is
likely to encounter great public and political resistance because of the apparent
discrimination among individuals. Moreover, application of such a policy to the
new loads of existing residential customers would require demand metering. This
is something which regulatory commissions have been hesitant to authorize for
numerous reasons, including the high cost of installing and maintaining demand
meters.
We need to understand that the cost of serving any electric utility customer
contains both fixed and variable components. ]'ixed costs are those incurred
by the utility in order to be in a position to serve the customer. no matter what
his or her level of usage may be. Variable costs are those which depend directly
on the amount of electricity actually used. Because the fixed charges-in the
short run-are independent of the number of kilowatt-hours actually consumed.
the greater the consumption, the lower will be the average amount of fixed
charge per kilowatt-hour (kwhr).
Variable cost in contrast, is the same for each kwhr used. Hence, short-run
average cost must decline for a given customer as the usage rises. This situation can be described in simple mathematical terms:
Average cost/kwhi=Fixed cost+ Variable cost/kwhr
Number of kwhrs
It is also aparent that the larger the variable cost relative to the fixed cost
at an:r given level of consumption, the flatter will be the average col"lt curYe. This
explains why increases in fuel costs tend to have the greatest flattening effect
30
31

wnensky. op. cit.
lbid., p. 3D.

on the average cost curve of a large consumer. The rapid increase in fuel prices
as transmitted through automatic fuel adjustment clauses is a good example
of this effect. The cost of service with a greater variable cost component is
typical in the case of large customers who take their energy at higher voltages
and do not require as much distribution investment per kilowatt of load.
Thus when fuel costs are rising rapidly, the average price per kilowatt hour
paid by the large industrial customer tends to rise at a higher percentage rate
than does the average price paid by a a smaller consumer whose average cost
of service includes a proportionally larger fixed cost component.
The Missouri Public Service Commission has required Union Electric to
undertake a cost-of-service study to help the commission to see more clearly
the relationships between costs and charges for each major class of service.
In announcing the study, the commission chairman, James F. Mauze stated:
We hope to find a rate structure that will enable the utilities to use
their plant more efficiently- not an inverted rate structure but a more
sophisticated structure that would induce more consumption during
o1f-peak
periods thereby bringing down the average cost per kilowatt
hour.82
Such a change might require significant modifications in living and working
habits. We can only speculate as to the extent that price incentives will encourage housewives to put off electricity-consuming chores during the daytime
and wait until the evening to use washing machines and dryers, or to get them
to turn off the air conditioning when they go shopping.
Q

Ibid., p. 3D.

CHAPTER

6.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY : GOVERNMENT CREDIT
GUARANTEES

The traditional response to prospective difficulties in financing the capital programs of electric utilities is in terms of increasing the general rate structure. As
shown in an earlier chapter, that is currently the preferred solution on the part of
many authorities.
Yet, recent rate increases have been so substantial and at times public opposition to further rate increases so vehement, that a number of people have urged
new approaches. It should be realized that these suggested innovations are not
generally described as complete substitutes for rate changes. Rather, they are
often presented as a means of slowing down the rising price of electricity.
This chapter is devoted to an examina-tion of one group of those proposalssuggestions to lighten the financing burdens of electric utilities through government credit guarantees. '£he following chapter presents and analyzes other proposals for easing the financial pressures on electric utilities.
The notion of federal guarantees of electric utility bonds has obtained some
support within the industry itself. Charles F. Luce, Chairman of the board of the
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, has been quoted as being sympathetic
to the approach as a means of dealing with the pressing financial problems facing
companies such as Con Ed.1 A specific plan for such guarantees has been advanced by William G. Rosenberg, chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission. Because of the national attention received by Mr. Rosenberg's proposal
and the detail that he has made available, the following analysis of federal guarantees of utility bonds is based on his approach.
DESCRIPTION AND RATIONALE OF THE ROSENBERG PLAN

Chairman Rosenberg presented his views in a -speech of the Eighty-Fifth Annual
Convention of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners on
September 18, 1973, Rates, Consumer Pressure and Finance: The Need tor Innovation in the EZectrio Utiilties.~ The 14-page speech was accompanied by a 32page paper with the same title which provided additional detail.8 In its essence,
the Rosenberg approach is to have the fede ..·al government guarantee the interest
of the bonds issued by electric utilities. The federal support is also seen as permitting the utilities to more highly leverage their financial structures, to issue a
larger proportion of bonds to stock than is currently the case. His expectation is
that the lower interest rates which the utilities could pay on these bonds would
reduce the very sub~tantial pressures for rate increases that are now being felt by
the Michigan Public Service Commission and by its counterparts throughout the
nation.
·~
.
The program is expected .t o operate in the following manner for a typical
electric utility:
1. The utility would petition the state reguiatory agencies for authority to
issue debt securities to finance new cons-truction and associated facilities or to
refinance debt.
2. After feasibility analysis, the commission would certify that the proposal
was in the public interest.
3. The utility would then apply to the appropriate federal agency for fed~ral
insurance and guarantee of the proposed debt issue.
1.

"Con Edison Says a Resumption of Payout Is Uncertain; Meeting Is Tumultuous,"

ThP. WtJ.lZ Street Journal, May 21, 1974. p. 6.
2 Wllllnm G. Rosen"~>erJr. Rates, Consumer Pressure· and Finance: The Need for Innovation in the Electric Utilities, a speech delivered at the Eighty-Fifth Annual Convention

of thP N~ttfonal Asf;oclatlon of Regulatory Utntty Commissioners, Seattle, Washington,
Seotemher 18. 1973 (hereafter referred to as Rosenberg Plan).
3 WUUnm G. RosenberJr. Rates. Consumer Pressure and Finance: The Need tor Innovation in. the Electric Utilities (hPreafter referred to as Rosenberg Paper). This paper
contains the following note: "The substance of this paper wns prPsented In a 11peech
nt the Efghty-Ffth Annunl Convention of the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners, Seattle, Washington, Tuesday, September 18, 1973."
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4. The federal agency, relying on certifications by the state ~O?Jlmissi?n, would
guarantee the debt service payments. It would charge the ubhty an msurance
fee sufficient to fund the risk of default.
5. The utility \vould then make its usual public offering or priv~te placement
of its bonds. The new facilities would be constructed under surveillance of the
state commission.
. .
6. Debt service payments and the insurance fee would be made by the ubhty
in accord with the terms of the bond indenture.
7. In the event of default, debt service could be paid from the insurance p~ol.
If the pool were insufficient, payments would be made by the U.S. Treasury.
Chairman Rosenberg contends that such a system of federal guarantees would
reduce the cost of capital by enabling electric utilities both to issue bonds at lower
rates of interest and to use more debt and less equity in their capital structures. Thus, savings would result from two ~ources: (1) lower inter~st pa;v~ents
and (2) a substitution of tax-deductible mterest for non-deductible dividend
payments.
.
.
.
The direct interest savings are estimated at 150 basis pomts (a 1 1h percentage
point reduction in the interest rate). The higher leverage resulting from a greater
percentage of debt in the capital structure is estim~ted to yiel~ su~stantial savings because "common equity, even under conventiOnal financmg, IS over three
times more e~pensive than debt." 5
•
•
Chairman Rosenberg advocates the use of government guarantees m view of
the cost pressures on the electric utilities. "There c~n be no doubt," he states,
"that when the financial facts are considered objectively, financial stress upon
the companies is serious." 8 The problem is also viewed as a continued ~ne: "It
is abundantly clear that the combination of growing demand for service and
decline in the attractiveness of utility securities will continue to result in severe
financial pressures." 7 He also cites various precedents for federal guarantee of
private credit.
.
_
It should be noted that Chairman Rosenberg does not view the proposal for
federal guarantee of electric utility bonds as a panacea. In his paper, he emphasizes the important role of utility rates:
It is clear that short-term benefits of less than fair rates are outweighed by the negative long-term consequence~ .t~ the society of ~ailure
to provide adequate utility service ... The utilities cannot service the
public's energy needs at a reasonable co~t and in an enviro"?mentan;v
acceptable manner unless they can attract needed ~xterna! capital. Capital will be forthcoming at the lowest costs only If earnmgs levels are8
sufficient to assure a reasonable return on bond :md equity investments.

Before undertaking a more detailed analysis of this proposal for federal guarantees of utility bonds, it may be useful to array the major "pro" and "con"
arguments that can and have been made for the plan.

Chairman Rosenberg's paper also acknowledg:es some of the techniral difficulties that would have to he faced in making effective any general program of
fed€'-ral guarantees of utility bonds. As he points out, most ontstanding uti1itY
bond indentures include a restriction on the issuance of additionql deht hy the
rompany. New deht may he issued unlPss coverage (tlw. rnto nf earnin~s heforf' taxes and interest to interest charges) is above a stmnlated level, usually
2.00. Since many utilities are already very close. to minimum ~overage. lev~ls,
they could not significantly increase the proportion of deht without viol::~h~g
the indenture restrictions. 9 Chairmnn Rosf'nherg urges amenrlmf'nt of thf' Pnhhc
Utility Holding Company Act and elimination of any other legislative obstacles
that may he identified. He concludes:
If Congress decides to apply the full faith an? cr~n.it. of thf' U.S.
Treasnrv to the financing requirements of electrtr nbhhes. f'ongr~ss
should have no furthE>r problem in amenrline- other statutes a~ertmg
nublic utilitv financing which coulrl cut across the indenturE> restr1ctwns
to assumE> that the fPCleral guarantee and insurance
proposal has broad
10
applicability to all of the nation's electric utilities.
4 Ro.~enbem Plan,
·11.
1ir7.,

pn. 10- 11.
sn
n.
Chairman Rosenbf'rg's paper rpfers to a potential 25 percent savings in
thP l'ost of capital (p. 17).
T11ir1., p. 3.
• 111i(l., n. 4.
R Ro.qenbem Pane1·, p. 7.
D J11ff1., pp, 13- 14.
1o Ibid., p 21.
n

1li ajor Arguments

Pro

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

It provides a new source of capital to the electric utility industry.
It lowers the industry's cost of financing.
It reduces the industry's tax bill.
It a voids federal controls.
It protects existing debt holders.
It does not change the status of equity investors.

It relies on numerous precedents for federal guarantees of private credits.
Con

1. It does not provide a new source of capital to the economy as a whole, but

uses the political process to give one industry a larger share of available capital
funds.
2. It could increase financing costs to the extent that delays resulting from
federal reviews force utilities to miss periods when interest rates are low.
3. It violates binding commitments to existing bondholders.
4. It increases taxes to be raised from the rest of society.
5. It subsidizes the use of energy when public policy is fostering conservation.
6. It opens the way for federal controls, which often accompany government
~ubsidies.

'i. It overestimates interest savings and ignores increased costs to other borrowers.
It is apparent that many of the disagreements between the proponents and
OPI~ onents of federal credit guarantees are based on different interpretations of
ihe impact of such federal programs;. Hence, a detailed analysis of federal credit
J{Uarantees in general and of guarantees of utility bonds specifically would seem
very much in order.
UIPACTS ON TOTAL SAVING AND INVESTMENT

The aYailable literature on the impacts of federal credit programs on the total
flow of saving and ilwestment in the American economy is clear. All authorities
l:ltate that these programs do not increase the total flow of saving or im·estment.
At the most, they merely change the share of investment funds going to a given
industry or sector of the economy and, in the process of doing so, exert upward
pressures on interest rates as investment funds are bid away from other sectors.
In commenting on existing programs of federally-assisted credit to the private
sector, Dr. Henry Kaufman, the distinguished economist with the investment
house of Salomon Brothers, has written:
FE>deral agency financing does not do anything directly to enlarge the
supply of savings ... in contrast, as agency financing bids for the limited
supply of savings with other credit demanders, it helps to bid up the
price of money. 11
In referring to borrowing by the Federal Government and its agencies, Dr.
Albert 'Vojnilower has made a similar observation:
Because these governmental borrowers need have few if any worries
about creditworthiness or meeting interest payments, they can preempt
as much of the credit markets as they choose. As a result, the Federal
sector has become one of the most relentless sources of upward pressures
on interest rates.:. ~
In a comprehensive study of federal credit programs for the prestigious Commission on l\I01wy and Credit, 'Varren Law of Harvard University concluded
that they have created inflationary pressures in every year since World War 11.13
11
Hrnry Kaufman. "Federal Deht 1\InnngPment: An Economist'R View from thf' 1\Iarkf'tpln<'P.'. in Ff'deral Resf'rve Bank of Boston, Issues in Fede1·al Debt Jllauagement, Boston.l!l73. p. 171.
_t 2 Alhert l\I. Wojnilower, "Can Capital-Market Controls be Avoided in the 1970's," in
:'lhchael E. Levy. editor. Containing Inflation in the Envi1·onmcnt of the 1970's, New
York. Conference Boarrl. 1971. n. 42.
13
•
·warren A. Law. "The Ai!greg::t!.£:: Impact of Federal Credit Programs on thf' Economy,"
m Commission on l\Ioney and Credit, Federal Credit Programs, Englewood Cliffs, PrenticeHall, 1963, p. 310.
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Professor Patricia Bowers has noted what she terms "costs" of federal credit
programs:
One cost arises from the fact that when the budget constraint is
loosened for housing, it must be tightened for other sectors. The other
two borrowing groups most adversely affected by tight credit are state
and local governments and small businesses.
A further cost ... is that the operations of the federal credit agencies
tend to increase the level of interest rates above the level1 that would
have prevailed if they had not entered the credit markets. '
This phenomenon occurs for a variety of reasons. The total supply of funds is
determined by household and business saving and the ability of banks to increase
the money supply. This is the budget constraint, as described above by Professor
Bowers, for new finance for all borrowers, public or private. The normal response
of financial markets to an increase in the demand for funds by a borrower, such
as is represented by a federal credit program, is an increase in interest rates so as
to balance out the demand for funds with the available supply. But the federal
government's demand for funds are "interest-inelastic" (the Treasury will generally raise the money that it requires regardless of the interest rate). Thus,
weak and marginal borrowers will be "ratiom~d" out of financial markets in the
process, while the Treasury and other borrowers pay higher rates of interest.:u;
Important insight into the effects of federal credit programs on capital markets
has been provided by Bruce MacLaury, the President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis and a former deputy Undersecretary of the Treasury :
The more or less unfettered expansion of Federal credit programs
and the accompanying deluge of agency direct and guaranteed securities
to be financed in the credit markets has undoubtedly permitted Congress
and the Administration to claim that wonder of wonders-something for
nothing, or almost nothing. But as with all such sleight-of-hand feats, the
truth is somewhat different.16
Dr. MacLaury goes on to point out that there are extra costs associated with
introducing new government credit agencies to the capital markets, selling issues
that are smaller than some minimum efficiently tradeable size, and selling securities that only in varying degree approximate the characteristics of direct government debt in terms of perfection of guarantee, flexibility of timing and maturities,
"cleanness" of instrument, etc. He points out that, as a result of such considerations, the market normally charges a premium over the interest cost on direct
government debt of comparable maturity. That premium ranges from 1,4 of one
percent on the well-known federally-sponsored agencies such as FNMA to more
than lh percent on such exotics as SBIC debentures and New Community Bonds.
He points out:
In general, if cost of financing were the only consideration, it would
financing for
be most efficient to have the Treasury itself provide the
17
direct loans by issuing government debt in the market.
MacLaury also describes the reduced efficiency that occurs in the economy by
providing a federal "umbrella" over many credit activities without distinguishing
their relative credit risks:
One function that credit markets are supposed to perform is that of
distinguishing different credit risks and assigning appropriate risk premia ... this is the essence of the ultimate resource-allocation function
of credit markets.
As an increasing proportion of issues coming to the credit markets
bears the guarantee of Uncle Sam, the scope for the market to differentiate credit risks inevitably diminishes ... Theoretically, the Federal agencies issuing or guaranteeing debt would perform this role, charging as
costs of the programs differing rates of insurance premia. In18practice, all
of the pressures are against such differential pricing of risks.
u Patricia F. Bowers, Private Choice and Public Welfare, Hinsdale, Dryden Press, 1974,
pn. 4CI4--496.
16 Ibid., p. 496.

16 Bruce K. MacLaury, "Federal Credit Pro~rams-:the Issues They Raise," in Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, Issues in Federal Debt Management, Boston, 1973, p. 214.
11 Ibid., p. 215.
ta Ibirl., p. 217.

IMPACTS ON OTHER SECTORS OF THE SOCIETY

In an article in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal which was
bas~ on .work done in th~ U.S. Treasury Department, the present ~riter pointed
?ut, ... It must be recogmzed that the very nature of [Federal] credit assistance
IS to create advantages for some groups of borrowers and disadvantages for
others." 19 To the questions "Who will be rationed out? Who will be the new disadvantaged in the credit market?", the literature provides clear answers. To
quote Dr. Kaufman again:
It is unlik~ly ~o be the large well-known corporations or the U.S. Gove!nment. It IS hkely. to be some State and local government, medium.:
Sized and smaller busmesses, some private mortgage borrowers not under
the Federal umbrella, and some consumer sectors. . . . This is bound to
contribute to additional economic and financial concentration in the
United States.20
J.ames Mc~e~? also notes that the continued expansion of governmentassi.sted credit wo~ld result in corporate issuers [not receiving federal aid]
havmg to reach a wider market with resultant consequences for rates. It would
also probably bar even more lower-rated issuers from the bond market in the
years to come." 21
Kaufman .also co~tend~ th~t the substanti·a l volume of new -offerings by the
federal credit agencies will widen sharply the yield spread between these issues
and t~ose of the U.S. Government, while the yield spread between the agencies
and high-grade corporate bonds will tend to be very narrow. 211
H.e also st~tes that investors may become reluctant to buy revenue bonds not
havmg the direct guarantee of state and local governments. 23 Pollution control
bonds having typically yielded moderately more than alternative long-term taxexempt issues and substantially more than the after-corporate tax yield of new
corporate bonds. This relatively high interest cost is ascribed to their rather
small size, and limited distribution and marketability,lK characteristics which
woul~ also apply to federally-guarantees of individual utility bonds.
It IS clear t~a~ the propose~ ~rogram of federal guarantees of utility bonds
would P.osses s.Imilar charactenstlcs as existing federal credit programs. It would
do noth~ng to mc~ease the total amount of saving in the economy which provides
the basic pool of mvestment funds. Moreover, to the extent that the government
guarantees eD;abled utilities to obtain larger share of available capital funds
the results would be two-fold :
'
. (1) to elbow out of credit markets weaker and "unprotected" borrowers such
a.s co~s.umers, homeow~ers, small businesses, school districts, and smaller counties, Cities, and other umts of local government.
(2) The diversion of investment funds from these other sectors to utilities
~o~ld require an increas~ in interest rates. Thus, some of the anticipated saving
m.mterest costs t~ the utilities from the government guarantee would not materiahze, and borrowmg costs to other borrowers would tend to rise.
IMPACTS ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ON FEDERAL TAXPAYERS

One impact of the Rosenberg plan is clear and negative: to the extent that the
guara!ltees were successful in permitting utilities to shift from stock issues to
bend Issues, the resultant increase in tax-deductible interest payments would reduce the payments of income taxes by utilities to the Treasury. Nothing in the
proposal would generate any offsetting savings in federal spending. Rather the
plan calls for the Treasury meeting utility interest payments if the comp~nies
are unable to do so and the guarant{'e fund is exhausted.
Thus, the Rosenberg plan would either result in a larger oudget deficit- which
wou~d accerbate the inflationary pressures which are the source of so much of
the mdustry's present financial difficulties--or it would require adding to the
tax burdens of all other taxpayers.
.
10 Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Financing and Controlling Federal Credit Programs" Feder~l Home Loan Bank Board Journal, September 1971, p. 15.
'
Kaufman, op. cit., pp. 171. 173.
21 .TameR .T. McKeon. "Ae-ency Debt Growth Shouldering Others From Market" Money
Mnnaqer, DPcemher 10, 1973. p. 3.
'
M 22 Henry Kaufman. "Continued Inflation Portends Vast Changes in Markets" Money
~:gied.' June 17, 1974, p. 5.
'

:u

Salomon Brothers, Comments on Values, June 5, 1974, p. 3.
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Another aspect of the proposed credit guarantee is the risk that it would impose on the United States Treasury. As the plan is now formulated, there is a
lack of incentive for individual companies or state regulatory commissions to
minimize high-risk undertakings. That is so because the plan calls for losses to
be covered by all utilities and, if necessary, by the Treasury. There is no provision for "merit rating." Thus, conservatively-managed institutions would pay
the same percentage fee as companies that engage in riskier ventures.
IMPACTS OF CREDIT PROGRAMS

TABLE 54.-GOVERNMENT LOAN CREDIT GUARANTEES AS OF JUNE 30, 1973
(In millions of dollars)
Amount of contingency

Agency and program
Funds appropriated to the President:
Agency for International Development: Housing guaranty fund.
Foreign military sales funds __

For
guarantees
and insurance
Total
in force

In considering proposals for new loan guarantees by the Federal Government,
some attention needs to be given to the existing burden of liabilities and contingent liabilities already borne by the U.S. Treasury. Table 53 summarizes the
major commitments of such a nature. On June 30, 1973, they totalled in excess of
$1.7 trillion, of which direct liabilities were over $520 billion and go-vernment
credit programs accounted for over $160 billion. By way of comparison, total
federal revenues for the fiscal year 1975 are estimated at about $300 billion.
Detailed information on the individual federal credit programs is contained
in Table 54. An examination of the array of programs is noteworthy. In the
typical case, the area being aided is one subject to close federal regulation (railroads, merchant marine, defense production, and agriculture) or has become,
at least in part, a federal responsibility (housing, economic development, medical care, education, veterans assistance, and disaster relief).
The largest federal program of loan guarantees is in the housing area. The
purpose of the loan guarantees is different than that envisioned in the Rosenberg plan. It is to open up the mortgage market to borrowers who otherwise
might be denied credit due to imperfections in credit markets. As explained by
one authority,
One of the factors discouraging the purchase of mortgages by the broad
spectrum of financial investors is the illiquidity of mortgage instruments due to the limited secondary market for mortgage instruments,
in contrast to the broad secondary markets for business and government
securities.25

Overseas Private Investment
Corporation.

218

Dep· rtment
of
Agriculture,
Agricultural credit insuranc3
Farmers Home Administration:
fund.
Rural development insurance
fund.

2, 874

Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration: Economic development
revolving fund.

48

TABLE 53.-LIABILITIES AND OTHER FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AS OF JUNE 30, 1973

Maritime Administration: Federal
f~~~. financing fund, revolving

2, 579

Rural housing insurance fund.

277
244

For
commitments
to guarantee
or insure Explanatory notes

277 -------------- Includes extended risk
contracts for housing.

244 ·······------- Represents guarantees of credit for
sales of defense articles and
services.
191
27 This Corporation offers U.S. lenders
protection against commercial and
political risks by guaranteeing
payment of principal and interest
on loans made to eligible private
enterprises in foreign countries.
2, 735
139 This fund is used to insure farm
ownership lo3ns and soil and water
conservation loans.

1, 509

838

671

6, 180

5, 869

311

48 __ • ____ ••• _. _.

1, 260

1, 319

(In millions of dollars)
Applicable
to other
Government
funds

Category

liabilities:
Public debL. ... . . . ... ... .................. . .................
124,210
Agency securities. ..... ............... .. . .....................
1, 996
Deposit fund liability accounts •... •• •••• • . • •• - ---··-·-·····------------------·
Checks and other instruments outstanding ____ ________________________________ _
Accrued interest on the public debt. ____ __ ___________________________________ _
Other Treasury liabilities _______ • _______ • ___• __ ___ • _______ • _____ • ______ ._. ___ •
Accounts payable on the books of government agencies____________
6, 377

Applicable
to the public

Total

333,932
9,113
3, 653
7, 075
2, 874
418
31, 049

458, 142
11, 109
3, 653
7, 075
2, 874
418
37, 426

-------------------------------388, 114
520,697

Subtotal, liabilities. __ ____• ___ • ___ ._ . ___ • ___._. _____ • ___ • __ ._

132,=58=3===~=====

Contingent liabilities:
Government guarantees insuring private lenders against losses __________________ _
Insurance commitments _____________ • __ _•• __ • ••••• ___ ._._. ___ ._. ___ ••• ____ • __
Unadjudicated claims ••. ____ _________ __• • ___ •• ______ • ___ • _____ • ____ • _______ ._
International commitments _____________ ••• _• • ____ •• _______ • ______ • ___ • _____ --

160,713
1, 021,915
5, 762
17, 502

160,713
1, 021,915
5, 762
17, 502

---------------------------1, 205, 892
1, 205,892

Subtotal, contingent liabilities •• _. _______ • _____ •• _____ • ______ • _____ ._. ____ ._

======================
Grand totaL •••• __ -··- · ._ •• ________ ••• _._ • • __ •• ____________ _
1, 594, 006
1, 726,589
132, 583
Note: Excludes actuarial deficiency in social security and other "social insurance" programs, and other contingencies
shown in source note.
Source: Department of the Treasurv. Bureau of Accounts, statement of liabilities and other finzncial commitments of
the U.S. Government as of June 30, 1973, January 1974.
25

Bowers, op. cit., p. 483.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration: Federal ship
financing fund, fishing vessels.
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare:
Medical facilities guar11ntee
and loan fund.
Student loan insurance fund ••

Department of Housing and Urban
Development:
Low-rent public housing
program.

12

455
2, 099

11, 783

New communities guarantee
fund.

294

Federal Housing Administration.

93,432

Urban renewal fund ________ _

3, 651

gurantee

12 -····---------

This fund is used to make, sell, or
insure water facility loans, rural
electrification and telephone loans,
industrial development loans, and
community facility loan~.
This fund is used to insure rural
housing loans, farm labor housing
loans, and lo3ns for rural rental
and cooperative housing. Loans are
made to persons of low income and
others in rural areas.
Outstanding guaranteed loans disbursed by financial institutions to
private borrowers for working
capital in connection with projects
in redevelopment areas.
Government insurance of loans and
mortgages which were financed by
the sale of bonds to the public
prior to the completion of construction of ships under mortgage
commitments.
Represents insurance of loans for
construction or purchase of fishing
vessels.

47
408 Guarantees in force represent medical
facilities guaranteed loans.
2, 099 •• _... __ ••• _•• Gu3ranteed loans-reinsured. Estimate of expected losses is $130,·
000,000. Funds are requested and
appropriated by Congress to cover
losses recognized during year in
which claims are received.
11, 783 _.•••• __ •• _. __ Represents guarantees of bonds and
notes issued by local housing
autho;ities to private investors.
198
96 Guarantees of loans issued by private
developers to finance land acquisitions and development costs of new
communities.
86, 877
6. 555 Insurance of loans for financing the
production, purchase, repair, and
improvement of residential properties. The FHA is indemnified against
loss by trust agreements, performance bonds, and personal demand
notes to the extent of $1,000,000.
3, 651 --- ----·------ Guarantee of non-Federal loans.
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Amount of contingency

Agency and program
Department of Transportation:
Federal Aviation Administration: Aircraft loan guarantees.
Federal Railroad Administration: Railroad loan guarantees.

For
For
guarantees commitments
to
guarantee
and insurance
or insure Explanatory notes
Total
in force

11

11 ------ ·- --- --- Represents guarantee of 1 aircraft
loan.

275

171

Urban Mass Transportation Administration: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
bonds.

445

445

General Services Administration:
Defense production gurantees.

49

2

Expenses, disposal of surplus anp
related personal property.
Real property activities ••• ______ _

Veterans' Administration : loan
guaranty revolving fund.

Other Independent agencies:
Emergency loan Guarantee
Board: Emergency loan
guarantee fund.
Export-Import Bank of the
United States.
Interstate Commerce Commission.

633

633

25,372

24, 420

250

150

104 Represents a guarantee of $68,000,(.00
on a loan made to the National Rail
Passenger Corp. and guarantees
of $103,000,000 on trustee certificates of railroad companies undergoing reorganization.
-------------- Principal and interest on bonds and
other evidences of indebtedness of
the WMATA may be guaranteed
by the Secretary of Transportation.
Periodic payment of ~ of the net
interest cost to the authority is
provided.
44 Guarantees are given on loans made
by public and private financing
institutions to facilitate performance of defense production
contracts.
- --------··--- Mortgage sold with full recourse to
the U.S. Government secured by
real property.
---------- ---- The GSA building construction program includes projects financed by
purchase contracts under the
Public Buildings Amendments of
1972.
952 Represents the guaranteed portion
only of total loans of $47,165,000,000 made to veterans for purchase
of homes, farms, and business
property: the remainder of $22,745,000,000 is non guaranteed;
cumulative gross claims of $1,698,000,000 were paid through fiscal
year 1973 out of $50,841,000,000
guarantees issued. Salvage operations (acquisition and resale of
security properties) have resulted
in recovery of all but $94, 800, 000
of total claim payments.
100 loan guarantee program for the lockheed Aircraft Corp.

2, 792 Represents loans sold with recourse
and medium term guarantees.
42 •. __ ____ ___•• _ loan guarantees to railroads. This
guarantee program ended as to receipt of new applications, on June
30, 1963. The appraised value of
collateral pledged is $66,100,000.
4 ------ -- --·--- The fund has guaranteed the loans
National Credit Union Admin·
4
purchased by successful credit
istration: National credit
unions from liquidating credit
union share insurance fund.
unions at a price to permit payoff
to members at par.
Small Business Administra3, 393
2, 673
720 Represents guaranteed portion of
tlon: Business loan and inloans held by private lenders. The
vestment fund.
non11uaranteed portion of loans, or
participants' share is $426,100,000.
Disaster loan fund___________
6
The nonguaranteed oortion or partici- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - pants' share is $671,000.
TotaL__________________
160,713
146,474
14,239

4, 576

1, 784
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That is, the $20,000 mortgage of John Smith ln Indianapolis is hardly the
market equivalent of a $20 million bond issue by Public Service of Indiana. In
the words of Professor Bowers, the residential mortgage"... is IIlOt issued by an
entity about which the public has some general knowledge and about which it is
possible to gain additional specific information without too much difficulty and
expense." l!6 Utility bonds do not seem to fit into that category.
Impacts on Government Bond Issues
As federal guaraiiltees are extended to more aud more private borrowers, an
ever larger proportion of the nation's debt consists of federal credit. In order to
entice a rising share of available savings, some increase would be expected in
the interest rates paid on such debt. That is, if-in the absence of the Rosenberg
Plan-total Treasury and government guaranteed borrowing in a given year
were $50 billion then, with the Rosenberg Plan, total Federally-assisted borrowing would rise to $70 billion.
It is reasonable to anticipate that a higher rate of interest would have to be
paid to attract $70 billion of saving to government credit ·a ctivities than $50
billion. liildeed, that is generally the conclusion of the scholars who have studied
the matter. However, no precise estimates have ever been made.
If the federal government were to guarantee all public utility debt, the resultant quick and massive expansion of the size of the government debt market
is likely to result in sharp increases in the interest rates necessary to attract
a new body of illlvestors to government securities. Even if the new rates are
below those now paid by utilities, they likely will be above those now paid by
the Treasury. Hence, the advantages that would accrue to the utilities and their
customers would be offset by the higher interest costs paid by the Treasury
and thus financed by all taxpayers and the general public.
For purposes of illustration, let us assume that the very substantial increase
in total government-assisted credit that would result from extending guarantees to all electric utilities would require raising the average interest rate
paid on such debt by one-quarter of 1 percent. In 1975, $28.4 billion of federal
interest-bearing marketable debt is scheduled to mature and about $8 million of
short-term Treasury bills are expected to roll over.27 Making an additional
allowaiilce for the $21.6 billion of net new debt estimated to be issued, 28 the total
added cost to the federal taxpayers would be about $145 million a year (.0025 X
$58,000,000,000).
As a general proposition, it would be expected that Government-guaranteed
debt would have a lower interest rate than ordinary utility bonds. But, as stated
by one authority, "There is some reason to doubt, however, that this would
actually be very substantial in effect." :e Herman G. Roseman, vice president of
National Economic Research As~ociates, points out that the yields on Treasury
bonds seem to have declined relative to utility bonds at least in part because of
the decline in the outstanding volume of Treasury bonds. "There is no reason
to think that a Government-guaranteed utility bond would be regarded as a
substitute for a Treasury bond-which has a very high degree of marketability-allld that it bear the same rate as a Treasury bond." 80
Support for this position is obtained by examining existing programs of federal
guarantees of the credit of private corporations. In the case of the railroads
whose loans were guaranteed by the Federal Government during the period
1959-63, the interest rates that they paid were substantially higher than the
rates paid by the Federal Government as well as those of public utilities, who
were operating without the benefit of a federal guarantee (see Table 55). This
indicates the low investor evaluation of railroad investments, regardless of the
government guarantee.
A more recent program of federal guarantees covers the financing of Americanbuilt ships. At the time of the offering of the 'b onds-which were clearly la'beled
"United States Government Guaranteed Ship Financing Bonds"-they were
li8Jbid.
Trens11r11 Bulletin, Aorl11974. pp. 22. 30.

ll1

Note: Excludes Government-sponsored enterprises, such as Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal land Banks,
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, and Federal Home loan Banks.
Source: Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Accounts, "Statement of liabilities and Other Financial Commitments
of the U.S. Government os of JUne 30, 1973." January 1974.

l!8 Official orojections for calendar year 1975 are not available for new public debt to be
issuefl : the fiscal :vear figure is useit in the calculation.
!19 Herman G. Roseman. Remarks on the Adequacy of Oapital Supply !or the Electric
Utility IndtJ.Btru in the Ooming Decade, New York, National Economic Research Associates,
Inc ...Tanuary 29, 1974, p. 50.
80 Ibid., p. 50.
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priced to yield 7.9 percent at a time when Treasury bonds were yielding about

placed the market oriented activity of FHA at a competitive disadvantage.33
In addition, Colean has called attention to the "Uncertainty and frequent
interruption of FHA activity" caused by settling terminal dates requiring Congressional action to review insurance authority, and the limitation placed annually on FHA's ability to spend the funds for administration that it obtains
from insurance fees and premi urns.~
In October 1972, the National Center for Housing Management contracted
with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to study HUD's
housing programs. The Center drew on a distinguished group of experts in the
area of housing. 35 In analyzing the requirements which have been added in recent
years to the FHA processing format- "such matters as affirmative marketing,
environmental protection, and project selection"-the center's report stated:
... the Task force feels that HUD has not proceeded in the most logical
fashion in dealing with these new requirements. It has tended to add
them on to the process without even analyzing the effect that they would
have on that process ... The end result has been that the constant imposition of new socially useful requirements for FHA processing has
produced a substantial loss of competitive status for FHA's single-family
prograiil8. 38
In a later part of the report, the Center stated that, "FHA has suffered
from ... overly comp'i<'ated l)r ou'"dated requirements for builders, mortgagees,
and mortgagors. This has discouraged many from applying, besides causing
frustration for those who do." 37
Perhaps the most fundamental problem that has arisen is the fact that FHA
guaranteed loans have always been subject to an officially determined mortgage
interest rate ceiling. In states with low usury ceilings, this has at times either
prevented otherwise elivib'" p?ople from using the FHA insurance program
of has required the use of "points" and other complicating subterfuges.
Once an industry has become dependent on the federal assistance, that situation can be used to impose additional controls, which may be unrelated to
protecting the government's investment or contingent liability. An example is
the recent report of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee which deals
with energy policy. Among its various proposals, it recommended that the Congress enact authority to require minimum standards for thermal efficiency in
new buildings as a prerequisite for approval under any federal subsidy or
mortgage insurance program. 38
In the case of electric utilities, one of the potential federal controls could
have fairly adverse effect<> on its <'!lnital financing situation- the Davis-Bacon
Act regulating wages on construction projects. Hence, some attention to this
control device is warranted. Contrary to the general laws and regulations that
require the awarding of government business to the lowest bidders, the Federal
Government tends to increase the costs of the construction projects that it
finances or subsidizes. The reason is the DaYis-Bacon Act, which directs the
Department of Labor to set "minimum" rates for construction workers on these
projects. Although the law stipulates that the minimums be set at the level
prevailing in "the city, town. village or other civil subdivision of the state in
which the work is performed," in practice these rates are rarely the average of
thoRe paid all construction workers in the area.
The Davis-Bacon Act is not limited to the construction projects financed by
federal agencies. It typically is appended to various programs of federal aid to
state and local governments, ranging from airports to highways to libraries.
Even in the case of the general revenue sharing legislation- whose basic purpose
was to shift decision-making from Washington to the grassroots- the law requires all of the state and local governments to abide by Davis-Bacon in the
case of construction projects where the revenue sharing money covers one

7 percent and utility 'b ond yields averaged about 8 percent.:n

As Roseman puts it, "These two examples illustrate the principle that a Government guarantee of a loan does not make the loan equiva ~ent to a Government
borrowing." 32 Hence, it is difficult to assume that electric utility bonds, if guaranteed as to interest and principal by the Federal Government, would thereby
bear interest rates similar to those on government bonds. It does. however, seem
reasonable to assume that the interest rate on guaranteed utility bonds might,
for some companies and under certain market conditions, be lower than they
otherwise would be.
TABLE 55.-INTEREST RATES ON RAILROAD GUARANTY LOANS AND YIELDS ON GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AND
PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS, 1959-63
[In percent)

Year

Range of
interest rates
on railroad
guaranty loans

1959•••••
------- - --------------- - ------- - -- ---- - _
1960
_____________________________________
_________
1961 _________________________ ___________________ ___
1962 ________________ ____________________________ ___
1963 ________ ___________________________________ __ __

5 -5H
5 -5H
4%-6%
5 -5P
4%-5%

Public utility
bonds
4. 70
4. 69
4. 57
4. 51
4. 41

U.S. Government securities
U.S. Govern3- to 5- ment long-term
year issues
bonds
4. 33
3. 99
3. 60
3. 57
3. 72

4. 07
4. 01
3.90
3. 95
4. 00

Source: Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Section of Financial Analysis, Statistic~! Summary for
Loan Guarantees to Railroads Under Part V of the Interstate Commerce Act, As amended, June 30, 1973; Federal Reserve
Bulletin, December 1961 and December 1964.
IMPACTS ON GOVERNMENT CONTROLS

An examination of existing programs of federal guarantee of private credit
also reveals how the credit assistance is often accompanied by various forms of
governmental controls or influence over the recipients of the credit. For example, federal credit guarantees for shipbuilders are part of a broader program
whereby the federal government requires the builders to incorporate various
"national defense" features into the vessels.
It is instructive to examine the largest federal program for guaranteeing private credit, that administered by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA),
to observe the extent to which controls accompany the credit assistance. The
FHA conducts an inspection of each residence to determine whether the builder
has abided by all of the agency's rules and regulations governing the construction of the homes that it insures. There are four separate "veto" points facing a
builder applying for FHA insurance of mortgages for a new project: (1) affirmative marketing to minority groups, (2) environmental impact, (3) architectural
review, and ( 4) underwriting.
Because of the division of responsibilities among the various federal housing
offices, considerable confusion and delay often arise. For example, after the
underwriting has been approved, which gives an appraised value high enough
to cover the builder's costs, aJditional requirements may be imposed by the
environmental impact office or by the architectural review which substantially
raise the cost of the project. Then the builder must return to the first office and
attempt to obtain a revised underwriting.
Miles Colean, the distinguished analyst of the housing industry, has commented on the deleterious effects on the housing industry of the increasing array
of government controls that has been imposed via the FHA program:
The complications of FHA operations by introducing numerous requirements that, being irrelevant to the extension of mortgage credit,

:n Ihid., p. 51. An offering- circular by the First Boston Corporation,. dated December 27.

1973, bore the followin!! lanl!llRI!e on thp fnct of thP dornment: 'The issuance of th!'

Bonos is subject to the execution hy the Secretary of Commerce of an ag-rePment. 011rsuant
to which thP navment of principal and interest will be I!Uaranteed by the United States of
America 1mder Title XI of the Merchant l\Iarine Act. 1936. as amended. which expressly
provides that: 'The full faith and credit of the Unitecl StatPs is pledJ?ecl to the navment of
all guarantees made under this title with respect to both princinal and interPst, inclnflingintei-est. as may be nroviiled for in the g-uarantee. accruing- between the date of default
under a g-uaranteed obligation and the payment in full of the guarantee.' "
3!! Roseman, op. cit., p. 51.

: j~~!f.s L. Colean, ':Quarterly. Economic Report," Mortgage Banker, March 1974, p. 63.
35
'l'hP AflviRory Council for th!' study consist!'cl of a variety of housing experts. includinC" William G. RoRPnherl!. Chairman of the Michirran Public Service Commission and
formPrly ExPcutiY!' DirPctor of the 1\fichl::ran State Housing Development Authority.

36 ReTJort of tl1e Tn.~k Force on lmnro1"i11f1 tlle Operation of Federally lnsu.rerl o1· Financed
HotuJin.Q Programs, Washington. National Center for Housing 1\Ianagement, Inc. (undated).
pp. fl!l- 70.
37 Jl>id .. n. !U4.
38
Joint Economic Committee, A Reappraisal of U.S. Energy Policy, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974, pp. 2-3.
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quarter or more of the cost. Although the original version of the bill did not
contain such a clause, a rider was adopted prior to passage.
"Minimum" wage rates set under. the Davis-Bacon provision are almost alwav~
at least as high as the local union rates and, in some instances, higher. Con-·
tractors who want to bid on these projects must agree to pay at least thesl!
rates. Professor Yale Brozen of the University of Chicago reports that in many
cases the Labor Department has set minimum rates above even the uni?n scalE!
found in the area in which the work is performed. Higher union rates m som4!
other area, 50 or 75 miles from where the work is to be done, are frequently
used instead of local rates, despite the instruction in the law to the ~ontrary .
More than 50 percent of the time the Labor Department has used umon rate.•1
from a country other than that in which the work was done. 39
Davis-Bacon minimum wage rates in Western Pensylvani.a, for example, are·
based on the Pittsburgh construction union scale. The common .labo~ rate for
building construction in Pittsburgh is $6.75 an hou.r plus 80 cents m frm~e ?en~
fits while the prevailing wage for common labor m depressed Appalachia IS $•·
an hour. As a consequence, local cOntractors did not bid for water, sewage, and
school projects. The "minimums" forced on them for these projects would havf•
raised their wage scales so high that they would have been una·ble to competf'
for nongovernmental projects. 40
The case of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation is frequently cited as an example
of the willingness of the Federal Government to provide capital to private corporations which are hard-pressed :financially. Some attention is thus warra~ted
to this precedent. First of all, it needs to be understood that what was provided
was not federal money, but merely a guarantee of private borrowing. 41
Furthermore the guarantee did not cover long-term capital, but only relatively
short-term bor'rowing-through December 31, 1975. Moreover, a substantial
interest fee was charged the company by the Treasury so that Lockheed's total
cost of •b orrowing the additional funds was no lower than that available to other
large :firms.
Specifically, Lockheed pays the Treasury the difference between the interest
it pays the banks on the guaranteed loans and the going rate for loans to airlines. Lockheed pays the banks an interest rate which is three-eighths of one
percent higher than the average yield on nine-month Treasury bills, to avoid
any windfall gains to the banks resulting from the federal aid.
The loans guaranteed by the Federal Government take precedent over all
other borrowings for purposes of repayment (literally, a policy of "last in,
:first out"). A number of control powers over Lockheed's activities were given
to a newly-constituted Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, such as approving
the payment of dividends As a major military contractor, the company is subject to a wide variety of other governmental controls, notably via the extensive
Armed Services Procurement Regulation.
It should be noted that the Congress passed the le~slation authorizing the
loan guarantee only after protracted debate. The bill passed the Senate by one
vote.
Chairman Rosenberg states that his proposal is not a vehicle for federal
control of electric utilities : "Federal insurance and guarantee would not replace
private ownership and control." 42 Yet, an examination of the draft legoi~lation
which has been prepared to carry out the plan shows that a wide variety of
federal controls and restrictions would ibe jmposed on both the electric utilities
and the state commissions that regulate them!3

In a description of the loan guarantee plan, Rosenberg provides for a relatively
small role for the federal government, which he describes as follows!
The federal agency, relying on state commission certification, would
guarantee the debt service payments and would charge the utility an
insurance fee sufficient to fund the risk of default.~
This is in striking contrast to the draft bill. The proposed "Electric Utility
Guarantee Act of 1974" would give the federal government a variety of new
regulatory powers over private utilities and stall commissions who want to
qualify under the bill. The major controls are as follows, with citations to the
draft bill:
1. Before a utility can apply for the federal guarantee, its public utility commission must submit for the approval of the Federal Power Commission a
"Statement of Need," containing a variety of information which may not be
available now or in the future on any but the most speculative basis. Each Statement of Need is required to provide the following material (Section 403(a).)
a. A projection of the electric energy needs of the state, by service classifications, for the next ten years.
b. A tabulation of peak demand and expected reserves to meet it.
c. A description of emergency load reduction measures in force.
d. A description of current efforts by the state to reduce the demand fol
additional electric energy.
e. A projection of the anticipated capital requirements to provide the
electric generating capacity required by the projection of energy needs.
f. An indication of the portion of the capital requirements which are estimated to be beyond the capacity of electric utilities to :finance "at a cost
consistent with the responsibility of delivering electric energy to consumers
at a reasonable cost."
g. A statement of the procedures and standards applied in authorizing the·
construction of a facility, including environmental and siting considerations.
h. A statement of the procedures and standards which are applied in approving new issues of stocks, bonds, and other indebtedness.
i. "Such other information" as the FPC may reasonably require, all in
accord with prescribed "form and content."
2. The FPC is given the power to reject the state utility commission's Statement of Need on either of two grounds (Section 404(b)):
a. The state commission has failed to meet the requirements listed in (1),
above.
b. The Statement of Need is not consistent with "national standards ...
for the conservation, use, and production of electric energy" to be developed
by the FPC itself.
3. Each public utility applying for a federal guarantee must provide the following information to the FPC, in addition to a description of the bond issue
itself (Section 405(b)):
a. A "detailed" description of the proposed use of the proceeds. In the
case of facilities; the description shall include the proposed construction or
installation schedule and the environmental consequences.
b. A "demonstration to the satisfaction of the commission" that no other
reasonable means of :financing is available on "reasonable" credit terms.
c. Assurance that the public utility commission has approved the proposed :financing and considers it to be consistent with the approved Statement of Need.
·
4. Each utility bond issue guaranteed by the FPC must meet the following
requirements (Sections .<106 (b), (e) 407) ) :
a. The net interest cost to the utility must not exceed what the chairman
of the FPC deems to be reasonable, taking into account the range of interest rates prevailing in the private market for similar obligations.
b. The interest is not exempt from federal incoone taxes.
c. The bonds must be paid off in 30 years.
d. The amount of bonds shall not exceed 85 percent of the value of the
facility being :financed (the ratio may go to 95 percent if the utility is willing
for the FPC to publish in the Federal Register a statement that the utility
"mould not otherwise be able, in its present :financial condition, to commence or complete construction of the Facility . . ."

The Rosenberg Plan and the White Bill

The bill drafted by Lee White is based on William Rosen:her~'s fedf'ral credit
plan and was prepared at the chairman's request. Althoug-h Chairman Rosenbf'rg
assures the utilities that his plan is one of nrovidin~ ff'deral credit rather than
federal control!'!, the bill c>ontains a varietv of new federal controls OYf'r activities
of electric utilities which historically have f'ither been subject only to state
control or to the discretion of company management.
:l9 Yale Brozen. "The Law That Boomeranl!ed." N"tion's Bu11iness . .Anrl1 1!l71l nn . 71 - 72
~eP Rl!'ln .Tohn P. Ooul<l . Davis-Bacon Act, Washington, American Enterprise Institute f•"'
Puhlico PoliC'v RP!'lParcoh 1971.
co RrozPn . oo. cit .. n. 72.
41
S~>e nenRrtm~>nt of the Treasury, Special Report of the Emergency Loan Guarantee
Bonrif . .TunP 2~. 1 07R.
42 Rosenhera P1an, n. lR.
43
Proposed "Electric Utility Guarantee Act of 1974."

u WillJam G. RosenberJ!'. "Rates, Consumer Pressure, and

Fortnightly, January 31, 1974, p. 7.
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5. The FPC is required to make the following official findings before it gua.rantees the indebtedness of a utility (Section 407) :
a. That the historic and prospective earning 'POWer of the utility provides reasonable assurance that it will be able to repay the indebtedness.
. b. That the management of the utility is "efficient" and is actively pursumg programs designed to improve the economic use and efficiency of its
existing facilities.
c. "Such other requirements" as the FPC may prescribe.
. Viewed in its totali.ty, the proposed Electric Utility Guarantee Act of 1974
Is J?Ore than ~ proposal to P-xtend federal guarantees to eJectric utili.ty bonds.
I~ IS a sweepmg proposal to extend t.he power of the Federal Power CommisSion over state ,regulatory commissions and individual electric utilities on matters which historically have been reserved for state and local governments or
for private sector decisionmaking.
There seem to be l:l number of technical defects in the White bill. It is limited
t? .mortgage. ~o.nds. and thus excludes ordinary debentures. It makes no pro·
VISIOn for utilities m states such as Minnesota, South Dakota and Texas which
lack statewide utility regulatory commissions. '.rhe draft biil would appear to
exclude those companies from its benefits.
. The projected role o~ the Federal Power Commission also seems to be ambiguous, and may even mvolve some potential conflicts of interest. For example
under the proposal the commi~sion would be passing on the wholesale powe;
rat~s of a given .utility and also on its requested bond guarantees. Thn8, t he tempta~wn could ar~se for the co~mission to reject or cut back rate increases and
shift the financm? b.urden to t11e guarantee fund and ultimately to the Treasury.
Also,. the c?mmiss~on would be setting standards for intrastate rates and at the
same time Will contmue to be passing on interstate rates. Again, the pos 8ibility
could develop whereby the FPC's decision-making shifts costs from one category of user to another.
Perh~ps, a more fundamental objection to the White Bill is that in order
to get mto. a position ?f eligibility for the federal guarantees, a utllity must
~ake th~ kmd~, of ac~wns that would repel private investors. The required
paupers oath· ( Sectwn 405 (b) ) w:ould thus force the utility to become not
only dependent on but beholden to the FPC. Having taken the actions that
reli!~ve It from ~he possibility of private financing, it would have put itself into a
positlO~ where It had no recourse but to agree to every FPU demand in order
to obtam the capital that it needs.
I~ is also difficult ~o see how electric utilities could attract atlditlonal equity
capital under these c1rcumstances.
IMPACTS OF FEDERAL GUARANTEES ON THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY

The propo~ed f~~era~ guarantees of their bonds would have a variety of impacts
on t~e ~lectriC uhht:v. mdustry, not all of which are obvious and direct. Some of
the mdirect effects might be quite serious. For example, even if federal guarantees wo11;ld reduce the .borrowmg costs of public utilities, such action would not
necessarily reduc~ their tota~ costs: Othe~ factors would not necessarily remain
the same. Operatmg costs m1ght likely rise more rapidly than otherwise. This
could occur ~ecause t~e g~vernment guarantees would lessen whatever market
fo!ces are still operatmg I~ .the government-regulated utility industry. There
might be less pressure on utility managements for efficiency and cost reduction
The result mig~~ be the "cost-plus" mentality that often characterizes govern~
ment markets. Ihus, the program could tend to Le not only self-perpetuating
and could lead to demands for large federal subsidies.
ThWe also need to remember that households are not the only users of electricity
e gua~antees would be a form of differential subsidy among industrial a~d
commercial user~. They ":ould tend to subsidize industries that are heavy consumers of electnc power m contrast to companies that are more dependent on
other energy sources or less energy-intensive means of production. Thus aluminu!ll would. be benefitted over steel and within the steel industr co~
·
usmg electnc furnaces over those with fuel-fired processes.
Y,
pames
Because the Federal G.overnment does not guarantee the bonds issued hv the
~e~;es~e Valley Authonty (they are backed only by the revenues of the TVA)
~· ~ . e~sury .only guaranteed privately-owned utilities that would tend t~
t~scridmmat e agamst the largest of the public power agencies, or at least reduce
e a van ages that they currently possess.

511
The most serious problems that utilities would encounter are likely to be in
the legal area-the commitments to existing bondholders that limit the amount
of additional bonds that a utility can issue, regardless of whether they are
backed by the federal government.
Legat Problems in Increasing Leverage
Among the legal and regulatory constraints placed on electric utilities is that
of the earnings coverage test as inc01·porated in bond indentures. This test is
analogous to the earnings to fixed charge ratio discussed earlier but with a
somewhat different definition of terms. In general, indenture coverage tests
require that earnings availa-ble for interest payments on bonds outstanding and
interest on the new bonds to be sold must not be less than 2.0 times for twelve
of the fifteen months prior to the month in which new bonds are to be issued. All
indentures carry such a provision, although in a few cases the coverage requirement may be set somewhat lower or higher than 2.0. For those companies that
are subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, this indenture
provision is a matter of policy by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
With the impact of higher interest rates and lagging rate adjustments the _interest coverage has fallen sharply for all electric utilities. Less than ten years
ago electric utilities in general had indenture-defined interest coverages of approximately five times. These coverages are now approaching minimum levels.
For some companies, including a few large and prominent ones, financial plans
have had to be altered because of the deterioration of this interest coverage to
a point where additional bonds could not be issued. With the prevailing level of
interest coverages, the increase in the mortgage debt component to the 80 percent level envisioned in the Rosenberg proposal (or even 60 percent level) is
clearly not possible without modifying the indenture provision. Modification of
indentures has proven to be difficult under conditions favorable to bondholders.
'Vith the proposed government guarantee of new bonds, the holders of outstanding bonds would certainly be expected to reject the opportunity to enhance
the financing activities of the companies whose bond they hold- at their own
expense.
The basic purpose of the Securities and Exchange Commission in requiring
an indenture coverage at certain minimum levels is to protect the investors.
The protection of new bond holders through government guarantees with a
concomitant decrease in overall interest coverage would place a great and perhaps intolerable burden on the existing bondholders. This problem could be
solved by extending the government guarantee to outstanding bonds as well as to
new bonds, all $55 billion of them. The premium required to establish support
for such a level of liability would be enormous. Moreover, the holders of the
old bonds would receive an undeserved windfall gain as the price of their bonds
increased in the market in response to their reduced risk.
For electric utilities with no debenture bonds outstanding, the indenture interest coverage test extends only to the .mortgage bonds of the company.
Under these circumstances government guaranteed debentures could be sold.
It is also possible that for companies with both mortgage and debenture bonds
outstanding, subordinated bonds could be sold to circumvent the protective intent
of the interest coverage covenants of the senior obligations. It should be
recognized, however, that the rating services as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission include interest on all of a company's bonds- secured,
unsecured, and subordinated-in computing the earnings-to-fixed-charge ratio.
And not only are indenture provisions a limitation. One must look to provisions in a typical utility company's charter normally appearing as protection
to senior equity or preferred stock. It is not unusual to find a requirement
whereby, if the ratio of common equity to total capitalization should fall below
a specified percentage, then the earnings which can be paid out as cash dividends
are seYerely restricted. To change such charter would require a vote of stockholders. It would not be reasonable to assume that preferred stockholders would
willingly or eYen possibly consent to a modification of a charter to reduce their
protection.
In addition to causing problems under indenture convenants, issuance of
government-guaranteed debt by a public utility over the 60 percent leYel might
cause prospective investors to avoid outstanding issues in the secondary market.
It might also result in institutional investors holding outstanding issues of
utility debt divesting themselves of those outstanding securities.
While the arrangements discussed above might circumvent the problem of
indenture constraints, certain other legal limitations of an indirect nature are
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brought into play in terms of the market requirements for a company's securities.
The laws of the State of New York as they apply to the eligibility of securities
for New York savings banks are of far broader significance than might appear
on the surface. These eligibility provisions have long served as a model for other
States as well as for institutional investors in the establishment of their investment standards. Among other things, to be eligible for New York savings
bank investments, a corporation issuing bonds must show net earnings for five
fiscal years preceding the new issue to have averaged not less than two times the
average annual interest charges on its total funded debt applicable to that
period. For the l·a st fiscal year preceding such bond issue, the net earnings of
the corporation must not be less than twice the interest charges for a full year
on its total funded debt outstanding at the time of such investment. With
interest coverage relationships now having reached minimal levels for most
electric utilities, an expansion of the debt component of the capital structure
of companies would clearly render the outstanding bonds of most companies
ineligible for investment by New York State savings banks. Further, the laws
of the State of New York also provide that savings banks may not purchase
corporate preferred stocks unless the net earnings for either of the last two
years cover the total of a company's interest charges plus its annual preferred
dividend requirements by one and one-half ti:mes. Not only would the expansion
of the long-term debt as a proportion of the capital structure render outstanding
bonds ineligible for New York savings banks but preferred stock as well.
California provides that its savings banks may not invest in public utility bonds
if the funded debt of the issuer exceeds two-thirds -of the value of its physical
property, less reserves for depreciation. Connecticut limits its savings banks'
investments in the funded debt of public utility companies to debt of any issuer
whose funded debt does not exceed sixty percent of tonal capital. Fiduciaries in
Iowa may not invest in public utility bonds unless the book V'alue of the utility's
outstanding st-ock is not less than two-thirds of its total funded debt.
The test for Massachusetts savings ·banks' investments is another of those critical provisions referred to widely in otller jurisdictions and in private contracts
and deeds. Public utility obligations are not eligible for investment unless the
issuer's -outstanding fully paid C'apital stock and surplus is equal to at least sixty
percent of its total funded debt. In addition, the aggregate principal of ·a ll mortgage bonds of the issuer must not exceed seventy five percent of the depreciated
value of the fixed ·p roperty of the company.
An "authorized security" within the meaning of all statutes of the State of
Minnesota (including those regulating banks and institutional investments) includes 1bonds of public utility corp-orations, subject to a number of tests, one of
which is that the book value of the outstanding ·capital stock of the issuing corporation shall at the time of such investment be equal to at least two-thirds of its
total ·f unded debt. In addition, the aggregate principal amount of bonds secured
by the first or refunding mortgage (plus the principal amount ·o f all the underlying outstanding ·b onds) shall not exceed sixty percent of the value of the physical property subject to the lien o·f such mortgage.
iNew Hampshire savings banks are limited ·in their investments to securities <Yf
those utility .companies whose total funded debt does not exceed sixty percent of
their total C'apital. Tennessee fiduciaries are permitted to invest in public utility
bonds provided,. among other tests, that the outstanding fully paid capital stock
of the issuing utility shaH be equal to at least two-thirds of the toal debt secured
by mortgage lien on ·a ny part or all of its property, and provided that the aggregate princ'iP'al amount of bonds secured 'bY the mortgage (plus the principal of
underlying outstanding bonds) shall not exceed sixty percent of the value of the
physical property owned by the utility and subject to the Hen of the mortgage.
!The State of Washington restricts its savings banks' investments in public utilities bonds to corporations whose "outstanding fully paid capital stock together
with premiums thereon and the surplus of the corporation shall be eQ·U'al to at
least two-thirds of the total debt secured by mortgage lien on any part -or all of
its property ... " In addition. the aggregate amount ·of •bonds secured ·b:v the first
or refunding mortgage plus the ftmount of all the underlying outstanding bonds
must not exceed sixty percent {)f the value of the physical property subject to the
lien of the mortgRgPs :;:ec>uring thP total morlgRge deht. 45
As a .further legal limit.a·tion the laws of manv States as they relate to savings
banks, trust funds, life insurance comnanies and other insurance companies are
subject to specific rating limitations. In Ohio, bonds purchased for trust funds
45

See appendix for cttattons.

must be rated in either the triple-A or double-A classifications as prescribed by
S·tandard & Poor's and Moody's. In Main~, savings banks may invest il_l :bon~s of
out of state corporations that are rated m one. of the fir~t three classlfications,;
that is, triple-A, double-A, or single-A, as esta'bhshed by etther Standard & Poor s
or Moody's.

The legal obstacles to the effective implementation of the Rosenber~
plan would thus seem to be most substantial. One aspect of the l.eg~ 6
barriers has been examined by Harvey Y ampolsky and Lee White..
Before turning to an analysis of tha:t st~dy, ~t should be note~ tha~ It
is limited to the question of the co;1s~Itutwnahty of Federall~gislatwn
voiding existing indenture restrictions. It does n?t .deal With ma~y
of the other questions raised here, notabl~ the existing legal _restrictions on ownership of utility bonds by savings banks, fidumanes, and
other regulated investors.
Constitutionality of Federal ..'Vullification of E_wisting Indentures
The Yampolsky-White· memo rela~es to s.e ctwn 7 (a) of the ~raft
bill which has been prepared to legislate th.e Rosenberg :plan, The
Federal Utility Insurance Act of 1974." SectiOn 7(a) provides thatIn any case in which utility bond ind.entures ou~standing
at the time new bonds insured under this A~~t are Issued set
minimum levels of income coverage or m~ximum levels f~r
debt to equity ratios, and the new bo:qds Insured under this
Act would result in exceeding those levels, such levels shall be
deemed null and void.
They point out that, although there is no cl~use in th~ Co~~itution
expressly forbidding the Congress from .pass~n~ laws n~pairing the
obligation of contracts, any Federal law Impairi~~ them In a manner
whi.ch the Supreme qourt found unreas.onable would do~~~;ess be
held to be a deprivation of property without due p~oce~s.
They
state that the Supreme Court has upheld statutes which It ~elt ~ere
"reasonable exercises of legislative power" even though they Impair~d
the obligation of contracts in a literal sense.48 Yampolsky an~ Whi~e
cite three factors which the Supreme Uou~ generally c<:m~Iders In
determining if legislation applied retroactively to preexisting contracts would violate the contract clause or the due process clause of the
Constitution:

1. 'l.'he nature of the public interest served by ,~he stdtute.-They con!end tha~
the court will be sympathetic when Congress acts to remedy ~ sen?us sub
stantive evil resulting from an emergency situation, and retroactively 1s a necessar:v recourse .. ." 49
•
~. The extent of the abrogation of the ass~ted ~.re-enactmen~ nght.-They
state that the greater the alteration of legal nghts, the weak~r ~s ~he c~se for
tlw constitutionality of t]1P statutP." 60 Althoug-h theY. state tha~ t.h1s IS .a d1ffic~l\
hypothesis to assess'' 51 Yampolsky and 'Vhite beheve that 1t 1s unhkely t a
the decision to purch'ase the bonds would have ·been adversely affected by knowl62
edge of the proposed legislation.
d
3 The nature of the right affected by a retroacti.v e statute.-They cone1u e,
aft~r weighing the three factors, that section 7 ?f the draft bill, would not be
found to violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
46 Harvev Yarnnolskv and Lee White. Constitutional Issue in the Federal Utility Insurance Act of 197 .q, Washington, June 10, 1974.

TbM. , p. 1.
Ibid., p. 2.
411 Ibid., p. 4.
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This report is not the appropriate vehicle for a definitive analysis of this legal
question. Yet, a reading of the available legal materials would appear to indicate
that, at the least, a ~erious Constitutional question would be raised by an attempt by the Congress to void existing indenture requirements of outstanding
electric utility bonds.

TABlE 57.- BASIS POINT YIElD SPREAD BHWEEN AA NEW ISSUES, LONG-TERM UTiliTY BONDS, AND
U.S. AGENCIES

lndependlfmt Recalculation of Interest Savings

January ______ _________ .• ________ _______ •• _. _________ ___ ___. _____ _
February--- -- ---- _. _______ _______________ ___________ __ __ . __ _____ _
March __ ______ __• _____ • __•• _____ ____. ___ ____________ ___ ___ • _____ _
ApriL
__ ---_____
___ ---------- -__--------___ -- -___________
__ -------- -. -----.
· --_
May ______
. _________
. _______ _______
_. _.. __- .--___
June ________ ___ ___ ________ _._ . ___________ __ _________ _____ _____ ___
July _________ __ _________ ___ _____ _________ _. _________ . ______ _. ___ _
August. __ __------- ___________________ . __________________ ______ _

Chairman Rosenberg contends that his proposal would save electric utilities
a very substantial portion of their interest costs ( $2.1 billion a year after 1977).
This section is devoted to an independent recalculation of these savings. Assum. ing the legal feasibility of the sa.le of substantial amounts of government guaranteed electric utility bonds, a calculation of cost reduction must be developed
in terms of the overall average cost of incremental capital.
As a first step in such an analysis, it is appropriate to consider the differential
cost of the sale of government guaranteed bonds as opposed to conventional bonds.
There is a temptation to identify this interest cost reduction as the differential between long-term U.S. Government bonds and the bonds of electric utilities
guaranteed by the Government. For the last 10 years new issues of double-A longterm utility bonds have sold at a cost of a little more than 100 base points above
the level of long-term tJ.S. government bonds (see Table 56). A basis point is
defined as 1/000 of 1%. In 1973, new long-term double-A utility bonds sold at
an interest cost of 75 basis points above long-term U.S. government bonds. It
should be recognized, however, that the lower cost of long-term U.S. government
bonds is a function not only of the lesser risk of such bonds relative to those of
electric utilities, but also is a matter of marketability and breadth of market.
TABlE 56.-BASIS POINT YIElD SPREAD BETWEEN AA NEW ISSUE lONG-TERM UTiliTY BONDS AND lONG-TERM
U.S. GOVERNMENT BONDS

JaPuary
------· ---------February___
___________________
March __ -- --- - -------- ____ _
ApriL ____ ·-·---- - --------May-----------__ --------_
June
_______________________
July ___ ____________________
AUfUSL------------------_________________
September
October___. ______ __________
November•. ---------------December___
. ___________ . __
AveraJ!e __ -- ---------

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

+29
+23
-f-15
+25
+25
+30
+29
+21
+23
+25
+25
+28

+21
-f-16
+23
+26
+26
+36
+34
+37
+40
+37
+33
+40

+39
+38
+41
-f-48
+57
+72
-f-69
+75
+llO
+109
+104
+110

+117
+58
+90
+84
-f-88
+97
+94
+96
+102
-f-94
+98
+101

+106
+105
-f-105
+117
+130
+139
+153
+130
+104
+116
+123
+119

+95
+95
+104
+122
+143
-f-147
+157
+166
+182
+162
+174
+213

+217
+210
+199
+210
+216
+190
+ 205
+192
+176
+195
+212
+ 193

+147
+93
+165
+146
+175
-l-196
+170
-f-187
+148
+1R2
+171
+163

+138
+139
+142
+137
+140
+142
4- 159
-f-161
+165
-f-154
+164
+153

+140
+SO
+57
+75
+56
-f-66
+76
+71
-f-69
+76
+72
-f-80

+25

+31

+73

+93

+121

+147

+201

+162

+150

+75

Source: Data from various Salomon Bros. releases.

As pointed out earlier, it is highly doubtful if the b-ondc; of electric utilities
guaranteed by the government would sell at the same yield as federal I!'OVernment obligations of similar maturity. A more appropriate comparison might well
be ~et~ecn interest rates on U.S. agency bonds and comparable maturity utility
obligatiOns (see Table 57). U.S. agenC'y bondR of 20-yPar maturity and more have
been outstanding since September of 1970 and during thi~ time span, the rates on
such agency obligations have averaged only about 25 basis points less than those
of double-A new issuP long-term utility bonds. Since the totnl volume f)f U.S.
agency bonds is roughly comparable to that of electric utilities. there would
seem to be the same breadth of market in both situations. It should be noted that
U.S. agency bonds possess certain charactPrist1c~ that governrnPnt guaranteed
electric utility hond~ would probflbly not enjoy. Among these may bP inclu(led the
fact tha.t mo~t of them are eligible as collatPral for federal rPserve b:mk aov:mces
and discot~nts. to. member banks, they arP le'!al invf'stmf'nt~ for fedPrallychartered msbtnbons, an<l they may be held withont limit by nntional hanks.
A few nre hRCkPit bv the fnll fnith Rnd C'TPdit of the TJnitPd Rtnte.o; Rnii mnnv nre
gnarantePii by the TrPasury or ~upnorted by the is~ning al?ency's right to borrow
from thP Treflsury. For sevPral of the tvt'M'~ of ai!'PnC'v hond~ thf' intPrest f'arned
on the securities is exempt from sta·te and local taxation. 113 '
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Source: Data from varicus Salomon Bros. releases.

In theory, the government guarantee should lead to a saving in interest cost.
In practice, we often find that the federal agency issues-backed by "the full
faith and credit of the United States"- are priced to yield the investor a higher
return than quality corporate issues. For example, in late :\lay 1974, the Farmers
Home Administration bond issue maturing in April 1989 was yielding 8.47 percent, while Carnation Company's bonds of :\lay 1999 were yielding 8.40 percent.
Similarly, the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority long-term bonds were
yielding 8.47 percent and General Electric's were at 8.40 percent.(>!
Insofar as a comparison between U.S. agency obligations and federally guaranteed electric utility bonds is appropriate and ignoring the suggested ¥s of 1 percent insurance fee, we would expect a reduction in interest costs of little more
than 25 basis points, or
of 1 percent. Further, the substantial increase in government supported obligations coming on the market as the result of such a
guarantee program would probably serve to narr-ow the spread between electric
utility government guaranteed obligations on the one hand and conventional nonguaranteed obligations on the other.
By way of illustration, by 1967, corporate use of tax-exempt industrial revenue bonds had increased to tne point where the municipal bond market had
begun to show signs of strain. A study by the Investment Bankers Association
at that time indicated that industrial revenue bonds in 196'7 alone had caused
municipal bond rates in the general market to rise by approximately 1.4 of a
percentage point. In addition to the costs to the llolders of outstanding bonds and
preferred stock, who find that their downgraded obligations can be sold only at
a lower price in the market, is the matter of the common stock of the company.
Among the scholarly studies made with respect to the effect of the capital structure on a firm's average weighted cost of ca.pital are those that claim the capital structure to be irrelevant. It is suggested to be simply a matter of allocating
a total identifiable risk of the firm among classes of securitiE'S. 55 The extE>nsion
of the long-term debt of an electric utility under this theoretical construction
would require a Yastly increased return on common equity to reflect adequately
the added risk incident to a 20 percent proportion of common equity in the capital structure. Traditional financial theory, on the other hand, holds that while
the addition of debt to a capital structure will serve to redu~e the average
weighted cost of capital up to a certain point, the continuing addition of debt has
the ultimate effect of increasing the average cost.&e
OYer the years electric utilities haYe sougl:.t this point of lowest average
weighted co ~t of capital for their capital structure. While it is spurious to argue
that the precise point of lowest cost has been specifically identified for all companies, it seems most likely that to increase the long-term deht to the levels
sugf!'ested by Commissioner Rosenberg would haYe an unfavorable effect on the
firm's average weighted cost of capital. This would be true notwithstanding the
reduction in the cost of incremental debt by 25 hasis points or more. The net
l'ffect of a government guarantee of a new Lond sold by an electric utility would
serve only to moYe the point of lowest aYerage cost of capital to a slightly higher
proportion of debt in the capital structure, accompanied uy a weakening of the
quality of outstanding securities.

*

54 "~nfety nnrl bRrl!nins in nJrency bonds." Business We.ek, June 1. 1974. p. 64.
55 Franco Mouil?liani and Merton H. MHler. '"rhe Co!'lt of Caplt11l. Corporation Finance
and the Tht>or:v of Inve!'ltment." American Econf)mic Review, June 1963.
150 B. Braham and L. Dodd, Security Analys.i s, Third Edition, 1951.
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Commissioner Rosenberg refers explicitly to the reduced incremental cost of
financing that would result from his propos~. ~ederal guarantee plan. In so
doing, he makes specific reference to the possibility of a 25 percent lower cost
of capital. In arriving at this figure, however, he makes some rather extreme
assumptions: (1) all of the debt of the firm is guaranteed, a~d at an ~reasonably
low rate, (2) there is no preferred stock, (3) common eqmty constlt~tes 20 percent of the total capital structure, and ( 4) the return on common eql!Ity revenue
constant.
· It is clear by his example 67 that he is addressing ~imself here n?t to the cost
of incremental financing but to a complete restructurmg of the capital structure
of the typical utility. Such a situation could only come to pass under un~sual.a~d
extended circumstances. If the sale of government guaranteed electric utll~ty
bonds-continues long enough, all existing bonds will.mat~re a~d be replaced Wl~h
government guaranteed bonds, but tha't is not the situatwn llkel;r to be faced m
the 1970's. Further, he assumes absolutely no preferred stock. Unllke the bonds of
the company, all of which have an ultim~te maturity, most preferred stocks
have no sinking fund and, of cour~e, no matunty.
.
I1t is not reasonable to anticipate that the utilities will be inclined to call m
the 3.5 to 5 percent preferred stocks that have been outstandi~g for man~ yea;~
and which have long since been discounted by the market. Smce elect~lC utlllty
capital structures are increasing at a compound annual rate of appr~ximart:e~y 7
percent -a nd since utilities retain approximately 30 percent of their earnmgs
avai•l abie on common stock, it would take approximately 25 years to reach an
80 percent debt level-assuming the sale of nothing but government guaranteed
bonds. If we are to be impre~sed by the prospect of a 2~ perce~t reduced cost .of
capital, we must be content with both extreme assumptwns With respect tp differential interest costs and a time horizon of nearly 25 years. If on the other
hand our interest lies with the near and intermediate term of 1 to 5 sears, the
redu~tion in average cost is not anly small but is accompanied by a decline in
the quality of the company's outstanding bonds, preferred stock, and common
stock.
Relation to Utilit-y Rates and Regulations

As ·a solution to the unfavorable side effects of the guarantee of new bonds
issued by electric utilities, it might be suggested that higher rates would permit
both a higher interest coverage relationship for outstanding bonds and preferred
stocks and a higher return on common equity. However, given such higher rates,
it would be unnecessary to have the federal guarantee of the new bonds of the
electric utility. In a very real sense the proposal of government guar~ntee of
the new bonds of an electric utility is offered as a substitute for appropriate rate
increases. It seems highly probable, however, that the effectiveness of pleas for
rate increases would be severely weakened with the advent of government guarantees of new electric utility bond issues. The net effect would be an increa~ed
emphasis upon incremental financing with a disregard for the interests of existing security holders. To facilitate new financing through government ~arantees
at the expense of existing securities could make it most unlikely that mvestors
will again be attracted to purchase the conventional securities of electric utilities.
Furthermore if electric utilities are required to obtain prior approval of the
FPC prior to issuing their bonds-they would have to do so in order to obrtain
the federal guarantees under the Rosenherg plan-that would exacerbate the
existing problems of regulatory lag. Meeting federal as well as state regulatory
requirements would be expected to lengthen rather than shorten the process.
In addition to the overhead expense involved in preparing and defending applications to a federal commission, the possibility of substantial increases in financing costs would arise. Given the volatility of financial markets, the delay in obtaining federal approval could force uti'lities rto miss periods when interest rates
are low and, hence, their securities can be sold at relatively low yields, with or
perhaps even without the fE-deral endorsement.
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CHAPTER

7.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY: OTHER PRoSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Many other prol!osals, in addition to suggestions for federal credit guarantees
have been offered m order to deal with the substantial financial pressures facing
the electri~al utility industry. These vary from large tax subsidies and other
federa.l assistance limited to electrical utilities to generalized incentives to promote mvest.ment throughout the. 1!-ation. A great many of the proposals center
on changes m the structure of utility rates and in the system of regulation. This
chapter attempts to examine representative proposals in each of these categories.
CHANGES IN UTILITY REGULATION

. In a letter sent t~ all 50 governors in early July 1974, Federal Energy AdminIstrator John Sawhill called for an overhaul of state utility regulations to make
th~r;n. more responsive to national energy policy. He specifically urged that
utihtles be allowed an automatic "pass through" of fuel and operating costs.
At pres~nt, at .least some portion of higher fuel costs can be passed through
automatically m most states. No state, however, has authorized an automatic
procedure for passing through total operating costs.1 Certainly, the analysis in
Chapter IV sho'!etl the ~re!lt state.-by-state variation in pass-through and other
regulatory practices, variations which do not seem to have any justification other
than happenstance.
Regulator-y Lag

If all regulatory commissions were to adopt the practices of the most advanced
commissi!lns, a verr considerable overall reduction could be achieved in regulatory l.ag m the Umted States. Such reduction in administrative delay-and in
the high cost of many of the administrative proceedings that are involvedwould surely contribute to an ease in the financial pressures now experienced
by electric utilities.
Future Test Years
A number oi. regulatory commissions are moving to the use of future test

years. The chairman of the Missouri Public Service Commission, James F. Mauze,
was quoted as stating late in June 1974:
In a short time, we hope to be using a 12-month future test year in
all cases. We want the best current information obtainable and we have
been working on ways to get it and make the best use of it.2 '
.Th.is approach is des~g?ed to avoid the "revolving door" phenomenon whereby,
withi_n months of a deciSlOn to grant a rate increase, a utility returns for another
~ate .mcrea.se b~aus~ of further increases in costs. Mr. Mauze described this as
an mcredibly mefficient way to regulate. It wastes our time, the utility's time
and the resources of the rate-payers and investors .... In the current infiationar~
stat~ of the eco~omy, sound regulation requires that rate-making be forwardlookmg and not bed to outdated information." 3
. Leon Keyserling, who bas been associated with numerous labor and consumer
Issues, has urged the use of future test years in utility rate-making:
.... I firmly believe that a past test year should be replaced by a model
which bases the rate of return upon looking a few years ahead ... the
rate of return should be based upon a moving average, looking a few
years ahead.•
Mr. Keyserling points out that errors may arise and can be corrected. He
concludes:
1 Federal Energy Administration, Governors Urged To Help Ease Utility Problems Press
Release E-74- 28H. Jul;v 3. 1974.
~
;,f~~r;B:Wllensky, "Ruling Lag Plagues Utilities," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 24,
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Ibid.
• Keyserling, op. cit., pp. 515-516.
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But to base the rate of return upon a past 'test year' starts with a
gross error, instead of starting with a reasonable position, subje<!t to
correction later on.u
Even if the regulatory bodies do not use such a mechani.sm in their rat~ de~i
sions, they certainly should have access to the information at some pomt m
the regulatory process.
A Change in the Investment Base

A number of investment analysts have proposed a change in the method in
which regulatory commissions estimate the rate b~se for ratemaking_ purposes
(the lower the base, the higher percentage return 1s shown by ~ny gi':en level
of earnings). Spcifically, construction work in progress g~nerally IS n<?t mclud~d
in the rate base. Nevertheless, an allowance for the estimated carrymg cost IS
permitted as a capital charge with a corresponding credit to income. James Stark
of Lehman Brothers contends that ":\'lost security analysts regard t·h is as bookkeeping sleight-of-hand" and take a jaundiced view of the allowance when assessing quality of earnings.11
A rough estimate of the amount of such construction work in ~rog_ress on t_he
part of investor-owned electric utilities is $25 billion. The total IS hke!y to. mcrease substantially in the future because of growth, longer construction time
for nuclear power plants, and inflation. Stark urges the inclusion of these ca.pital
costs in the utility's rate base.7 The argument for maintaining the status quo is
that current customers should not have to pay for future capacity. The argument
for change is that maintaining the financial viability of electric utilities ~s .a
likely of concern to existing as well as future users. If ~ change were. ~a~e It IS
likely that it would be phased in on an incremental basis, so as to mm1nnze the
resultant rate increases.
Charges tor Late Payments

Unlike most other lines of business, many utilities are not ~uthorized to char~e
interest or penalties for late payment of bills (as sho~'?. m C_hapter 5) .. T.lus
practice further increases the borrowing needs of the utilities without providmg
any o:trsetting income. In retail trade, in comparison, extra charges for late payments are nearly universal.
.
In recognition of its unusual financial diffic~lties, the Consolida~ed Ed~son
Company was recently authorized to charge I~s large (so-called mdus~~al,)
customers interest of 1.5 percent a month. 'Vh1le only 62,000 of the utility s
2.8 million customers are affected, they make up 57 percent of the utility's ann~al
revenues. Government agencies- federal, state, and local-represelllt~. a maJOr
portion of the utility's outstanding accounts receivable of ~9·? million as ?f
April 1974.8 Obviously, other state commissions could make s1m1lar changes m
what are often archaic billing practices, at least as measured by the standards
of the 1970's. Certainly prompt payment of their utility bills by governme~t
agencies would seem to be an obvious response to the needs of cur~ent conditions. It is not apparent why in some jurisdictions, residentia~ and busmess users
are charged extra for late payments, but government agencies are excused.
Changes in Rate Structures and Company Practices

As discussed in Chapter 5, many authorities advocate cha,nges in utility r~te
structures as a means of reducing peak-load demands and thus decreasmg
somewhat the need for further capacity on the part of this most capi~-int~n.s~ve
industry. A review of recent statements by executives of some electri.c utih~es
conveys an impression of great reluctance to follow a course of actwn wh1<:h
would dampen down the demand for th~ir industry's I?r?du~t. Althougi;t that 1s
a very natural reaction- if you truly believe that electnc1ty 1s a good thmg, th~n
more would seem to be better than less-that approach does not .seem to ~- m
accord with current national efforts to conserve _energy- nor 'Ylth the ns~ng
long-run average costs facing the ind':lstr~. As pomted OH;t earlier, and unl~ke
past experience. new electrical ca.pacrty 1s now substantially more expensive
than existing capacity, both in terms of capital investment and total cost per
kilowatt-hour.

:
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5~~·et· J. ~hark. in an unpublished address to the Atomic Industrial Forum, San
Francisco, California, November 13, 1973, p. 8.
~R~~id

A. Andelman. "Con Edison to Bill Major Users 1.5% For Late Payment," The

New York Times, May 14, 1974, p. 1 et f!.

The demand for electrical power is uneven, a factor which tends to increase
costs. In most regions, there is a summer seasonal peak, as well as daily peaks
during the mornings and late afternoons. Typically, there are large slack periods
at night and in the early morning.
During the slack periods, the most efficient generating plants are operating.
During the peak periods, the most inefficient generating units are brought on
stream. The average load factor for the electrical utility industry in 1973 was 62
percent, with very substantial variations among individual companies. Thus,
much of the equipment was underutilized. As a public utility, of course, each
company in the industry has to maintain sufficient equipment to meet peak
demands.
However, if the electrical load could be made more level, the most efficient units
could be operated to capacity most of the time and the relatively inefficient ones
could be used to the minimum extent possible. Since electricity cannot be stored
directly, if the efficient units were used to capacity during the off-peak hours,
there would be a net saving in the total energy consumed.
Potential uses of off-peak power include electrical vehicles, electrical storage
heating, pump storage, and industrial processes. The British electrical sup)lly
system has achieved substantial reductions in peak demands and has improved
the load factor by stimulating the use of off-peak night storage heating.
The Federal Energy Administration and the Federal Power Commission are
jointly evaluating proposals for a pilot demonstration of the feasibility of off-peak
power use. FEA is also examining proposals to study three related aspects of
electric utility rates: long-run marginal cost trends, rate flattening, and peakperiod pricing. 9
Federal Energy Administrator Sawhill has urged ·new rate structure alternatives, including variable pricing for electricity, with lower charges for off-peak
hours. He asked the governors to discourage promoticm. practices "such as advertising and cost-reduction on all-electric homes."
There may be important changes which the companies themselves can make.
Many of the managements are already doing so. For example, advertising and
related promotional activities could be fundamentally redirected. Rather than
urging uses such as air conditioning which tend. to heighten the peak load problems of the industry and thus accentuate its need for capital, consumers could
be encouraged to rely more heavily on off-peak uses of electricity, such as space
heaters and hot water heating. The result would be a more economical use of
existing capacity and thus a dampening of the pressures for rapid rate increases.
Rather than a ban or severe restrictions on utility advertising, as has been done
In some states, what is needed is a positive program of customer education on
how to use electricity more efficiently with especial emphasis on curbing use during peak periods.
A prime candidate for conservation efforts is air conditioning, a relatively small
but strategic usage; air conditioning is a major contributor to the summertime
peak load for utilities. An indirect method of dampening such demand, and
adopted by some companies, is to charge a higher summer rate. Home and office
insulation might make an important contribution here, as well as in the spaceheating field. As mentioned previously, federal labeling efforts are underway to
encourage consumers to purchase appliances that are more efficient and hence
more economical to operate, rather than those that merely have a lower purchase
price.
Multiplicity of Government Regulations

Spokesmen for the electric utility industry frequently complain about the multiplicity of approvals that are required before a new electric generating plant can
be put into operation. The average person may discount this concern until he or
she actually sees the extensive and repetitious nature of these controls. The accompanying schedule of authorizations required for the construction and operation
of a si·ngle generating plant was prepared by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
(Table 58). In the case Gf the proposed Fulton facility, the Philadelphia Electric
Company has to obtain 24 different kinds of approvals from five federal agencies,
five state agencies, two townships, and a regional commission. The required permits and licenses range from approval of its towers by federal and state aviation
agencies to the state environmental agency authorizing a trestle across Peters
Creek.
o Sawhill, op. cit., p. 10.
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TABLE 58.-MULTIPLICITY OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORIZATIONS
REQUIRED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF A NUCLEAR
GENERATING PLANT
PROPOSED FULTON GENERATING STATION OF THE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

Agency

Nature of authorization

Federal:
Atomic Energy Commission ______ _
Atomic Energy Commission ______ _
Atomic Energy Commission ______ _
Atomic Energy Commission ______ _
Corps of Engineers_____________ _
Corps of Engineers _____________ _
Environmental Protection Agency __
Federal Aviation Administration __
Federal Aviation Administration __
Federal Aviation Administration __
Department of Transportation ____ _
State:
Department of Environmental Resources ----------------------Department of Environmental Resources ----------------------Department of Environmental Resources ----------------------Department of Environmental Reseurces ~~~~-------------------

Construction permit.
Operating license.
Byproduct material license.
Special nuclear materials license.
Dredging in navigable streams and
tributaries permit.
Construction of structures in navigable streams and tributaries.
National pollution discharge elimination system permit.
Construction
of
meteorological
towers.
Construction of cooling towers.
Construction of transmission towers.
Authorization to transport fuel in approved containers.
Air pollution permit for auxiliary
boilers and radioactive off-gas facilities.
Industrial waste permit for thermal,
chemical, and radioactive liquid
discharges.
Water obstruction permit for trestle
across Peters Creek.
Stream-encroachment permits for construction extending into the Susquehanna River.

Department of Environmental Resources ----------------------Department of Environmental Resources ----------------------Department of Labor and Industry_

Sewage permit.
Certification of water quality for
plant water~
Use and occupancy permit for buildings.
Pepartment of Transportation ___ _ Notice of construction (same as Federal Aviation Administration).
State Police-Fire MarshaL ______ _ Flammable liquids permit to store and
use potentially hazardous materials.
:public Utility Commission _______ _ Certificate of necessity to exempt
plant buildings from local zoning
ordinances.
Local:
Drumore TownshiP--------------- Building permit.
Fulton TownshiP---------------no.
Susquehanna River Basin Commission -------------------------- Surface water withdrawal.
Source: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Draft Environmental Statement
Related to the Proposed Fulton Ge.nerating Station Units 1 and 2. PhiladeZph!ia
Electric Oompany, Dockets Nos. 50-463 and 50-464, May 1974, p. 1-2.

Representatives of the electric utilities contend that existing procedures unnecessarily delay the process of getting new power plants, especially nuclear, into
operation. The Vice Chairman of Commonwealth Edison Company contends that
"there is no justification for continual and repetitious litigation of the same questions over and over again, and always with the same intervenors represented by
the same attorneys." He urged that the pros and cons of a particularly energy

installation decision be reviewed "once and for all," pointing out that a power
station delay may involve continuing costs of up to a million dollars a week. 10
A recent survey by the Atomic Industrial Forum of 95 nuclea:r power plant projects of 37 different utilities reported that 70 out of the 95 have experienced
delays ranging from 2 to 66 months. An average delay of 24.3 months was reported
for plants under construction, and 25.9 months for those awaiting permits.
By far, the most frequently cited reason for the powerplants being behind
schedule was governmental licensing and regulatory requirements. Many of the
utilities urged elimination of the required public hearing prior to issuance of the
operating license. This would still leave a public hearing before a construction
permit is granted. On·the average, this move is estimated to speed up construction
by three to four months. An even larger speedup, on the order of seven to eight
months, could be achieved by allowing site preparation work before a construction permit is issued. 11
The process whereby the Atomic Energy Commission reviews proposed nuclear
power installations has been criticized by many observers. Professor Paul Joskow
of MIT has focused on the AEC's guide for preparation of environmental impact
statements required by the National Environmental Policy Act:
When this Guide is read for the first time, one's gut reaction is that
of horror. If all major construction projects in the economy had to go
through this kind of administrative review, would anything ever get
built? ... More careful reflection leads me to believe that some of these
initial fears may be well founded ... this whole approach to environmental protection may generate more paper work than protection. 12
Professor Joskow suggests a more straightforward approach. Rather than requiring applicants to prepare extensive analyses which AEC will then review on
an individual basis, he presents the alternative approach of the Commission simply specifying the safety and effluent standards that it is using as evaluation
criteria and telling the company to design a system that meets the standards. He
offers a pessimistic evaluation of the present procedures:
In the short run the result will probably be substantial delays in the
construction and operation of nuclear plants, forcing many utilities to
build additional fossil-fuel capacity to satisfy the demand for electricity.
While these delays buy time to obtain further information about the
environmental impacts of nuclear power, this time is not costless. Society
pays for it by using alternative fossil-fuel technologies (having their own
environmental problems) which may, in retrospect, turn out to involve
higher total social costs than does nuclear power.13
Some changes in federal regulatory procedures seem likely to increase costs
and/or delays in the generation of electric power. For example, the Atomic Energy
Commission recently adopted amendments to its Rules of Practice to make specific provision for members of the public to request a proceeding to modify, suspend -or revoke an AEC license.1' Previously, while the rules did not preclude
such requests, there were no specific procedures for doing so. Pr-ofessor Arthur
Murphy of the Columbia University Law .School, in testimony before the Congressional Joint C-ommittee on Atomic En-ergy, urged that intervenors should be
given an opportunity to appear at regulatory hearings, but that their ability to
contribute sho~ld be examined by hearing offi.cials.15
In response to this problem, the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) has
recommended legislation whiCh w-ould result in slowing down the rise in utility
construction costs by reducing the long delays now experienced in bringing
nuclear power plants into operation:
1. To help achieve earlier decisions on facility siting.
2. To diminish the possibility that license decisions may become delaying
factors.
3. To encourage and take advantage of generic design approvals.
10 Gordon R. Corey, Oentral Station Nuclear Electric Power in Meeting the Energy
Orisis. a lecture at the City College of New York. May 14. 1973. p. 3.
11 "Government is m11in atom plant roadblock," Industry Week, May 27. 1974. pp. 24-25.

1ll Paul L. Joskow, "Approving nuclear power plants: scientific decisionmaklng or adminlstrntive charade?," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 1,
Sprinl!' '74. p. R27.
13 Ihilf., o. 3R2.
u Atomic Energy Commission. News Release T-150, Aprtl 5, 1974.
15 Oliphant Washington Service, Aprll 26, 1974.
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4. To offer different approaches for facility licensing and thereby add flexibility
to the present process.16
In testimony before the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, an
Assistant Administrator of the FEO stated that " ... it is difficult to accept unreasonable delays caused by the licensing process" in the case of facilities which
are identical or essentially duplicates of plants previosly designed, constructed,
or reviewed.11
The federal official also urged alteration of the dual 'hearings procedure which
has prevailed under the concept of treating each reactor on a "one of a kind
basis." Presently, section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act requires a public hearing
before issuance of both the construction permit and the operating license. He
recommended eliminating the mandatory hearing at the construction permit stage
"where no valid contested issues are raised, and no real purpose is served by a
public hearing." 18
If a hearing is held at the construction permit stage, FEO urged that it be
comprehenesive e.nd thus render further hearings unnecessary unless there are
changes that could significantly affect public health and safety.
The FEO also pointed out that the time required and 't he diversion from their
primary duties imposed by prolonged hearings and licensing procedures is "a
serious problem" for both management and technical personnel in the utilities
and in other organizations participating in the review process. "This si•t uation
detracts from the quality of professional input, as well as job progress." 19

spending in the current economic environment, it must ·be realized thra t a subsidy does nothing to encourage consumers to conserve or to use energy more
efficiently.

Adequacy of Earnings

Despite the opportunities for improvements in the regulatory process and in
utility rate structures, there would still seem to be a key and no doubt still
fundamental role for the adjustment of rates to reflect the substantial rise in costs
being experienced by the entire economy and especially by the electric utility
industry. As shown in earlier chapters, adequacy of earnings is basic to the
ability of electric utilities to perform their franchised function of meeting rising
demand for electricity on the part of an expanding population and growing
economy.
William Simon, the Secretary of the Treasury, underscored the need for
adequate electric utility earnings in recent Congressional testimony on economic
growth:
... the lc>w rates of profitability allowed by the rate-making authorities are threatening to destroy the industry's wbility to raise the enormous
volume of capital it needs to do its job. The electric utilities require
higher earnings to assure that adequate electric power is available for
all of us in the future. 20
William Rosenberg, 'Chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission,
has been quoted as coming to a very similar conclu::;ion:
There is logic and necessity to price increases and we shouldn't mislead the puhUc. 21
Dr. Andrew F. Brimmer, believeing that a series of emergency assistance
such as that given to Consolidated Edison was not to 'be forthcoming, has presented his preferred alternative:
Instead, I am personally convinced that a more sympathetic-and
timely-response of regulators to requests for rate adjm:;tments will
enable the vast majority of :firms to cope with their problems. 22
The route of rate increases of courRe contrasts sharply with proposals for
government subsidy of consumer fuel bills, or for some part of them. Aside from
the inflationary impact that would result from increased government deficit
1e Statement by Robert H. Shatz. Assistant· Administrator of the Federal Energy Office
beforP the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at the Hearings on Nuclear Power Plant
Sitin~r and Licensing, March 21. 1974, p. 2.
17 Tbir7.' n. 3.

Ibid., p. 4.
Tbirl., n. 5.
Statement of the Honornble Willi"m E. s;mo?t. Secretnr11 of the Trensuru, before the
Subrommittee on Economic Grotcth of the Joint Economic Committee, Washington, June 26,
18
19
20

1974. n. 7.
21 .Tohn Teare. "Rates Decided by Unlikely Trio," Lansing State Journal, May 19, 1974,
p. B;-2.
211 Br-immer, op. cit.

ANOTHER ROUl'iD
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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT

Considerable interest is developing in the possibility of fostering another
round of technological advancement in the electrical utility industry. Although
such innovation could help to increase efficiency and thus slow the trend of
rising costs, the lead time for such development is quite long. It is unlikely
that any of the increased efficiency will occur during the nel..'t few years,
when :financial constraints •a re apt to be most critical.
Nevertheless, fostering technological progress in the industry may •b e a means
of assuring that the present :financial difficulties will not •become permanent.
Four basic technical approaches are receiving considerarble attention: the dual
use of energy, the improvement of combustion efficiency, recovery of waste iheat,
and using refuse as a fuel. 23
Dual use of energy

The Federal Energy Office states that recent studies suggest that fuel consumption for energy can be reduced by 30-40 percent by developing multiple
energy industrial centers. These centers would combine the gener•ation of electricity and the production of industrial steam. At present, an electric utility
may be building a cooling tower to dispose of heat left after the generation of
electricity, while nearby a fa'Ctory is producing heat to run a foundry.
The National Science Foundation has initiated a project in Michigan to
study the feasibility of this approach, drawing upon the combined resources
of industry, state government, and a major university. An alternative approach,
also ·b eing examined· under National Science Foundation auspices, is the "energy park" in which power-generating facilities are clustered together, rather
than dispersed throughout a region. Progress in developing a "superconducting" mode of power transmission (in which there is no energy loss) or one
using extra-high voltage (with reduced power loss) would determine the feasibility of such parks.
Improving combustion efficiency

The Federal Energy Office is studying new approaches that might permit
higher combustion efficiencies within existing furnaces as well as new designs.
One potential change is more widespread use of automatic controls to eliminate
waste from oversupply of air (the operating efficiency of a utility boiler is
partly determined by the amount of air present in the combustion mixture at
one time).
Waste heat recovery

A variety of federal agencies (the Federal Energy Office, the Federal Power
Commission, the Council on Environmental Qnality, and the Environmental
Protection Agency) are considering using the environmental impact statement,
and the process whereby such statements are reviewed, as a means to foster
new ways of recapturing waste heat and using it more productively. FEO
points out that one means for recovery of waste heat is through greater use of
recuperators. Waste heat might also be used for preheating incoming fuel and
air for improved combustion. Alternatively, it might be used for agriculture. 2 '
Refu.rte as a fuel

Municipal solid waste has a heat value of about two . .thirds of low sulfur
coal. No adverse boiler effects have been observed in units using solid wastes to
supply about 10 percent of their energy requirements. The Union Electric
Company recently announced plans to establish a Solid Waste Utilization System capable of handling essentially all of the solid waste generated in the entire
metropolitan St. Louis area. Plans call for the system to be in full operation by
mid-1977. 25 It is expected to pay for itself through such factors as the heating
value of the burnable material, dumping fees, and the sale of recyclable material.
23 Testimonu of Jo1m C. Sawhill; Administrator, Federal Energy Office, before the Senate
Commerce Committee on S. 2582, Electrical Energ11 Conservation Act Washington June 17
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In addition, the utility will be alleviating a major environmental problem for
large metropolitan areas, the disposal of solid wastes. FEO estimates that apapproximately 5- 10 percent of the U.S. electrical energy demand could ultimately be produced from the Nation's municipal solid wastes.
A National Gridf

Several members of the Congress have proposed a National Grid Act to establish
a public corporation to provide for power planning and pooling of electricity on
a national basis ( S. 1025 and H.R. 4998). The suggestion for a national grid
has a plausible ring to it and ha~ gained some popular support. A recent editorial
in Business Week stated:
There is some evidence ... that a national power distribution grid
could reduce the need for peak power generating capacity by as much
as 25%. Individual utilities could share loads and bring down the costs
of capacity expansion. 2t!
The reality turns out to be less euphoric than the surface appearance. It seems,
on inspection, that the electric utility industry already is obtaining most of the
~eJ?efits of. a national grid through the existing nine regional grids. For example,
It IS not unusual for the Commonwealth Edison Company of Chicago to ship
energy packages of 1,000 megawatts to eastern utilities. The generating capacity
behind such a distribution, in turn, may come from the company's own facilities
or from those of cooperating utilities further north, or west or south.
The major argument against the notion of a national grid is that there is not
a significant load diversity between the Eastern and Pacific time zones during
the pe~k p~riods of summer demand. In 1971, the maximum coincident peak
load diversity between the east and west coasts of the United States was estimated at only 100 megawatts.
Summer peak loads are temperature sensitive and tend to result in :flat load
curves which remain at high levels for several hours. This tends to largely
eliminate any difference in time of occurrence of peak loads because of difference
in clock time. 27 For example, many people tend to run their air conditioners
around-the-clock during heat spells.
?-'~ere are important economic limitations to the transfer of power from one
utility system to another. Typically the most critical restriction is not the lack of
transmission facilities, but the availability of fuel. During last winter's fuel
oil problems, the amount of electrical energy transferred to the northeast was
generally limited by the availability of coal, and not by major transmission
bottlenecks.
More?ver, a national grid is an overbuilding of existing transmission lines.
Hence, It would add to the amount of transmission facilities which would have
to be installed and financed.
CHANGES IN FINANCIAL PRACTICE

More use of leasing and convertible debentures

. The evolution of the c~pital markets has resulted in a complementarity of
mvestor demand and busmess supply with respect to forms of investment in~truments. The large sums of money required for expansion of the electric utility
mdustry have dictated a close adherence to a rather narrow range of investment securities. First mortgage bonds and debenture bonds have provided the
bulk of extern~! financing for these companies, with the primary market in
recent !ears bem~ trust funds and pension and profit sharing plans, both public
and p~vate. St~ai~ht preferred stock has played a larger role in electric utility
financ~ng than m mdustrial firms. Common stock has rounded out the typical
financmg pattern.
The use of such privileged securities as convertible bonds and preferred stock
or. 'Y~rrants has played a very small part in the overall financing of the electric
ubhtles. Although there is a marginal demand for these special types of
28
"Guidance for the Utilities." Business Week May 25 1974
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securities, this demand is typically so limited that it cannot accommodate the
basic capital needs of the industry. In 1969, Commonwealth Edison initiated
the use of the intermediate term note. That company has continued to utilize
maturities of four, five or six years from time to time. Other companies have
also issued this type of security, but the total demand has been quite limited.
A West Coast utility has negotiated intermediate-term loans28 with the Bank
of Tokyo, and other utilities are studying the Eurodollar market.
As the supply of these intermediate term issues on the market has increased,
the interest cost differential between intermediate term and long-term maturities
has been reduced. In June 1974, Commonwealth Edison sold an additional issue
of 5-year notes at an estimated savings relative to 30-year maturities of only
15 basis points. In recent years Commonwealth Edison has issued long-term
warrants, as has Tampa Electric. It thus appears that the electric utility industry has not only been conscious of the availability of alternative forms of
investment instruments, but has attempted to take advantage of them when
opportunities have arisen.
The use of warrants and convertible securities is considered appropriate under
two circumstances. First, for financially strong firms there may be instances
in time when such securities may be strategically used in limited quantity. Second,
such preference securities may be used by companies that find it difficult to raise
capital on any other basis. In this latter instance, it is important to keep in
mind that Incremental financing is accomplished at the expense of existing
security holders. Give these two basic applications of the use of preference securities, it is obvious that their role in the financing of the electric utility industry
promises to be a very small one, as in the past.
Of greater significance in recent years has been the matter of leasing. The
principal advantages to companies of leasing equipment have been two-fold. In
the first place, these contracts have not been reflected on company balance
sheets.:zv This has had the effect of slowing down the rate of interest coverage
deterioration as customarily calculated. The second advantage relates almost
exclusively to tax economies. In some instances tax advantages have been
achieved through the shorter depreciation life obtained by the leasing firm in
the ownership of assets. In other cases the lease arrangement has made it possible
to take adyantage fully of depreciation expense offsets or investment tax
credits against the profits of the leasing firm or its parent when the lessor
has had inadequate profits to fully take advantage of such expenses and credits.
Rental rates are adjusted to reflect tax benefits.
While the use of the lease device undoubtedly will continue to be important
for electric utilities especially as it relates to such special types of equipment
as the nuclear cores for nuclear power production and unit trains for the transport.ation of fuel, it is unlikely that there will be any major growth in the
leasmg arrangement as a form of financing. There is a strong movement in the
accounting profession, bolstered by recent actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to require the inclusion of lease obligations as a longterm liability on the balance sheet rather than merely as a footnote .
~other form of specialized financing is that relating to the support of pollut~o:r;t .control and waste disposal facilities. Financing to accommodate these
a~tlv1t1es was exempted from the provisions of the 1968 Revenue and Expenditure Control Act that severely restricted industrial revenue bond financing
Such securities are sold through local or state governmental authorities with
the result that the interest is exempt from federal income taxes, and often
fr~m local and st~te. taxes as well, even though the utility pledges the payment
of mterest and pnncipal. _The volume of such financing has increased strikingly in
the last three years and IS expected to reach significant levels in the near future.
In the fi;st .10 months of 1973, over $579 million of these bonds were issued, a
substantial mcrease over the $127 million in 1972 (see TablP. 59).
28
" Can utilities get the megabucks to build all those megawatts?," Electrical World,
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TABLE 59.-ELECTRlC UTILITY POLLUTION CONTROL BONDS
(Doll:~r

amounts in thousands)
1972
Number

19731
Amount

Numbt~r

Amount

• As cf October 1973.
Source: Ebasco Services, Inc., as reported in Electrica! World, June 1, 1974, p. 288.

It h~s been ~~t~mate~ that from 22 to. 30 percent of the cost of nuclear power
producmg facilities Will be for pollutiOn control purposes. With many such
plants now under construction or on the drawing boards and with the cost of
tbe typical 11~ megawatt nuclear plant costing approximately $500,000,000, this
~ype of fin.ancmg could become of great importanee to the industry in the near
future. It IS also true that the cost saving!': to the electric utilities resulting from
the use of taxfree bonds represents an equivalent loss of revenues ot the Treasury
Department. It may be the better part of prudence to assume that the Treasury
Department will either have to increase its revenues from other sources or will
narro'Y the definition of qualifying pollution control projects for this type of
financmg.
. Some co~panies use ~hese bo~d.s despite their opposition to the general prinClple o~ prVIate enterprises obtammg such government aid . One energy company
executive has been quoted as follows:
Exxon generally feels that prviate enterprise should finance on its
own. We've gone this route because the bonds have been authorized by
Congress and used by a number of corporations. Not to take advantage
of the bonds would put us at a competitive disadvantage. 30
About 10 percent of the tax-exempt bonds sold in 1974 are estimated to be for
corporate, not governmental. purposes. Partially because of the influx of these
corporate borrowers, the municipal bond market has been under considerable
pressure from rising interest rates. Some of the 17 states that have interest rate
ceilings on their tax-exempt general obligation bonds are finding the interest
rates they face rapidly approaching the legal limits.
S?me electric utilities have made other adjustmf:'nts to the difficult financing
enVIronment. In July 1974, Consumers Power Company of Michigan issued
bonds maturing in 20 years, and which wi11 be nonrefundable for at least 10 years.
Traditi.onally, utilities have issued 30 year bonds, providing only fiv~ years of
protectiOn against early refunding. Annual sinki:::J.g fund payments. to begin in
1979, are expected to retire ahout 75 percent of the bonds before final maturity
.in 1966. This is a provision which has been seldom employed on previous utility
ISSUeS.
The utility also issued convertible preference stock, a departure from the industry's traditional reliance on nonconvertible preferr~d. The new preference
shares can be converted into common after October 31, 1974, and also will be
safeguarded by a sinking func to retire all of the shares by 1994.31 The entire financing package appears designed to attract investors who are concf'rned with
the risk that is now attached to electric utility investment, a risk that appears
to be greater than in previous years.
30 Rfch~rrl

R. Lee:er. "More Comuanies Sell Tax-Exemnt Bonds for Pollution Control,
Savina Millions." The
Street Journal. July 8. 1974. p. 22.
31 "Consumer!'! Power SPtl:: UOO Million Issue With Provisions to Lure Wary Investors "
The Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1974, p . 10.
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Other utilities are relying on relatively new forms of project financing that
effectively keep the project requirements off the company's income statement
until the new equipment goes into service, yet while permitting the utility to
retain control over the financing as well as construction. Tucson Gas and Electric
has announced plans to create its own trust to raise and administer the project
construction funds. 32 Via the trust arrangement, a utility may line up bank loans
commercial paper, and similar short-term and intermediate-term credit instru:
ments which enable it to reduce the normal "allowance for funds used during
construction." Another technique is the single payment bond, which has appeal
to pension funds. 33
The previous chapter covered the impact of increased leverage on the interest
coverage of electric utility companies and the relationship of that increased
leverage to legal restrictions. While regulatory authorities have not established
specific legal limits within which companies must manage their capital structures, extreme positions by individual companies could be met with strong opposition. There would seem to be little prospect of reducing the cost of electric
utility financing by substantial incrPases in the leverage in company capital
structures.
The typical electric utility has, in fact, increased its leverage in the last ten
years in an effort to offset increased cost pressures on earnings. Such decisions
were undoubtedly made in the expectation that such cost pressures would ease
and that traditional capital structure positions could be regained. The chronic
nature of cost pressures which have now become acute has resulted in a difficult
position for tlw electric utility industry. In retrospect, it might be argued that
wi.th steadily increasing embedded interets costs, it would have been more appropriate to have reduced the proportion of long-term debt in order to maintain
traditional interest coverage ratios. The combination of reduced earnings, increasing embedded cost of debt, and increasing leverage have all contributed to the
deterioration in interest coverage ratios. It seems almost certain that not only
will the industry be unable to expand its long-term debt component of the capital
structure, but that the sale of common stock will have to proceed at an increased
rate in order to establish capital structure levels compatible with adequate interest coverage ratios and appropriate returns on common equity.
DIFFERENTIAL TAX BCRDEJI\S

As might be expected, some individual utility executi-ves have advocated government tax subsidies as a way of easing their financial pressures. Although
such nction would require Congressional approval , it would not be subject to
the close and continuing scrutiny that is normally given to appropriation bills
~roviding for direct payments from the Treasury. The economic impact of course
Is t~e same. A dollar less in tax receipts increases the federal budget deficit as
surety as does a dollar of additional direct expenditure. There does not appf'ar
to be any economic justification for exempting elecrric utilities from paving their
full and fair share of taxes.
•
What may be a more relevant question is whether the existing tax burden on
thf' .electric utility industry is fair. Even the most cursory examination of the
subJect reveals that this desirable situation is not always the case. At the federal
level, u~ilities only receive a 4 percent investment tax credii, whereas all other
compames gen~rally are allowed a 7 percent credit for their capital investment.
Tab.e 60 contams the TreaRury Department's estimates of the revenue cost of
liberaliz~ng tlw investment credit for a sample of 39 large electric utilities. If
the credit had been raised from 4 percent to 7 percent in 1972, the payments of
federal co~porate income tax by the 39 companies would have been $63 milliou
less than they actually were (a reduction from $537 million to $474 million).
B~c~use the cr~dit is limitf'd. to 50 percent of taxable income, the bulk ( $122.5
million) of the mcreased credit could not have been used in 1972 and would have
been carried over into future years.
If the incomP limit Wf're raised from 50 perC'ent to 100 percent, the federal
ta~ .payments by the 39 electric utilities would have been reduced by $140.5
million and only $44.9 million of the credit would have been unused nnd carried
over.
32 "Tucson G&E Refines Project-Financing Plan To Retain Control " Electrical Week
l\Iav 6. 1974. p . 5.
'
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Bn rkwi~1. "The Stngle Payment Bond : An Innovative Financing Technique "
Publtc Uttltttes Fortmghtly, l\Iay :l, 1974, pp. 3- 7.
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TABLE 60.-REVENUE COST OF LIBERALIZING INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT FOB 39
ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN 1972

TABLE 61.-SPECIAL LOCAL TAXES ON PUBLIC UTILITIES, APRIL 1971

[In millions of dollars]

SELECTED CITIES WITH TAXES ON UTILITY RECEIPTS BUT NO BALES TAXES

Oate(loru

Raising the credit from 4% to 7%:
Impact
Increased credit in 1972------------------------------------------- $63.0
Carryover to future years---------------------------------------- 122.5
Raising the credit to 7% and raising the income limit to 100%:
Increased credit in 1972------------------------------------------ 140.5
Carryover to future years---------------------------------------- 44.9
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury.
In an earlier period, it may have been the case that electric utilities could be
counted on to make a high level of investment in new plant and equipment without as generous incentive as is received by other companies. In the present circumstances, however, that approach appears to be outmoded and based on unrealistic assumptions. Placing electric utilities on a parity with other industriel'l
in the tax incentives received for new capital investments would seem to be highly
desirable. Moreover the provision limiting such credit to 50 percent of net income
benefits companies with high earnings and penalizes utilities with low net income.
It also encourages using "middlemen'' (leasing companies) in order to gain some
portion of the tax credit through indirect and hence most costly means.
High Ta:c Burdens of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities

It is primarily at statP. and local government levels, however, that the disparity
between the tax •t reatment of investor-owned utilities and other taxpayers is most
apparent. The relatively high state and local tax burdens borne by electric utilities can be traced back to relatively recent periods when the underlying circumstances were quite different than at present. In a st·a ndard work on public utility
economics written in 1947, Professor Emery •.rroxel pointed out how and why
local jurisdictions levied heavy taxes on utilities:
Being large, frequently prosperous, and handy sources of tax revenue,
corporations are taxed more heavily ·than property owners and proprietorship businesses. And public utility companies, which are quasi-public
enterprises ana often have large and quite stable earnings, are taxed
even more heavily than other corporations. . . . Local governments,
indeed, often preferred to eliminate unreasonable earnings with franchise taxes and franchise obligations instead of price reductions or new
service obligations."
Troxel made a similar observation concerning state governments:
The earnings of utility companies attracted the attention of the authorities who wanted more tax revenue. These companies often were
large, had excellent earnings, and lacked strong political support. Legislatures knew that further taxation of them was a safe political way to
increase the tax revenue. 315
Table 61 lists those cities which were reported in the Municipal Yearbook for
1972 as taxing public utility receipts but not having a general sales tax. Some
local governments that have both forms of taxation may levy higher rates on
utilities than on other sales, but d11ta are not readily available. The data in the
yearbook are limited to 391 cities of 25,000 or more that supplied information.
In more recent times, the tax treatment of the Consolidated Edison Company
of New York has received very considerable public attention. In a widely cited
article, Professor Irving Kristol has described what he termed the "mugging"
of the Consolidated Edison Company, "not by ordinary criminals, but by elected
public officials ..." 315 Kristol explains the nature of the special tax on utilities,
which is distinct from and in addition to its lo~al .property tax :
This consumer tax is not specified as such on one's electric bill-it is
simply hidden in the total. That practice, of permitting the city to tax
its citizens while making it appear that Con Ed was charging them for
service, was instituted by the company long ago, as part of its strategy
to pacify revenue-hungry politicians by quietly appeasing them. 37
u Emery Troxel, Economics oJ Public Utilities, New York, Rinehart and Co., 1947, p. 251.
Tbid., pn. 251- 252.
Irving Kristol. "The Mugging of Con Ed," The WaZZ Street JournaZ, May 17, 1974,
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Ci•t ies With Over 500,000 Population
Atlanta
Dallas
Detroit

Kansas City (Mo.)
Memphis
Milwaukee
Cities With 250,000 to 500,000 Population

Dayton
Honolulu
Miami

Minneapolis
Norfolk
Wichita
Cities With 100,000 to 250,000 Population

Cedar Rapids
Fort Lauderdale
Greensboro
Jacksonville
Little Rock
Niagara Falls

St. Petersburg
Springfield (Mo.)
Syracuse
Utica
Waco
Cities With 50,000 to 100,000 Population

Arlington (Mass.)
Davenport
Dubuque
Fargo
Fort Smith
Midland
Muncie
Newport
Oak Park
Odessa
Ogden

Ontario
Oxnard
Palo Alto
Pasadena (Tex.)
Reno
Roseville
Saginaw
St. Joseph
Salem
Sioux City
South Gate (Calif.)
Cities With 25,000 to 50,000 Population

Anniston
Minnetonka
Beloit
Missoula
Bismarck
New London
Burlington
North Miami
Clearwater
Norwood
Coral Gables
Nutley
DeKalb
Owensboro
Florence
Pocatello
Grand Forks
Rocky Mount (N.C.)
Grand Island
Rome
Greenville
St. Cloud
Kirkwood
Shawnee
Lakeland
Southfield
Marietta
West Orange
Midwest City (Okla.)
Wilson (N.C.)
Source: Municipal Yearbook, 1972, pages 285-290.
That strategy clearly has not worked, according to Professor Kristol. The
high. electricity bills have resulted in the company becoming unpopular with the
public and hence a ready target for attack by political candidates and others.
In a relatively freewheeling interview on the occasion of his retirement as chairman of the New York State Public Service Commission Joseph C. Swidler
voiced similar sentiments. He placed much of the blame fo~ the problems of the
ConsolidatE>d Edison Company on a series of indifferent or even hostile city
administrations-"it's been good politics to kick Con Ed around." 38 Swidler
88

David Bird, "Con Ed Troubles Are Laid To City," The New York Times, June 2, 1974.
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also stated that over 20 cents of every revenue dollar received by the utility is
paid to the city and that the city relies on Con Ed for $1 out of every $12 it
collects in all taxes.
The extent to which many local governments have come to depend on the
capital-inteusive electric utility industry for property tax reYenues is a closelyrelated aspect of the problem. For example, when the New Yorl\: State legislature began to consider easing the capital burdens of Consolidated Edison by
taking over some of its facilities, New York City officials pointed out. that the
city stood to lose about $45 million a year in real estate ~ax receipts. The
company pays a total of $227 million in annual taxes to the City.
In a letter to the Governor of New York, the city Controller made an interesting point (which indirectly underscored the contribution of investor-owned utilities to the local community) :
Since the city depends upon the real estate tax for 26 percent of
total J:evenues it is vital at this stage to establish the principle that
our tax base ~nd ability to finance future expense budgets will not be
eroded by state take-over of utility holdings of any kind or location.39
The problem described here may have become most evident in New York City,
but it hardly is limited to a single utility. It is not unusual for. local political
leaders to oppose utility rate rises and simultaneously urge heavier reliance on
special utility taxes as a means of avoiding an unpopular general property tax
• •
increase. ' 0
The heavy tax burden borne by investor-owned electric utility systems contrasts sharply with the tax exemption afforded to the government-operated or
government-financed power systems. Table 62 shows that the subsidy to these
other electric utilities (in terms of taxes rhus not paid) was estimated at $911
million in 1970 and at over $11 billion for the 15 year period 1956-1970.n
Although such computations are by their very nature based on a series of asSUIJ?·Ptions and estimates, the numbers used here are the lower of two separate senes
developed by the Edison Electric Institute.~~ .
.
Although the precise measurE'ments may differ, corro.b?~atwn of the su~
stantialLv larger tax burden borne by investor-owned utilities than by public
power units can be founil in a number of other studies.
The Conference Board has estimated that, in 1968, the taxes foregone by
government-owned electric utilities-that is the taxes .th.at they would hav~ ~ad
to pay if they were privately owned-came to $342 milhoJ?-. Another $42 _II~I~lio~
of taxes were similarly foregone on the part of cooperatively-owned utilities.
TABLE 62.-ESTIMATED TAXES UNPAID, GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT-FINANCED POWER AGENCIES
[In thousands of dollars)
Estimated federal tax
deficiency

Estimated total tax
deficiency

1956-70

1970 onl)'

1956-70

1970 only

1956-70

$59,740 $1,008, 128
170, 373 2, 842,929
887,793
55,977
286,090 4, 738,850

$89, 860
224, 002
72,553
386,417

$837.487
2, 047. 439
675.708
3, 5&0, 634

$149, 602
394, 375
128. 530
672, 507

$1, 845, 615
4, 890, 368
1, 563, 501
8, 299,484

1, 603, 185

133, 807

1, 150, 532

238,726

2, 753,717

1970 only
Federal power agencies. _______ ____ __
Municipals _____ -- - _______ - ---- --- -State, district and county _________ ___ _
Total Government. ______________ ___ _
REA-financed rural electric cooperatives ___________ ______________ ____

Estimated other tax
deficiency

104,919

Total Government-owned and
Government-financed power
syl~efQs~nly ____ _____ ___ ____
391, 009 ___ ______ ___
520, 224 _________ --911, 233 -----------1956through 1970(15 yr) _______________ 6, 342,035 ------------ 4, 711,166 --- --- -- -- - - 11,053,201
Source: Edison Electric Institute, Government Power, 1974, p. 107.

ae "City Seeks State Payment for a Consolidated Edison Take-Over," The New York

Times, MAy 2. 1974 p. 24.

40 "League Mav Fi~rht UttUtieR." St. Louis Post-Disnntch, March 17. 1974. p. 10C.
u For detailed computation of these figures, see Edison Electric Institute, Government
105
Power, 1974. nn. 107- 118.
._.
4ll For an alternative set of estimates :vieldinl! highe~ results. Ree Ibt""., pp. 100 .
•a Bernarrl A. Ge1b. Ta:r-E!I'empt Business Enternnse-Its Ea:tent ,!md Impact on Taa:
Reven11es, NPW York. Conference Board. 1!l71. n. 61. The "preferred estimates are used
here. For substantially higher estimates, see Ibid., p. 67.

National Economic Research Associates has estimated that government-owned
and/or financed electric utilities received subsidies in excess of $1.6 billion
in 1967. Of this amount, the federal government provided $1.2 billion or 76 percent, with the remainder provided by state and local governments. '.fhe research
organization estimated that the annual subsidy will exceed $4.2 billion by 1980."
One major type of subsidy that these government-assisted utilities receive is
in obtaining capital at a co8t lower than that available to investor-owned enterprises. Federal projects other than the Tennessee Valley Authority obtain capital
,directly from the U.S. Treasury. 'l'hey benefit from the fact that the government's
cost of borrowing is less than the cost to private enterprise.
Similarly, cooperatives assisted by the Rural Electrification Administration
have until recently obtained their capital directly from the federal government
and the bulk of it at a highly subsidized rate set by statute-2 percent. TVA's
position as an agency of the federal government enables it to borrow at the
government "agency" rate, rather than at thP. higher private rate. It also need
not raise high-cost equity capital. Municipally-owned utilities are able to raise
capital at low rates because no federal income tax is imposed on municipal
bond interest.
The second major source of subsidy to the government-assisted utilities is
their freedom from direct taxation. They normally pay no federal or state
corporate income taxes and no property taxes, although s0me modest payments
in lieu of local property taxes are made. No suggestion is made here to extend
similar subsidies to privately-owned utilities. Rather existing preferences might
be reduced.
OTHER PUBLIC POLICY PROPOSALS

A final category of proposals which have been advocated to assist financing
electric utilities consists of those changes in public policy which are not limited
to a single industry, but would help to reduce the rate of inflation and otherwise increase the availability of funds for saving· and investment.
Clearly, more effective use of monetary, fiscal and other macroeconomic policies
designed to deal with the general inflationary situation facing the United States
would help the electric utility indlll)try. However, there is such ample reason to
support these efforts independent of their effects on a single industry that it
would not seem to be fruitful to further develop that theme in this report.
Reducing Government Credit Subsidies

On the other ,hand, there is one aspect of general economic policy which, on the
basis of this study as well as other considerations, would seem to be worthy of
much greater public attention-the need to promote an overall economic climate
which will yield a larger flow of private saving to finance the rapidly increasing
investment requirements facing the nation. As the analysis of the proposed
federal credit guarantees brought out, attempts to provide the electric utilities
with a larger slice of an inadequate "pie" of investment funds will be selfdefeating.
Even if they legally caa be accompanied, such specialized credit subsidies result in rising interest costs as the favored borrower-with government assistance-forces some other borrower out of the credit markets. Moreover, the typical pattern is for the potential borrowers so forced out to push for special credit
legislation on their behalf, which will only result in another round of interest
rate increases and governmental intervention. Clearly, the game of musical
chairs, particularly when played for such high stakes is not in the overall public
interest.
To advocate providing adequate funds for electric utilities and ignoring the
consequences for other industries does not constitute appropirate public policy.
Rather what is needed are various actions to increase the size of the savings
pie, the capital pool available for private investment. There are useful things
that government can do or do differently.
First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that not only are government deficits
inflationary hut. aJ~o. l1eNlllHf' financing thosE' budl!et deficits draws on the private savings pool, they reduce the amount of iin-estment funds available to the
privflte Pconomy. Conversely, federal surpluses permit a reduction in outstanding
fpderal deht and lwnce E'nhance the private ~aving pool. A r£-cent study by the
Brookings Institute estimates that a ft>deral budget surplus on the order
4' NAtional Economic ReRenrch Associates. Inc .. Subsidy Received by Governmettt-Owned
and/or Financed Electrir Utilities, New York, June 1970, pp. 3-4.
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of $10 billion (on a full employment basis) wlil be required in 1980 to balance investment and saving without higher levels of real interest rates. 46
Reducing the 'l'a:D Burden on Saving

The second thing that government can do is to give greater weight to the
incentive to save in the composition of the tax structure and of government
spending programs. Thus, in raising a given dollar volume of revenues, more
of the taxes levied can come out of funds that otherwise would be available for
consumption rather than savings. One basic approach has •been suggt!sted by John
R. Bunting, Chairman of the First Pennsylvania Bank in Philadelphia, who
has urged the following:
What we have to do . . . is to continue to transfer resources, on
a relative basj.s at least, from the consumer sector to the producer
sector of our economy over the next two and a half years ...
Specifically, we need more savings by consumers ... ·Savings is prerequisite to investment.
The major source of savings in America is the average-income earner.
He could be encouraged by making interest tax exempt on regular savings accounts and on retail certificates of deposit up to $20,000 at commercial banks, mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations."
Other suggestions along these lines include the liberalization of capital gains
taxation, possibly an exemption for the first $1,000 of caiptal gains income or
that portion of the rise in asset values which results from infiation. Other possibilities including increasing the current $100 dividend exclusion on the federal individual income tax.'7
A more fundamental tax change would be to substitute an expenditure or value
added tax for all or a part of the present income taxes. Such new forms of
taxes would by definition exempt savings and investment and base the revenue
burden on the consumption rather than the production of output. As has been
amply demonstrated in the public finance literature, an expenditure tax could
be made as progressive as an income tax. 46 'l'hat would be more difficult in the
case of a value-added tax, but provisions can be enacted which reduce or even
eliminate its regressivity."
Reduce FederaZ Discouragements to Saving

As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, many government spending programs,
although they may help further other objectives, reduce the incentive to savings.
This is particularly true of the many income-maintenance transfer payments,
which also turn out to be the largest and most rapidly growing portion of the
entire federal budget. The substantial increases in social security taxes also
have reduced the amount of disposable income available for savin.e:.
FederaZ Programs and Inflation

A related possibility is the modification of the various federal programs which,
even though often unwittingly, give an infiationary bias to the economy. One
of the most comprehensive catalogues of such proposals was developed by Dr.
Maurice Mann, former Assistant Director of the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget and now president of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco.150 Although a detailed examination of Pach of these proposals is beyond
the scope of this study, the overall category warrants some attention. Dr.
Mann's catalogue follows :
1. The Davis-Bacon Act. As pointed out earlier, this law requires the Federal
Government (and federally-assisted programs) to pay higher wage scales on
construction projects than is generally warranted by ha~ic su:nply and demand
conditions in labor markets. In effect, wage scales established in this way set
a fioor for ?ther wages in the relevant market area.
Bleckman. op. cit., pp. 267- 268.
"John R. Bunting, Tight Money Is Not Enough," The New York Times, June 27, 1974,

45

p. 3- 1. 3-6.

47 "Tax reform for capitalists," Business Week, June 1, 1974, p. 36.
"See Advisory Commission on Inter~overnmental Relations, The Expenditure Ta::e,
Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974.
• For a balanced discusRion of the pros and cons of the VAT, see Charles E. McLure and
Norman B. Ture, Value Added Tax: Two Views, Washington, American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1972.
&o Maurice Mann, "Public Policies: Promises, Problems and Innovations." in Michael E.
Levy, editor, Oontrr,in.ing Inflation in the Environment ot the 1910's, New York, Conference
Board, 1971, pp. 32-33.

2. The Robinson-Patman Act. Although originally designed to reduce the buying advantages of chain stores and other mass distributors, it has been interpreted in such a way as to inhibit price cutting in many markets.
S. The Jones A.ct. This statute requires that all ships used in domestic transportation or fishing be constructed in U.S. yards. It is effectively a zero quota
on foreign-made ships and has led, among other things, to the export of lumber
from Alaska to Japan, while the "lower 48" States import lumber from Canada.
4. Import quotas. A quota system works to isolate the U.S. market from the
world market. As demand increases a quota system increases the gains (prices)
going to domestic producers. In contrast, under an appropriate tariff system,
an increase in demand tends to stimulate imports and thus restrain increases
in prices.
5. The "Buy American" policy. This practice, which is followed by the Federal Government and many states and localities, prescribes that American goods
will be chosen ahead of foreign-made goods by ~ government or quasi-government body, providing that U.S. goods are not priced more than a certain percentage above foreign-made goods. "Buy American" thus reduces the benefits
of competition by ensuring U.S. producers a certain percentage markup over
foreign costs.
6. Re&aZe Price Maintenance Laws. These enable the seller of a product identified by a brand-name or trademark to set a minimum price below which the
buyer may not go in making a subsequent sale. The purpose obviously is to prevent retailers from competing in the prices charged for branded goods. The
resale price maintenance arrangements are exempted from Federal anti-trust
attack by the Miller-Tydings Act and the :McGuire Act.
1. The question of union monopolies. When businessmen combine and agree to
control the supply of goods and services in order to increase prices, the action
is condemned as a conspiracy in restraint of trade as it should be. Dr. Mann
states that when workers combine and agree to control the supply of labor in
order to increase wages, a different rule seems to apply. More aggressive efforts
to open union membership would be helpful. Aggressive and innovative steps
to improve the functioning of our labor markets are also urged by Dr. Mann.
8. Competitive re.<?trictions on banking and financial institutions. Restrictions
have been imposed on the amount of interest payable on deposits, on the maximum rate of interest that can can be charged, on the composition of portfolios, on
entry, and on branching. The net effect of these rules and regulations is to reduce competition. and to make our financial institutions and financial markets
less efficient than they otherwise might be.
9. Government programs that tend to raise prices or introduce rigidities in
certain markets. These programs are typified by agricultural commodity price

supports and by the stockpiling of a wide range of commodities deemed "essential for national security purposes."
APPENDIX TABLE A.-VARIATIONS IN REGULATORY LAG IN ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE INCREASES, 1971-73
(TIME FROM FILING OF APPLICATION TO FINAL ORDER FROM COMMISSION)
[Percent distribution)

Date of final order

0 to 6 6 to 12 12 to 18 18 to 24 24 to 30 Over 30
mo

mo

mo

mo

mo

mo

Comapnies which
received interim increases
prior to final
order
Total Number Percent

Jan. 1 to Mar. 31, 197L___ ___ ___ ___ _
1
15
40
10
4 -------------------·---Apr. 1 to June 30, 197L_______ ___ ___
5
11
1
9
6 ------ - ---- --------------------July 1 to Sept. 30, 197L________ ___ __
2
2
1 ------- - ---------------5 --- --- ---------Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1971________ ______ _
5
23
6
26
9
8
1
---------------Jan. 1 to Mar. 31, 1972__________ _____
7
25
6
24
13
2
2 - - -- ---1
Apr. 1 to June 30, 1972________ _______
3
17
4
24
12
2 ------------ -----------July 1 to Sept. 30, 1972___________ ____
4
18
6
33
6
7
1 --- --- - ---·- -- -·
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1972______________ _
12
23
2
9
10
1
------------------Jan. 1 to Mar. 31,1973______ _________
6
21
5
24
9
1
4
1 ----- -- Apr. 1 to June 30, 1973______ _____ __ __
7
18
3
17
7
1
2
1 - ---- - - July 1 to Sept. 30, 1973______ ______ ___
5
17
7
41
5
7 ----- ------------ ---- -· Oct.l to Dec. 31, 1973____________ ___
3
18
5
28
10
1
2
2 -------Total. _______________ _____ ___ --60_ _ _9_9_ _3_5_ _1_2_ _ _4_ _ _ _ _2_11_ _ _
51_ _ _2_4
Percent distribution _______ ___ ·--- ___ ==
28=. =
4 ==4=
6.=9==1=6=
. 6= = 5=. =
7 ==
1.=9= = 0=
. 5==10=0==.0= . =__=_=__=_=__=_==
__:;;:_=__=_
Source: Edison Electric Institute, Electric Rate Case Decision Data Surveys.
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APPENDIX TABLE B.-NEW CAPITAL AS PERCENT CF PERSONAL SAVING ON BOTH NATIONAL
INCOME ACCOUNT AND FLOW Of FUNDS ACCOUNT BASES

Year
1947--------------------------------1948 _______ ------------------------ -1949 ____ -- -·-- ----------------------1950 ••• -----------------------------195L ••••• __ •••••••••••••• ------ -••••
1952.-------------------------------1953 ------------------------------- 195-1 .•. • - ---------------------------1955•••• - ---------------------------1956 •••• - --------------------------- 1957--------------------------------1958.----------------------- •. ------1959 .••• ----------------------------1960 ·--- -- --------------------------1961 . ••• - - --------------------------1962 . ••• - --------------------.------.
1963. •• --- -----------------.--------1964 .•• --------------------- •• ------1965 ____ _- --- ..... -.-.- ... --------.-.
1966..••• - -----------.-.-.-.------ •• -1967 -------------------------------- 1968 . •.• ---- ----------------.--- -·--.
1969 •••• - ------------.- .... -- •• -.-.-.
1970. ••• -- --------------- --·--.--- --197L •••••• --.--- ••• ------.------ --·1972••.• -------------------------.-- -

Investorowned
electric
utilities
new capital
(millions)

National
income basis
(billions)

Percent

Flow of
funds basis
(billions)

Percent

$611
1, 338
1,393
1,246
1,495
1, 731
2,348
1, 694
1,364
1, 452
2,473
2,277
1,928
1, 798
1, 578
1,448
1,144
1, 526
1, 446
2, 718
3,236
3, 777
4,844
7,886
8,899
8,667

$7.3
13.4
9.4
13.1
17.3
18.2
18.3
16.4
15.8
20.6
20.7
22.3
19.1
17.0
21.2
21.6
19.9
26.2
28.4
32.5
40.4
39.8
38.2
54.8
60.9
54.8

8.4
10.0
14.8
9.5
8.6
9.5
12.8
10.3
8.6
7.1
11.9
10.2
10.1
10.6
7.4
6. 7
5. 7
5.8
5.1
8.4
8.0
9.5
12. i
14.4
14.6
15.8

$11.5
14.4
10.0
14.8
22.2
21.1
22.0
21.0
22.0
27.0
26.4
29.7
24.7
20.8
26.3
25.2
27.0
31.2
33.3
40.7
42.5
41.2
34.3
63.1
56.2
NA

5.3
9.3
13.9
8.4
6. 7
8.2
10.7
8.1
6.2
5.4
9.-l
7. 7
7.8
8.6
6.0
5. 7
4.2
4.9
4.3
6. 7
7. 6
9.2
14.1
12.5
15.8
NA

Personal savings

Source: EEl Statistical Year Books; Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
APPENDIX TABLE C.-COMMON EQUITY AS PERCENT OF CAPITALIZATION (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETTLED
DURING PERIOD)

Time period
Jan. 11971 to Mar. 31, 1972.. _________ _
Apr. 1 to June 30, 1972•• ---·-···--··-July 1 to Sept. 30, 1972••••••••••••••• •
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1972.................
Jan. 1 to Mar. 31, 1973.. ...............
Apr. 1 to June 30, 1973 •••••.•.•..•.. • •
July 1 to Sept. 30, 1973................
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1973.. ...............
Total. __ •• _________ ••••••• __ • ••

less than
25

25 to 30

30 to 35

35 to 40

40 to 45

45 and
over

Total

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

1
2
1
1
0
1
2
0

47
16
6
16
14
6

27
3
6
4
10
7

9
5

8

4
0
4
0
0
0
0
2

5
0
1
6
0
2
2
2

84
21
18
27
24
14
19
18

8

119

71

10

18

225

6

Source: Edison Electric Institute, Electric Rate Case Decision Data Surveys.

APPENDIX TABLE D.-OITATIONS FOR LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON
MARKET FOR COMPANY SECURITIES
Article 6, Section 235(13) (d), McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York.
Article 6, Section 235(26) (a), McKinney's Consolid:ated Laws of New York.
Section 1366 (a) , California Financial Code.
Section 3&-96 ( 5), General Statutes of Connecticut, as amended.
Section 682.23(9), Code of Iowa, 1971, as amended.
Section 46(B), General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 168.
Section 50.14, Subdivision 11, Minnesota Statutes, 1971, as amended.
Section 387 :8(1), New Hampshire Revised Status Annotated, 1955, as
amended.
Section 35-309, Tennessee Code, Annotated, as amended.
Seotion 32.20.170, Revised Code of Washington, as amended.
Title 11, Section 1109.10 and Title 21, Section 2109.37(P), Ohio Revised Code.
Chapter 9, Section 626, Maine Revised Statutes, as amended 1969.
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